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DUE PROCESS AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
I. INTRODUCTION

School discipline ' and procedures for imposing sanctions against
erring students are easily shrugged off as peripheral or even frivolous
concerns. What counts is the education provided by schools, for education is the great equalizer in the United States, the port of entry to
wealth, status, and the good life. Education is the foundation of
democracy, the sine qua non for a literate and enlightened electorate.
Educational inequalities associated with race and poverty do exist, to
be sure, but they are to be regretted and overcome. With sufficient
dedication equal educational opportunity can be made a reality. Any
problems related to the procedures for regulating student conduct pale
by comparison.
And yet . . . it might all be stated differently.

The educational

inequalities of race' and poverty 3 remain truly massive. And the
Coleman Report,4 which so depressingly chronicled our intuitive
suspicions concerning the gaps separating the educational achievement
of different ethnic and socioeconomic groups, has strongly suggested
that very little of the education which is susceptible to measurement
can be attributed to what school provides.' This and other sources
have prompted searching questions about the meaning of educational
opportunity.6 Even sharper questions point up a still darker side of
lThroughout this Article the term "discipline" is used in a simple and general
sense to refer to action taken by the school authorities (the "school") against a
student because his conduct, as distinct from his academic performance, has failed to
conform to some school standard. "Discipline," "sanction," and "punishment" will
be used interchangeably and without any suggestion of different nuances.
2
See U.S. CoMm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 4-9 (1969). "[T]here are many places still in this country where the

schools are either 'white' or 'Negro' and not just schools for all children as the
Constitution requires." Alexander v. Holmes Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218, 1222
(Black, Circuit Justice, 1969).
3
See, e.g., Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable
Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305 (1969);
authorities cited in id. 307 n.2; Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 7 (1969).
4
OFFICE, OF EDuc., U.S. D'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNIY (1966) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN REPORT].
6

See id. 302-19.

0

See 1 U.S. Coamm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBUC
SCHOOLS (1967) ; Equal Educational Opportunity, 38 HARV. EDuc. RZEv. 3-175 (Special

Issue, Winter 1968); cf. Cohen, Defining Racial Equality in Education, 16 U.C.L.A.L.
R v. 255 (1969) ; Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in
Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a
State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 787 (1968); Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal-The
Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1147 (1966) ; Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 583 (1968).
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the school's afflictions: Are schools repressive? Do they stress getting
into college too much and realizing one's individual potential too little?
Do they reward conformity and suffocate creativity? Do they teach
children that life is stultifying and arbitrary, and that one must accommodate himself to these hard "facts of life"? The affirmative answers
frequently given to these and similar questions portray school as too
7
often a positively harmful force in the lives of children.

The variety and frequency of the criticisms of public schools do
not demonstrate that school should be let out for good or that the effort
to equalize educational opportunity should be abandoned. Such persistent criticism does indicate, however, that generally accepted assumptions underlying our nearly monolithic compulsory school system 8

should be reassessed more thoroughly than has thus far occurred.'

But

the problems of educational quality and equality are gargantuan and

will not be solved tomorrow.
Meanwhile, the student attends school under the command of the
law and, as a result, suffers a considerable diminution of the freedom
he would enjoy if left to his own and his parents' regulation. For
millions of students spending large portions of their lives under the

power of public school authorities, the fairness of discipline procedures
has a daily impact. The school's control over its student is even more
complete because the high school diploma is infused with enormous
7

See, e.g., G. DENNISON, THE LrVES OF CHILDREN (1969); E. FRIENBERG,
(1965); P. GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION
(1964); J. HOLT, THE UNDERACHIEVING SCHOOL (1969); H. KOHL, 36 CHILDREN
(1967); J. KOZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE (1967); G. LEONARD, EDUCATION AND
ECSTASY (1968); C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1970); Cunningham,
Hey, Man, You Our Principal, 51 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 123 (1969); Illich, Commencement at the University of Puerto Rico, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Oct. 9, 1969, at
12; Schrag, Gloom at the Top, SAT. REv., Aug. 16, 1969, at 50; Taylor, Book Review,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1970, § 7, at 6. A number of works detailing the students'
criticisms have recently appeared. How OLD WILL You BE IN 1984? (D. Divoky
ed. 1969); OUR TIME Is Now-NoTEs FROM THE HIGH SCHOOL UNDERGROUND
(J. Birmingham ed. 1970); THE HIGH SCHOOL REVOLUTIONARIES (M. Libarle &
T. Flesion ed. 1970).
COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA

S Some variety is provided by the constitutionally protected option to attend
private school. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Approximately
6,489,000 children, or 13% of the school-attending population, availed themselves of
this alternative in the 1967-68 school year. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL. ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 103

(1969).

Requirements

of money and/or religious affiliation make private school a viable option for
small minority of children. Cf. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 312-13
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Of course, compulsory education laws also assist
schools in obtaining their clientele. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 323
(Jackson, J., dissenting).

only a
(1963)
private
(1952)

SFor various reasons many of the critics of public school education have urged
or implied that compulsory attendance requirements should be qualified or eliminated.
See G. DENNISON, vupra note 7, at 88; J. HOLT, supra note 7, at 28; G. LEONARD,
supra note 7, at 102; Illich, Education Without School: How It Can Be Done,
15 N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Jan. 7, 1971, at 25. See also Cunningham, supra note 7,
at 128.
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power as a pass card to decent jobs and college. In short, school
discipline imposes potentially pervasive restrictions on the student's
school-related life, and may impair his future life chances by excluding
him from school.
School discipline procedures may also be vitally important insofar
as they project an image of a fair society to school children. In
contrast to the many negative faces society shows its younger members,
fair procedures in disciplinary proceedings represent a virtue with immediate impact--on students in trouble and on those who merely
watch. To insist upon fair treatment before passing judgment against
a student accused of wrongdoing is to demonstrate that society has
high principles and the conviction to honor them. Speaking of procedural due process, Justice Frankfurter once said:
The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect
for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice
fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by a secret, onesided determination of facts decisive of rights.'
A public school student will tend to learn that "democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men," or that it does not, depending
on whether his "government"-the school-treats him and his classmates fairly or unfairly.
Procedural regularity in administering school discipline is particularly critical today. Student activism has spilled over from colleges
to high schools and even junior high schools." Crime and violence,
often associated with racial tension, are becoming problems of frightening proportions in many school systems. 2 These phenomena are likely
to be accompanied by an increase in the number of discipline cases and,
inevitably, by pressure for "toughness." 11 Popular impatience with
'Ojoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
"1 "Sixty percent of all the high schools of America have experienced some kind
of student protest within the past year, according to reports from over 1,000 principals
queried at random by the National Association of Secondary School Principals."
Pileggi, Revolutionaries Who Have To Be Home by 7:30, 50 PHaI DELTA KAPPAN
561 (1969).
12 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 4 (racially based); TIME, Nov. 14,
1969, at 49; U.S. NEws & WoRaL REP., May 20, 1968, at 36-38. Independent preliminary studies by Senator Thomas S. Dodd and by the U.S. Office of Education
have resulted in reports of staggering conditions: millions of dollars being spent to
insure security in schools; teachers carrying guns; dramatic increases in such
statistics as student assaults on teachers, student assaults on students, and expulsion
of "incorrigible" students. See NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Jan. 28, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
13 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (Gallup poll reveals 49%
believe school discipline is too lax). An attitude of concern about "law and order"
in the public schools has already found its way into judicial statements. For instance,
"groups of students all over the land are already running loose, conducting break-ins,
sit-is, Dist.,
lie-is,393and
Tinker
v. Des Moies Independent Community
School
U.S.smash-ins.
503, 525 " (1969)
(Black,
., dissentng); see Madera v. Board
of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
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the activities of students increases the possibility of unfair treatment
and heightens the importance of providing an accused student with
procedural safeguards designed to secure a fair determination that misconduct has occurred and that a particular disciplinary sanction is
appropriate.
Important as they are, however, fair procedures do not insure
wise policies or just results. The substance of in-school rules is often
more critical to a student than the procedures governing their enforcement. No procedure will protect a child from tyranny if regulations
govern his religion, his speech, his thought, or his style of hair and
dress. Yet when rules of conduct violate the Federal Constitution or
a state constitution, statute, or regulation, appropriate procedures are
essential to reveal these substantive infirmities. And although rules
may offend or humiliate the child without being illegal, fair procedures
will tend to force the rules and the reasons for punishment into the
open, subjecting the wisdom of the rules to the scrutiny of all.
Until recently, the overwhelming thrust of the law dealing with
school discipline left the discretion of the school authorities virtually
uncontrolled by the limitations of procedural due process. 4 It is now
hard to avoid concluding that this virtual absence of procedural protection was always wrong in principle and no longer rests on viable
legal authority. The student has a high order interest in obtaining an
education and in avoiding any loss of freedom beyond that essential for
implementation of compulsory education laws. Any substantial impairment of this interest by reason of sanctions for misconduct should result
only after the utilization of procedures satisfying the requirements of
due process of law. But the specific content of these requirements
varies widely with circumstances, including the effect upon the
potentially competing school interests. Accordingly, in this Article I
will devote primary attention to the relevant constitutional standards
for school discipline, examining at length four "rights" closely identified
with procedural fairness-impartial tribunal, counsel, cross-examination, and record for review. First, however, it is necessary to consider
the current trends in judicial treatment of cases involving youth, the
attitude of the courts toward school discipline, and the interests involved in the identified disciplinary proceedings. In Part III these
general considerations will be brought to bear upon the problem of
determining whether a student should be entitled to the identified
procedural rights in a disciplinary proceeding entailing the possibility
of serious punishment.
14See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903, 908-09, 916-20 (1958); N. EDWARDS,
COURTS AND THE PtBLIC SCHOOLS ch. 14 (rev. ed. 1955); L. PETasoON, R.
MILLER & M. VoLz, THE LAw AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATIOx ch. 13 (1968)
inafter cited as PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION].

THE
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II. GENERAL

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE AVAILABILITY OF
DUE PROCESS PROTECTION IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CASES

Although the Supreme Court and most other courts have yet to

require adherence to due process standards in school discipline proceedings, the general basis for applying these standards is easily outlined.
A logical beginning point is the language of the fourteenth amendment:
"No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . ." It is well established that action

by a school district is "state action." "' And "liberty" has been
construed to encompass a student's interest in obtaining an education. 6 Certainly excluding the student from school would entail at
least a temporary impairment of that interest. Alternatively, unless
the effect of any particular disciplinary sanction is considered de
minimis, confining a child in school and then subjecting him to further
physical restraint seems to present a straightforward case of liberty
deprivation. Thus, inquiry must focus on whether the disciplinary
infringement involved in any particular case has been imposed without
due process of law.
Consistent with the meaning given to it in many different settings,
procedural due process in school discipline must be tested by the
extent to which the procedures available to the student conform with
fundamental fairness.
According to language recently repeated by
the Supreme Court in Jenkins v. McKeithen,'8
"[d]ue process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries
are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific
factual contexts. .

.

.

Whether the Constitution requires

that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged
right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible
burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must
be taken into account.
The elements of the standard suggested by the Court are not claimed
to be the only relevant considerations. 9 The essence of all such verbal
15

See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
16 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
17 See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath 341 U.S. 123, 161-74 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D.

Fla. 1963); Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different View,
54 A.A.U.P. BUL.. 143 (1968); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State
University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 368 (1963); Wright, The Constitution on
the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1060, 1082 (1969).
18395 U.S. 411, 426 (1969) (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442
(1960)).
19 The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alter-
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attempts to characterize procedural due process is open-endedness. In
short, giving content to the due process clause requires a sensitive
balancing of competing interests, and much depends upon individual
judgments of the weight to be assigned to the various interests. In
the words of Justice Frankfurter: "Due process is not a mechanical
instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate
process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment
by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the
process." 20 School authorities should not be too niggardly in determining what fundamental fairness requires; nor should courts be too
deferential in satisfying themselves through hindsight that fundamental
fairness was provided. Hopefully, enlightened administrators will
realize that the due process clause sets only minimal, not ideal, standards
of fairness.

A. Present Framework: Due Processfor Youth
Prior to 1961 the student's rights played a negligible role in school
and college discipline cases.2' In that year the Fifth Circuit decided
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,' prohibiting a state college from expelling students without providing any of the procedural
safeguards required by due process. The expelled students, who sought
injunctive relief, had participated in a sit-in demonstration at a local
restaurant and a large demonstration at the county court house. At the
suggestion of the state governor, they were summarily expelled.' After
rejecting as irrelevant the argument that the students had no constitutional right to attend the state college, noting the potential for arbitrariness, and establishing the absence of any interest to justify failing
to afford fundamental fairness, the court held that "due process requires
notice and some opportunity for hearing before a student at a taxsupported college is expelled for misconduct." 24 Writing for the court,
natives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the
office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt
complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations
that must enter into the judicial judgment.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
2

0Id.
21 See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1956) ; 47 Am. JuR. Schools §§ 173-88 (1943);
79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts §§ 493-505 -(1952) ; N. EnwARns, slipra note

14, ch. 22; PUBLIC ScHOOL OPERATION ch. 13.
22294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
An excellent
bibliography of the literature spawned by the Dixon case, most of it dealing with the
rights of college students, may be found in Van Alstyne, A Suggested Seminar in

Student Rights, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 547 (1969).
2 294 F.2d at 154.
24Id. at 158.
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Judge Rives quoted Professor Seavey's famous statement that: "It is
. . . shocking to find that a court supports [educational officials] in
denying to a student the protection given a pickpocket." ' As Professor Wright has said: "The opinion . . . had the force of an idea

whose time had come and it has swept the field." 26
Although Dixon has not yet "swept the field" below the college
level,"7 the case will inevitably lead to profound changes in the law of
public school discipline. The speed with which and the extent to which
Dixon will eventually alter public school discipline law will be affected
by several significant differences and similarities between the college
and public school situations. First, the college cases have been influenced by the value of a college education.2" Below the college level,
however, education is even more indispensable to the student's welfare.2 9
Second, high school education is compulsory whereas college education
is optional, a distinction often remarked upon by the courts.3
This
difference alone dramatically alters the context of public school discipline, for two of the pre-Dixon justifications for constitutional immunity at the college level-privilege and contractual consent a-have no
applicability to students attending school under compulsion of law.
Third, the daily pattern of life in public schools contrasts sharply to
that of college life."2 The college student controls a greater portion of
his time, enjoying freedom commensurate with his age. The public
school student chafes under greater confinement and restrictions.
Fourth, unlike his college counterpart, the public school student lives
at home and generally receives more parental protection and super25 Id. (quoting Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. Rxv.
1406, 1407 (1957)).
26 See Wright, supra note 17, at 1032.
2
7The Dixon decision has been followed with respect to public school as well as
college discipline cases. See Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); cf.
Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 788 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94,
281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
28
See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988-90
(W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
2
See text accompanying notes 139-143 infra.
30
See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1943);
General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D.
133, 141 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en banc); cf. Board of Educ. v. Purse, 101 Ga. 422,
433-35, 28 S.E.896 900-01 (1897). See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150, 156-57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
31 See Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 370; Note, Private Government on the
Campus-JudicialReview of University Expulsions, 72 YA.E L.J. 1363, 1369 (1963).
See genwrally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 H1Av. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
32 See Banks v. Board of Public Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 292 (S.D. Fla.
1970), vacated sub nom. Board of Public Instruction v. Richardson, 39 U.S.L.W.
3420 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1971) (No. 888).
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vision. The parent bears more responsibility for the child than for the
young adult,33 and the public school student is usually thought of as a
"child." Finally, public school students are more numerous and encompass a greater span of ages and development than college students.
Consequently, maintaining a disciplinary system involves a greater
commitment of resources at the public school than the college level,
and the courts are more likely to be cautious about intervening in public
school discipline. 4
These differences argue variously for public school procedures
which are either more or less complete than those required at the
college level-or just different. On balance, however, they suggest an
even more compelling case for procedural due process at the public
school level. In short, these differences support rather than contravene
the view that Dixon is a landmark for public school students no less
than for college students.
This conclusion is strongly reinforced by Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,5 in which the Supreme Court
held that school authorities were prohibited by the first and fourteenth
amendments from suspending students who wore black armbands to
protest the Vietnam war. The Court noted: "It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate." " The school
claimed that students wearing armbands disrupted the educational
process, and the district court found its claim sufficient. The Supreme
Court looked for proof of disruption and found it wanting:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression..
[W]here there is no finding and no showing that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition cannot
be sustained."
Of course, the facts of the Tinker case were loaded. A first amendment right was involved. The armband, nearly "pure" symbolic speech,
3

S

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 316 (1965); cf. Board of Educ. v.

Hansen, 56 N.J. Super. 567, 153 A2d 393 (1959) ($344,000 judgment against parent

for child's negligent act setting fire to school building).
34See Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154, 1156-57 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); cf. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150, 160 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
35393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36 Id. at 506.
87 Id. at 508-09.
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was also political speech, arguably entitled to special protection.38
Furthermore, the circumstances amply indicated that the anti-Vietnam
war message of the armband had been singled out for suppression3 9
Also, as Justice Fortas' majority opinion specifically noted, the case
involved neither disruptive conduct nor hair or dress regulations0 In
view of Justice Black's intemperate dissent ' and the public opinion it
presumably represents, for the Court to disclaim doing more than it
did is understandable. Yet the Court did not disclaim jurisdiction over
questions involving disruption or suspect regulations; it simply declared
that they were not raised by the case.'
The student's interest in freedom from hair regulation is arguably
entitled to less protection than is his interest in freedom of speech and,
assuming that the Court will apply a sliding-scale calculus of the type
used in the equal protection area, 43 perhaps more deference is owed to
the "reasonable" fears of school authorities when lower order interests
are at stake. But there is no reason to conclude that the regulation of
either dress or disruption may be enforced without minimal procedural
regularity. On the constitutional scales, fair procedure would seem
nearly as weighty as free speech. 44 Thus, as long as the student's interest may be embraced by the constitutional phrase "life, liberty, and
property," the Court's opinion seems to make clear that the student
threatened wth disciplinary sanctions may claim the protection of the
due process clause.
38See A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLncAL FRDOM pt. 1 (1960).

39 393 U.S. at 510-11.
4OId. at 507-08.
,Justice Black concluded in part:
Turned loose with lawsuits for damages and injunctions against their teachers
as they are here, it is nothing but wishful thinking to imagine that young,
immature students will not soon believe it is their right to control the
schools rather than the right of the States that collect the taxes to hire the
teachers for the benefit of the pupils. This case, therefore, wholly without
constitutional reasons in my judgment, subjects all the public schools in the
country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not
their brightest, students.
Id. at 525.
42Id. at 509. Justice Fortas' special concurrence to the denial of certiorari in
Barker v. Hardway, 394 U.S. 905 (1969), slightly undercuts this statement. In
agreeing that certiorari was properly denied, Justice Fortas explained that "fain
adequate hearing was afforded them on the issue of suspension." Id. at 905. This
sentence may mean that he does not believe that students have a right to counsel in
these cases, but a more likely interpretation is that he found the procedure, including
the full hearing provided in the district court, sufficient. Any conscious judgment concerning the hearing procedures in Barker was probably heavily influenced by the
students' "violent and destructive interference with the rights of others," emphasized
in Justice Fortas' opinion. See id.
43See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. RExV. 1065,
1120-21 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
44 "Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional
system." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4
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The Tinker opinion does recognize "the comprehensive authority"
of school authorities "to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." "5
Nevertheless, the tone of the opinion is not overly deferential to the
judgments or interests of these officials. The Court stressed that education includes the entire school-related experience, not simply formal
classroom teachings. According to the Court, such nonclassroom learning experiences include "personal intercommunication among the students." " Moreover, the Court expressed deep concern that the
student's experience in school might be shaped by the school's arbitrary
power.
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well
as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They
are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to
the State.
Although Dixon has not yet received formal approval from the
Court, it did receive passing approval in Tinker. In limiting the significance of Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,4
which had held that requiring a state university student to participate
in military training did not infringe the due process clause, the
Court stated in Tinker: "The decision cannot be taken as establishing
that the State may impose and enforce any conditions that it chooses
upon attendance at public institutions of learning, however violative
they may be of fundamental constitutional guarantees." " In support
of this statement, the Court cited Dixon together with two college discipline cases " and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,4' the elementary school flag salute case. In addition, there may
be significance in the Court's rejection of Justice Harlan's dissenting
position in Tinker. Justice Harlan urged that the complaining student
should have "the burden of showing that a particular school measure
was motivated by other than legitimate school concerns" 5---a position
45393 U.S. at 507.
461d. at 512 (footnote omitted).
47Id. at 511.
48293 U.S. 245 (1934).
49393 U.S. at 506 n2.
6gDickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967),
modified, 394 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Troy State Univ. v.
Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp.
174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
51319 U.S. 624 (1943).
52393 U.S. at 526 (dissenting opinion).
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strikingly reminiscent of the open-ended discretion historically allowed
to college and school officials prior to Dixon.P
A student's claim to due process protection in school disciplinary
proceedings is further strengthened by the Court's decision in In re
Gault." The Gault case involved a juvenile proceeding against a fifteenyear-old boy for "delinuent" behavior-participating in an obscene
telephone call. The proceeding afforded the accused boy was drastically
lacking in ordinary procedural safeguards: there was no adequate advance notice or statement of the charges; the evidence was largely
hearsay; the boy was not advised of his right to remain silent; participation by counsel and cross-examination were both denied.P Following this proceeding, the boy was committed to reform school for a
maximum of six years, although an adult would have received a maximum fine of five to fifty dollars or imprisonment for not more than two
months. The Court held that, in a juvenile court proceeding, an accused youth is entitled as a constitutional minimum to counsel, to crossexamination and confrontation, and to remain silent after appropriate
warning.
Although Gault heralded a constitutional revolution in juvenile
proceedings, several considerations urge caution in analogizing to the
school discipline area. Gault, although technically not a criminal case,
is at least "quasi-criminal." The offense charged would have been a
crime if committed by an adult and carried a comparable stigma; a
"delinquency" determination meant a jail-like sentence at a detention
home2ao Consequently, the Court relied heavily on the criminal law
and the Bill of Rights. The Court's rationale in Gault may not amount
to "selective incorporation," but it came close. 7 Plainly the wholesale
adoption of various fifth and sixth amendment criminal procedures
would have been impossible in a case that did not have the appearance
of a criminal prosecution. A second limiting consideration is that the
Court was responding in Gault to widespread recognition that the juvenile system had not fulfilled its promise and needed major overhaul. 58
WSee, e.g., Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
186 F. Supp. 945, 951 (M.D. Ala. 1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
64387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5Id.at 4-10.
661d. at 23-24, 27.
57 Compare Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law,
1 FAMUy L.Q., Dec. 1967, at 1, 10-13 with Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication 5of the Juvenile Court, 1967 Sup. tr. REv. 233, 246-47.
8 Sources critical of the juvenile system are cited throughout the Court's opinion.
Much of the material is collected in PRESIDENT'S COm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION

(1967).
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No equivalent accumulation of knowledge or general condemnation
exists concerning the workings of school discipline, although criticism
has been growing.-" Finally, one dimension of school discipline appears
to be missing from the juvenile court system. The juvenile process is
solely concerned with preventing antisocial or criminal conduct and
rehabilitating juveniles who "go wrong." The schools, on the other
hand, are chartered to provide education. They have an interest not
only in preserving the educational process, but also in protecting all
those persons who are, by command of law, physically involved in it.
Furthermore, a student charged with misconduct has a relationship
connecting him with the school and its personnel prior to and independently of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Unless the
student is expelled, this relationship will continue after the proceeding
is completed. Thus, the offense causing the student to be threatened
with punishment may be seen as only a part of a complex relationship,
and this may accordingly reduce the air-clearing benefits of "having
it out."
Yet despite these limiting considerations, Gault contains some
important lessons for the school discipline context. The Court consciously chose to base its decision demanding procedural safeguards on
the serious deprivation of liberty involved, and explicitly refrained
from classifying the case as "criminal" or "civil," minimizing the
relevance of the distinction."0 This emphasis on the severity of the
deprivation suggests that the application of due process standards to
school discipline proceedings depends upon the nature of the threat to
a student's liberty and not upon the "character" of the discipline.
The Gault opinion also dismissed the arguments that the state's action
in juvenile court is taken as "parens patriae" rather than as an adversary, and that the informality made possible by the absence of
procedural safeguards is beneficial to the child's rehabilitation. The
Court concluded that the paternal role of the juvenile courts was
historically dubious and practically ineffective as a substitute for procedural safeguards, and that the claimed benefits of informality were
either nonexistent or preservable under a due process regime.61
Throughout runs the theme that the good motives and the alleged
achievements of the state's procedures are not enough when a serious
threat to individual liberty, even a child's liberty, 2 is involved.
59 See authorities cited note 7 supra.
60 See 387 U.S. at 49-50; id. at 68 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61 See id. at 16-28.
2
6 "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court.' Id. at 28.
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All three cases in the trilogy of Dixon, Tinker, and Gault involve
the application of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to
protect the liberty of young people. Taken together, the three cases
indicate that when significant deprivations of liberty may result from
school disciplinary proceedings, the courts should not be deferential in
determining the procedural safeguards required by due process.
B. The Hands-Off Approach of the Courts
To argue that the broad themes of Dixon, Tinker, and Gault have
already established a new due process regime in school discipline would
overstate the case, for such a development does not take hold immediately. The historical hands-off approach of the courts in school
discipline cases is deeply ingrained and likely to reappear in future
cases.' Therefore, before dealing in detail with due process requirements in school disciplinary proceedings, some major bases for judicial
abstention must be noted.
1. Traditional Avoidance: The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis
The antecedents of the American doctrine of in loco parentis are
found in Blackstone's Commentaries:
He may also delegate part of his parental authority, during
his life, to the tutor or school master of his child; who is
then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power
of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint
and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes
for which he is employed.'
In time this doctrine was transplanted wholesale and without question
into the compulsory education system. Some commentators have noted
that the compulsory attendance law rather than parental delegation
provided the school its unusual authority over the child, 5 and the
implications of the difference between the parent's and the teacher's
relationship to the child have occasionally been observed by the courts."0
In general, however, the doctrine continues to be applied routinely, most
frequently when raised by a teacher as a defense in a criminal or
6 A particularly interesting illustration of blending the old and the new is
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F2d 638 (4th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969) ; see note 361 infra.
641 W. BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES *453.
05 See, e.g., Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to

Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional-Analysis, 117 U. PA.

L. REv. 373, 384 & n.44 (1969) ; Sumpton, Responsibility of Principalfor Planning
and Supervision it Connection With Field Trips and Errands, in LAW AN'ID THE
ScHooL PvaciPAL 137, 138 (R. Seitz ed. 1961).
0
6 See Marlar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S.W2d 634 (1944) ; Lander v. Seaver,
32 Vt. 114 (1859).
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personal injury suit growing out of his use of corporal punishment.67
Although the effect of this change has never dissuaded courts
from applying the doctrine, the enactment of compulsory attendance
laws " drastically altered the parent-pupil-teacher relationship upon
which the doctrine was founded. As long as the relationship between
parent and tutor was consensual, the parent directly controlled by
selection the person holding disciplinary control over his child and
could terminate the appointment if he became dissatisfied with the
delegate. But when a parent sends a child to school because the law
so directs, he delegates no power. And to suggest that the parent
delegates unrestricted power, especially when he objects to the discipline imposed, is patently absurd. 9 Even ignoring the transplantation
from private education to public compulsory education, a doctrine
supporting the right to beat a child is unquestionably inconsistent with
current values.70
Furthermore, although many teachers obviously care deeply about
their students, the student-teacher relationship is significantly different
from the parental one. In the modern school setting, the teacher does
not and perhaps cannot have an individual, parent-like concern for the
child's welfare. 7 ' A close home-school community that might bring
the teacher within the ambit of family trust rarely develops. Indeed,
in some areas cataclysmic breakdowns in relations between parents and
1 ,"'[0]ne standing in loco parentis, exercising the parent's delegated authority,
may administer reasonable chastisement to a child or pupil to the same extent as the
Holmes v. State, 39 So. 569, 570 (Ala. 1905) (dictum)
parent himself . . . .'"
(quoting from another case, but not case cited) ; accord, State v. Lutz, 113 N.E.2d
757 (C.P. Ohio 1953). See generally M. NOLTE & J. LINN, SCHOOL LAW FOR
TEACHERS 206-08 (1963) ; PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION, supra note 14, at 404.
68 Massachusetts enacted the first modern compulsory attendance law in 1852.
Most states followed this example by 1900, and all did so before 1929, although
Mississippi and South Carolina repealed their compulsory attendance statutes following the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions. A. STEiNHILBER, STATE LAW ON
COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 2-3 (1966); see
EDUCATION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 100-08,

R. BuTTs & L.
357-67 (1953).

CREmiIN,

A

HISTORY OF

69

See Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) ; cf. Casey County Bd. of Educ. v.
Luster, 282 S.W2d 333 (Ky. 1955) (suspension). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 153 (1965) (in contrast to private school teacher, parent cannot limit
the public school teacher's privilege to use force on a child).
Over one hundred
70 The dangers have long been recognized by some observers.
years 'ago, a judge warned that "[s]uch a system of petty tyranny cannot be watched
too cautiously nor guarded too strictly." Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290, 292 (1853).
7

1

See

NATIONAL ASS'N OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS,

THE REASONABLE

The following view of the teacher-student
ExERCISE OF AUTHORITY 5 (1969).
relationship hardly typifies the modem situation:
Our public schools were created to make, not scholars simply, but men
and women. . . . The true teacher will know his pupils as individuals, and
will feel in each an interest which only the term parental describes.
. . He notices a girl too showily dressed, and, choosing his time,
appeals to her kindness not to make her less wealthy neighbors uncomfortable. . . . He overhears the coarse expressions of a good-natured,
stable-bred young fellow, and finds occasion to point out to him that the
only sure indication of culture is the language one uses.
C. BARDEEN, A MANUAL OF COMMON SCHOOL LAW 213-14 (1890).
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school authorities have occurred.
The case for broad discretionary
school power seems especially weak when differences in race and social
class underline the impersonal aspects of the student's relationship with
school authorities.7" Although a closely knit home-school community
is a desirable ideal, the student's rights should be protected by procedures adapted to reality.
When the sanction in question is exclusion from school, the doctrine of in loco parentis seems a peculiarly inappropriate justification
for refusing to hear a student's plea for fundamental due process.
Parents cannot take disciplinary action parallel to excluding a student
from school, for they generally have a state-imposed duty to support
and care for their children. 4 Nevertheless, the school's authority
in loco parentis has sometimes been offered as a justification for allowing expulsion without a hearing,7" and even when not explicitly advanced, the doctrine looms hazily in the background. In loco parentis
has also been an important bar to the application of due process
standards to disciplinary proceedings resulting in the imposition of
other sanctions, particularly corporal punishment. 76
Yet the doctrine has never freed school discipline from all restraint.
For example, when a student shows abuse of discretion, he can recover
in tort or obtain his reinstatement.7 To recover, however, the student
must prove that the teacher acted unreasonably 7S--with malice, 79 with
punishment disproportionate to the offense,"0 or with punishment insufficiently accounting for the age, size, sex, or physical condition of
_2 See, e.g., D. ROGERS, 110 LnOGST N ST6.= 363-94, 500-01 (1968) ; Brooks,
Tragedy at Ocean Hill, DIssENT, Jan.-Feb. 1969, at 28; Roberts, The Battle for
Urban Schools, SAT. REV., Nov. 16, 1968, at 97.
73 See Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dimissals, 20 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 378, 381-82, 387-88 (1969). See geterally K. CLAsRl, DARK GHaEro 111-53
(1965); P. SCHRAG, VILLAGE SCHOOL DOWNTOWN 74-117, 154-68 (1967).

74 See generally State v. Moran, 99 Conn. 115, 121 A. 277 (1923) ; Hummel v.
State, 73 Ind. App. 12 126 N.E. 444 (1920) ; State v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 136
P. 215 (1913); In re iustodian, 39 U.S.L.W. 2354 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Dec. 24, 1970).
'75See John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) ; Vermillion
v. State e, rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907) ; State ex rel. Burpee
v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150 (1878).
7
6 See N. EDWARDs, supra note 14, at 610; M. NOLTE & J. LiNN, supra note 67,
at 206-10; PuBLIc SCHOOL OPRATION, supra note 14, at 404-09; M. Rt MrLn,
SCHOOL LAW 267 (2d ed. 1962).
77See Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342, 347 (1913) (failed to show
"oppression or gross injustice") ; Morrison v. Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91
(1904) (damages for abuse of discretion).
7

tSee Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 469, 476-85 (1954);

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 147 (1965) ; Note, Right of a Teacher to Administer Corporal Punishment
to a Student, 5 WASHBURx L.J. 75, 78 (1965).

See, e.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954).
SOSee Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944); Cooper v.
McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290 (1853) ; Rupp v. Zinter, 29 Pa. D. & C. 625 (C. P. Montgomery
County 1937).
1
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the student."' By imposing a very heavy burden on the student, the
courts have greatly indulged the school authorities. Moreover, even
were the standard less exacting, no convincing reason exists for substituting after-the-fact relief for before-the-punishment procedural safeguards.8 2 Schools need disciplinary power, but that power properly
develops from necessity, not from a misleading Latin phrase. The
doctrine of in loco parentis should not bar procedural safeguards. Due
process requires that schools achieve their legitimate ends only through
procedures striking a fair balance between the schools' needs and the
students' interests.
2. Avoiding Due Process Issues: "Prematurity"
and "Investigation"
If in loco parentis seems an inadequate basis for dismissing challenges to student disciplinary procedures, courts have at their disposal
two related tactics to avoid due process issues. First, they could refuse
to pass upon prematurely raised issues, and second, they could treat
students' claims to due process as they treat claims raised by witnesses
in administrative investigations, according them little or no constitutional recognition. In some circumstances, neither of these judicial
responses would be exceptionable, but they lend themselves to abuse
in the school discipline context.
a. Prematurity
Madera v. Board of Education" arose when Victor Madera, a
fourteen-year-old student, was suspended. Under the applicable statute,
a suspended student receives a Guidance Conference in "an effort to
solve his school problems." 84 As a direct result of the conference, the
District Superintendent of Schools might direct that the student be
readmitted to his former school, assigned to a comparable school, or
assigned to a school for socially maladjusted children-sometimes
known in New York City as a "600 school." I In addition, the
superintendent might make recommendations ultimately leading to
81oSee Sheehan
v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 2 A. 841 (1885) (age, size, and physical
condition); Melen v. McLaughlin, 107 Vt. 111, 116, 176 A. 297, 299 (1935) ("sex,

age, size and strength").
82 Even the argument that discipline, and particularly corporal punishment,
teaches "respect for authority," see Indiana St. Personnel Bd. v. Jackson, 244 Ind.
321, 337, 192 N.E2d 740, 748 (1963) (concurring opinion), does not legitimately
suggest that respecting authority for authority's sake is valuable. Authority must be
placed within the framework of justice. Cf. Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 63
(M.D. Ala. 1969).
83386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
84 Id.at 782.
85 Id.

19711
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proceedings in the Family Court, assignment to a detention school, or
exclusion from the public schools altogether.83 Madera requested permission to have a lawyer present at this conference, but the rules
clearly forbade this s and the superintendent denied the request. Federal District Judge Constance Baker Motley upheld the student's
constitutional right to counsel at the conference, 8 but her decision was
reversed by the Second Circuit in an opinion written by Judge Moore.
Because Madera gives the illusion of deciding more than it does, the
case is important and merits thorough treatment.8 9
In denying the right to counsel, the Second Circuit sharply distinguished between those actions which might "directly result" from
the Guidance Conference and those which might "ultimately result."
The less serious direct results would not, in the court's view, constitute a constitutionally cognizable loss of liberty.90 The court then
concluded that any due process claims with regard to the more serious
ultimate results were premature. The court explained that before any
serious consequences-including expulsion--could result, "[a] whole
series of further investigations, hearings and decisions must occur
. Support for this explanation was drawn from a footnote
in the Supreme Court's Gault decision, distinguishing adjudication
Despite the court's
from pre- and post-adjudication proceedings.9
assertion, it is open to question whether the Guidance Conference was
preliminary in nature, or, assuming that it was, whether any subsequent
proceeding would adequately protect the student's interests.
sGId.at 783. The New York statute does not specifically provide for expulsion,
but school authorities are authorized to "exempt" certain students from attending
school. In the district court opinion Judge Motley described this procedure as
"sophisticated expulsion." Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, 371-72
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
87386 F.2d at 779-80.
8 8
Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
89 Subsequent to Madera, the right to counsel at the Guidance Conference has
been established by statute, N.Y. EIuc. LAw § 3214(6) (c) (McKinney 1970), but
that development does not reduce the significance of the case with respect to the law
of school discipline generally.
90 386 F.2d at 783; see note 169 infra.
91386 F2d at 785.
92MI. at 788 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31 n.48 (1967)). This is a
curiously selective use of Gault, particularly in view of Judge Moore's rejection of
the district court's reliance on Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and his
related conclusion that a criminal trial is the "polar opposite" of the Guidance Conference. Both District Judge Motley and Judge Moore quoted the following language
from Powell: "If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it
reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing,
and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense." 287 U.S. at 69. Judge
Motley italicized the words "civil or criminal," 267 F. Supp. at 369; Judge Moore
italicized "case" and "court," 386 F.2d at 786. A fuller reading of Gault in conjunction with the Powell language could have provided a link between purely civil
and purely criminal cases.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

564

[Vo1.119:545

Nothing in the Madera opinion provides any concrete basis for
concluding that a subsequent proceeding would be available at which
the student could fully protect his interests. For expulsion, the contemplated chain of events was (a) referral to the Bureau of Child
Guidance as a result of the Guidance Conference, (b) recommendation
for or against expulsion by the Bureau, and (c) final decision by the
superintendent. The court failed to identify what additional hearings
follow the Guidance Conference, what issues are then open, what
procedural safeguards are then afforded the student, what recommendations are likely, and what decision on the recommendation is most
probable. 3 The court did state, in connection with referral to the
Family Court for proceedings on truancy violations, that "there would
seem to be adequate safeguards . . . for preservation of . . . con-

stitutional rights, including the right to counsel." " But even this
limited assurance is undermined by an unexplained discrepancy between the district court and the Second Circuit concerning the student's
protection against self-incrimination in the Family Court proceeding.9 5
The court's distinction between direct and ultimate consequences
of a Conference leaves unanswered the basic question whether the
suspension was lawful in the first place. The New York statute
authorizes suspension only for certain reasons.9" It would seem that
the student should have a right to challenge the existence of those
reasons in some hearing. The Guidance Conference provides a logical
point for such a challenge, as any subsequent disposition-whatever
93

According to the district court, the grounds for expulsion are unspecified, but

recommendations of the Bureau of Child Guidance urging expulsion "are invariably
accepted." 267 F. Supp. at 368.
94 386 F2d at 785.
95

Compare the following excerpts, the first from the circuit court's opinion and
the second from the district court's:
[T]here is no showing that any attempt is ever made to use any statement
at the Conference in any subsequent criminal proceeding. The record is to
the contrary . . . and the district court so found. .

.

. Therefore, there is

no need for counsel to protect the child in his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
Id. at 780 (citation omitted).
[T]he admissibility [in subsequent Family Court proceedings] of any statement made during the Guidance Conference as presently conducted is now
the subject of considerable doubt...
. . . [Enforcement] of the "no attorneys provision" of [the school rules]
may deprive plaintiffs of their right against self incrimination but this court
finds it unnecessary to so hold.
267 F. Supp. at 372.
96 The following types of students may be suspended under the statute:
(1) A minor who is insubordinate or disorderly, or whose conduct otherwise
endangers the safety, morals, health or welfare of others; (2) A minor whose
physical or mental condition endangers the health, safety, or morals of himself or of other minors; (3) A minor who, as determined in accordance
with the provisions of part one of this article, is feebleminded to the extent
that he cannot benefit from instruction.
N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3214(6) (a) (McKinney 1970).
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the intervening steps-proceeds on the assumption that the suspension
was appropriate. This inference is reinforced by the apparent concession in the Second Circuit's opinion that the school's statement of
the student's misbehavior was a relevant issue at the Guidance Conference.9 7 Furthermore, the opinion betrays a tacit assumption that
no challenge will ever be considered: "In the present case, the child
has already been suspended and the determination for the District
Superintendent's Guidance [sic] is how that child may best be returned
to the educational system." 98 This statement suggests that the Guidance Conference is not a preliminary proceeding to be followed by a
subsequent stage at which a "full panoply of due process safeguards"
would be available; 9' rather, it suggests an adjudication on the merits
followed by what appears to be a sentencing hearing.
Even on the assumption that the Guidance Conference could be
properly regarded as a preliminary hearing, it does not follow that the
student's due process claim is premature. The cautionary footnote from
the Gault opinion does not support the court's prematurity argument.
In that footnote, the Court carefully reserved judgment on guaranteeing
procedural safeguards at pre- and post-adjudication proceedings in the
juvenile process:
Since this "consent decree" procedure would involve neither
adjudication of delinquency nor institutionalization, nothing
we say in this opinion should be construed as expressing any
views with respect to such procedure. The problems of preadjudication treatment of juveniles, and the post-adjudication
disposition, are unique to the juvenile process; hence what
we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability
to other steps of the juvenile process.? 0
To argue that the Guidance Conference is comparable to the "consent
decree" procedure can hardly end the discussion. The Supreme Court's
caution in leaving open a difficult issue not raised in the case at bar
is understandable. As the Court itself seemed to suggest, hopeful
experimentation was being carried out in the areas on which the Court
refused to rule.'' Also, the Court wisely wanted to avoid incorporating the far-reaching implications of Miranda v. Arizona' 2 and its
progeny without hearing thorough argument.' 3 To observe in a foot97 See 386 F2d at 788.

98 Id. at 784.
99 Id. at 785.
100 387 U.S. at 31 n.48.
101See id.; Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 57, at 5-6.
102 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
103 But cf. Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 57, at 37-41.
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note, with respect to a matter not in issue, that the Court's decision has
"no necessary applicability" is entirely different from failing to grapple
with an issue decisive in the case at hand. That the Court did not
decide these issues in Gault is further illustrated by the continuous
litigation and argument over the applicability of Gault to pre-trial
proceedings. The right to counsel at both the pre-adjudication ..and
post-adjudication '5 stages of the juvenile process has received strong
support.
Furthermore, in some contexts the Supreme Court has expressly
rejected the argument that procedural safeguards may be deferred to
some subsequent, more critical, proceeding. The issue in Kent v.
United States,' the immediate progenitor of Gault, was the transfer of
a juvenile's case from juvenile to criminal jurisdiction. Although the
0
decision was based upon the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, 1
the constitutional overtones were clear.'08 Once the case was transferred, all of the procedural protections of the criminal process would
have been available, but the Court regarded the first step toward criminal
punishment as sufficiently grave to require extensive procedural safeguards. 1 9 More recently, the Court made the same point in a different
context. In dealing with an investigation that might lead to criminal
action, the Court said, "Finally, in the circumstances of the present case,
we do not regard appellant's opportunity to defend any [subsequent]
criminal prosecutions as sufficient to deprive him of standing to challenge the Act." 10 Although both of these cases involved potential
criminal liability, the underlying principle is not limited to criminal
or quasi-criminal cases. A loss of liberty may occur in progressive
steps in any type of proceeding, and reversing the process may become
increasingly difficult. The important question is, in view of the
potential deprivation of liberty and the likelihood of effective protection
at a subsequent proceeding, must the full panoply of due process safeguards apply at the present proceeding to accomplish fundamental fairness? If-because of the nature or lack of subsequent proceedings10 4 See In re William, 29 App. Div. 2d 182, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968) ; Dorsen &
Rezneck, supra note 57, at 41-42; Skoler, The Right to Counsel and the Role of
Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 43 IND. L.J. 558, 566-69 (1968). See also
Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969); In re Creek, 243 A2d 49
(D.C.0 5Ct. App. 1968).
1 See Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 57, at 43; Paulsen, supra note 57, at
256-57; Skoler, supra note 104, at 569.
106 3M3 U.S. 541 (1966).
0
1 7 D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (1967).
108

See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile

Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 179, 182-83; Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 585-88 (1968).
109 See 383 U.S. at 554.
1 10

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969).
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an adverse decision before the Guidance Conference will probably lead
directly to an adverse recommendation from the Bureau of Child
Guidance and virtually automatic expulsion by the superintendent, then
the process of deprivation of liberty occurs beginning with the Guidance
Conference, and the student must be afforded due process at that stage
if his constitutional rights are to have any meaning.
b. School DisciplinaryHearingsas Administrative Investigations
The Madera court presented the prematurity argument in another
guise, drawing support from the Supreme Court's opinion in In re
Groban.'' The Groban case held that a witness testifying before a fire
marshal was not constitutionally entitled to be represented by counsel.
The decision was firmly based upon the distinction between the rights
of a witness in an administrative investigation and the rights of a defendant in an accusatory judicial proceeding. Although in Madera
Judge Moore stressed the preliminary nature of any threat to the
liberty of a witness in an investigation, he did not expressly argue that
a student discipline proceeding was an investigation. This argument
was explicitly made, however, in Barker v. Hardway,"2 a college discipline case. Relying heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Hannah v. Larche,13 the Barker court equated the discipline hearing
with an administrative investigation, and concluded that the students'
claims to certain procedural safeguards should be rejected.
The Hannah case grew out of the Commission on Civil Rights'
investigation of voting rights violations. Certain Louisiana registrars,
subpoenaed to appear as witnesses before the Commission, requested
that they be given the names of persons who had filed complaints against
them, a description of the evidence given by these persons, and the right
to cross-examine. The registrars argued that Congress had not authorized the Commission's rules against disclosing the information, and
that the rules denied their constitutional right to procedural due process.
The Court rejected both contentions." 4 The due process argument was
rejected on the ground that the Commission was engaged only in investigation with the sole purpose of reporting facts to Congress and
perhaps recommending remedial legislation. The Commission pro"'1352 U.S. 330 (1957).

The court also cited two other investigation cases,

Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959), and Nason v. Immigration & Naturalza-

tion Serv., 370 F2d 865 (2d Cir. 1967). The primary thrust of all three references,
however, was to support denial of counsel at the conference. See 386 F2d at 787.
'112283 F. Supp. 228, 237-38 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969).
t3 363 U.S. 420 (1960). Although Hannah and Groban are similar in reasoning
and holdings, the Hannah Court explicitly refrained from relying on Groban. Id. at
451 n.31.
1 4 See id. at 430-39.
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ceeding would not result in any adjudication of the registrars' rights.
The Court emphasized the devastating effect on an investigation of
allowing all witnesses to convert the proceeding into an adversary contest." 5 Permitting cross-examination and disclosure of witnesses'
names would have opened the possibility of intimidation of black registration candidates and other potential sources of information, greatly
limiting the capacity of the Commission to investigate deprivations of
the right to vote. Despite these considerations, Justices Douglas and
Black felt that the likelihood of criminal liability growing out of the
investigation was sufficiently great to permit the right of cross-examination, and accordingly dissented."1
The inapplicability of the administrative investigation cases to the
school discipline area-and the frailty of the investigation-adjudication
distinction-is demonstrated by analysis of Jenkins v. McKeithen,"'
decided by the Supreme Court after Hannah. The Louisiana statute
involved in Jenkins was consciously patterned after the federal statute
upheld in Hannah. Under the statute, a commission was established to
investigate criminal activity arising out of labor-management relations.
The constitutionality of the statute was challenged on several grounds,
including restrictions upon the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. On this basis, the Court held that the commission's procedures
did "not meet the minimal requirements" of due process. 1 ' In contrast
to the investigation in Hannah, the Court perceived the procedure in
Jenkins as the first step in criminal prosecution focusing on particular
persons and itself involving punishment to the extent that those named
would be exposed to public condemnation. Even the three dissenting
Justices, speaking through Justice Harlan, conceded the difficulty of
quarrelling with the majority opinion if the Louisiana commission was
1 "
considered an agency of exposure."
Taken together, Jenkins, Hannah, and Groban point in the direction of insuring due process for students in expulsion hearings. Even
when the due process claim is asserted by a witness in an investigation,
the Supreme Court has shown reluctance in foreclosing the right when
a deprivation of liberty may grow directly out of the investigatory proceeding. A fortiori, a student directly threatened with expulsion or
some other substantial sanction should have the right to demand procedural due process. The absence of any disadvantage in school disciplinary proceedings comparable to the obstruction of the investigation
115 Id. at 443, 448, 451.
16See id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
117 395 U.S. 411 (1969) (opinion of Marshall, J.).

218Id at 428.
119 Id. at 438.
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in Hannah and Groban reinforces this conclusion. Cases such as
Hannah and Jenkins are made difficult by uncertainty concerning the
threat to a participant's liberty, the extent of the burden on the proceeding, and the danger of defeating the goals of the investigation if
the demand for procedural protection is recognized. In the school discipline cases, however, the threat to the student's liberty is direct, the
burden on the proceeding is minimal, and the proceeding's only goals
are to determine whether the student is guilty of misconduct and to
apply sanctions. The student is not merely a witness in a proceeding
which has another focal point; he is the only focus. The potential loss
of liberty is not simply a possible outgrowth of the disciplinary proceeding; it is the subject of the proceeding.
In Barker, the court concluded that the proceeding was merely an
investigation because the committee before which the students appeared
had no dispositive power, but only made recommendations to the college president."2
The court was evidently misled by language in
Hannah referring to the fact-gathering function of the Civil Rights
Commission, because in Hannah the Court was speaking of legislative
fact-finding, 1 not adjudicatory fact-finding like that involved in school
discipline cases in which the student's misconduct is the focus of the
proceeding. If there were any validity to the Barker court's conclusion
that the student has no procedural rights before the committee, it would
have to be because his rights would be recognized at some other stage,
and not because the committee was conducting an "investigation" as
that term was used in Hannah. Yet a prematurity argument also fails
to rationalize the denial of the right to counsel, for the recommendations
of the committee in Barker were intended to have an important bearing
on the ultimate decision. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that
the president would subsequently hold a de novo hearing, nor any suggestion of other further hearings. The proceeding before the committee
was clearly the most appropriate point at which to afford the student
due process.
Characterization of a school disciplinary proceeding as an administrative investigation is a spurious ground for failing to recognize the
applicability of procedural due process. Although instances may arise
in which school authorities wish to investigate massive unrest in their
schools by calling student witnesses, disciplinary proceedings always
120 This reasoning would logically lead to the conclusion that an unfair labor
practice hearing before a trial examiner is an investigation because the examiner's

conclusions are only recommendations to the National Labor Relations Board-hardly
a tenable result. See also Administrative Procedure Act § 557(b), 5 U.S.C. §557(b)
(Supp.
V, 1970).
21
1
For a discussion of the distinction between legislative and adjudicative factfinding, see 1 K. DAvis, ADmiNIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.02, 7.06 (1958).
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focus on the alleged offenders. Because their liberty is at stake, accused
students must be afforded due process of law. Similarly, situations may
arise in which procedural due process claims are raised prematurely.
Whenever a student's liberty is jeopardized as a consequence of the
hearing, however, even if only in the future, his rights must be protected at the original fact-finding hearing.
3. The Mystique of the Educational Institution
Transcending all of the particular reasons given to explain the
refusal to hear student due process claims is a pervasive reluctance by
the courts to intrude into educational matters. Educational institutions
seem to be enshrouded with a mystical immunity from judicial interference. This attitude can be seen in Judge Cameron's dissent in Dixon:
Everyone who has dealt with schools knows that it is
necessary to make many rules governing the conduct of those
who attend them, which do not reach the concept of criminality but which are designed to regulate the relationship between
school management and the student based upon practical and
ethical considerations which the courts know very little about
and with which they are not equipped to deal."2
Judge Moore's Madera opinion reveals a similar predisposition:
To [grant rights accorded in adversary proceedings] would
be destructive of the original purpose of the Guidance Conference-to provide for the future education of the child. The
conference is not a judicial or even a quasi-judicial hearing.
. . . Law and order in the classroom should be the responsibility of our respective educational systems. The courts should
not usurp this function and turn disciplinary problems, involving suspension, into criminal adversary proceedings-which
they definitely are not.'
Judge Cameron's dissent suggests that the courts should not intervene
because of their incompetence. Judge Moore stresses that these educational judgments were entrusted to officials other than the courts.
Both views lead to the conclusion that judicial intervention will frustrate educational purposes and thus do more harm than good.
Although these arguments for judicial nonintervention are understandable and valid up to a point, they do not justify the exaggerated
deference that often results. Fundamental educational policy for public
schools in the United States is uniformly made by lay boards of
education, entitled to no more judicial respect-on grounds of expertise-than any other subordinate political body. Moreover, any
=2294 F.2d at 160.
=2 386 F.2d at 788-89.
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inclination to indulge educational wisdom should take into account the
widespread recognition among educators of the serious failings of
American schools.'
The tendency toward judicial timidity reflected
in the statements by Judges Cameron and Moore can be questioned on
more narrow grounds as well.
As Judge Cameron suggests, a school is indeed a unique institution. Some discipline is required to maintain the well-being of that
institution and perhaps only the school authorities understand the
institution well enough to determine its disciplinary requirements.
These factors provide a solid basis for allowing school authorities some
discretion in determining what disciplinary regulations are necessary.
As an argument for denying the student all procedural safeguards,
however, the idea topples of its own weight. However little courts
may know about education or school discipline, they do know about
factfinding, decisionmaking, fairness, and procedure. Although the
public school context may require special latitude for educational or
administrative judgment, punishment for student misconduct seems
clearly inappropriate without a decision that: the student acted, what
he did was forbidden by some rule, the rule was valid, there were no
exonerating circumstances, and the punishment was appropriate under
the circumstances. Making such determinations would under any
ordinary definition be regarded as "adjudication," 125 the field in which
courts are most competent.
In like fashion, the Madera opinion abdicates too much responsibility to educational judgments and purposes. The plea that the
superintendent regarded the proceeding as nonadversary is strikingly
reminiscent of one defense of the juvenile system rejected in Gault:
The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the
procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.
These results were to be achieved, without coming to
conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not 1adversary,
but that the state was proceeding
26
as parens patriae.

The Court found this justification wanting:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due
process has resulted in instances, which might have been
24
1
See e.g. Stevens, Reform Drive Now Key Issue in Education, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 11, 19h1, a 47, col. 1; authorities cited note 7 supra.
M See 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADAINiSTRATivE LAW 119-27 (1965); 1 K. DAVIs,

supra note 121, at § 7.02.
126 387

U.S. at 15-16.
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avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate 2 7findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of
remedy.'

The characterization of the disciplinary proceeding by the school authority in Madera is certainly no more compelling than the characterization of the juvenile proceeding offered by the state in Gault.
Similarly, an obvious parallel exists between the original purpose of
juvenile delinquency proceedings-to rehabilitate the unfortunate
child-and the claimed purpose of the Guidance Conference-to facilitate a disposition of the disrupting child which will be in his best
interest.128

In Gault the Court doubted whether juvenile proceedings

achieve their intended purpose, 2 9 observed that failing to follow procedures regarded as essential for adults had probably led to serious
abuses, 3 ' and announced that the alleged purposes were not legitimate
grounds for depriving the child of constitutional rights. 3 ' The inappropriateness of displacing constitutional rights by laudable purposes
possibility of abuse or
seems equally applicable in the school setting; the
32
failed purposes should not be assumed away.
In further contrast to the school authorities' view echoed by the
Madera court, the Gault opinion suggests that fair procedures would
be psychologically beneficial to the student.3 3 One of the motivating
ideals of the founders of the juvenile system was a desire to spare children the trauma of indictment and trial in criminal court.3 4 The unremitting harshness of criminal process was to be replaced by the
friendly and understanding judge with an arm around the misbehaving
boy. But this ideal is often flawed by an inherent inconsistency. When
the arm around the shoulder is followed by confinement in a hostile
institution, the child is likely to see the entire process-and through it
society-as arbitrary, hypocritical, and untrustworthy. It might be
127 Id. at 19-20.

128The Madera court relied heavily on the purpose it attributed to the Guidance
Conference's program-"to provide for the future education of the child." 386 F.2d
at 788. Yet, however much one patches over the unpleasantness of many of the
alternatives considered, three of the "ultimate" educational options-detention school,
juvenile court proceedings, and total exclusion from the public schools-do not forbode
an educational future that most children and parents would find desirable.
12 9 See 387 U.S. at 21-22.

Id. at 18-20.
Id. at 27-28.
132See generally Schafer & Polk, Delinquency and the Schools, in
130
131

PRESIDENT'S
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 222 (1967).
133See 387 U.S. at 26; Cf. PRESIDENT'S COmm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETy 85
COMM'N ON

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

(1967) ; Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of

Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 9-21.
134 See Paulsen, supra note 108, at 168-75.
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far more beneficial for the child to participate in a fair and regular, even
if adversary, proceeding. 3 ' Perhaps the case for the psychologically
purifying effect of the regularized adversary system is overdone. Still,
if it is valid for the juvenile offender, it may also be valid for the
student threatened with expulsion, suspension, or other discipline.
Introducing an adversarial character into disciplinary proceedings
arguably would not entail these benefits because of the greater complexity of the student's multifaceted, continuing relationship with his
school. But that distinction may be insignificant because a student
normally comes into contact with school authorities other than his
teachers only when he is in trouble. In fact, the links between school
discipline and the juvenile process tend to be strong. In New York,
for example, the Guidance Conference hearing is characterized as
"[c]ommitment and parole of a school delinquent."13' Under this
statute, a student suspended as "insubordinate or disorderly" (the
standard ground for suspension) is automatically classified as a "school
delinquent." ' Moreover, two of the possible measures contemplated
by the suspension statute are confinement and prosecution in the Family
Court for truancy. This interrelationship between truancy and delinquency is a staple of the compulsory education system. 138 A child
in trouble with one system is often in trouble with both. Consequently,
a child brought to bar in the educational system will probably not
regard the proceeding against him in a totally different light from a
juvenile proceeding. Thus, much would probably be gained by giving
the student the dignity and self-respect which would result from clearly
drawing sides, stating frankly that a serious matter is at issue, and
indicating that the student must take some responsibility for the outcome and will be given a fair opportunity to do so.
C. The Interests in the Balance
1. School Interests: The "Burden" on the Proceeding
The school's most obvious interest in limiting the procedural
complexity of disciplinary proceedings lies in maintaining the integrity
of the educational process: the conditions necessary for educating must
be preserved. Students must be brought to a single location in large
numbers; teachers must be available; books and other equipment must
135 See Note, A Balancing Approach to the Grant of Procedural Rights in the

Juvenile Court, 64 Nw. U.L. Rv. 87, 96-102 (1969).
136N.Y. EDUc. LAw §3214(5) (McKinney 1970).
137Id. §3214(1).

138 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit.
52, § 304 (1958) ; CoLo. Rv.STAT. ANN. § 123-20-9
(1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-25-1 (1970). See also Shafer & Polk. supra
note 132, at 250, 255-56.
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be provided; appropriate physical conditions such as warmth, light,
chairs, rest rooms, and quiet must exist to facilitate reading, writing,
lecturing, discussing, and experimenting. Providing procedural protection in school disciplinary proceedings may affect these conditions
by drawing off resources or the time of educational personnel. Additionally, the school has an interest in protecting the welfare of the other
students who, no less than the accused, are required by law to attend
school. In like fashion the school must protect teachers to enable them
to carry out the school's educational functions. As a slightly lesser
concern, the school has an interest in preventing damage to or loss
of the physical property of the school and of the members of the school
community. The cost of supporting discipline proceedings cannot be
dismissed lightly by contrasting its "economic" character to the
"human" dimension represented by the threat to the student's liberty,
for the economic costs of fairer disciplinary procedures necessarily result
in a shifting of scarce resources from the purposes to which they would
otherwise be put.
Akin to cost and efficiency is the possible effect upon the academic
atmosphere. Disciplinary proceedings could intrude upon the rhythms
of the life of the school in ways more elusive (but perhaps more
fundamental) than taking up the time of teachers and administrators
or the money allocated for books. If disciplinary proceedings are
frequent or lengthy, and if they are conducted publicly or sensationally,
students and their teachers are likely to be distracted from other
pursuits and thoughts. School interests are also affected in a different
way if the procedural system utilized for discipline proceedings consistently fails to prevent misconduct either because the procedural protection exonerates those who have engaged in misconduct or because
the procedures are so burdensome that condoning misconduct may
seem more convenient to those involved than invoking them.
On a different tack, the school has an interest in providing fair
procedures. Although procedural due process is only one educational
value of many, its importance is especially great at a time when serious
questions are being raised about the validity of much of what the school
offers. From a more pragmatic point of view, providing fair procedures for school discipline may actually eliminate the distracting
effect of disciplinary proceedings that do not give the student a fair
opportunity to defend himself against the authorities or that leave the
students with a feeling that they have been dealt with unfairly. Moreover, significant as the school's other interests are, they must be kept
in perspective, for they are not always affected to the same extent by
providing procedural safeguards for students subjected to school dis-
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cipline. As in society at large, fear for the interests of the majority
does not justify elimination of the rights of the minority. The school
has no legitimate interest in disciplining a student who has not been
given a minimal opportunity to establish his innocence or the inappropriateness of a particular sanction.
2. Student Interests: The Liberty at Stake
a. Education
Because the importance of education has often been asserted,"'0
only the highlights of the argument need be mentioned. The Supreme
Court has paid its respects to education on numerous occasions never more clearly than in its memorable statement in Brown v. Board
of Education:141
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. . . . It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education.
At the very least, there is evidence of a strong correlation between
years of schooling and income."
And the child is told by everyone
from the Supreme Court to his classroom teacher that he must have
a formal education-usually the more the better. In part then, education is important because society says it is. Moreover, despite attacks
denigrating the quality or performance of public schools, they often
offer academic, social, and cultural benefits which are unavailable elsewhere to many students. Furthermore, schools are supposed to prepare
students to be informed participants in public affairs and enable them
to protect their self-interest by competing on fair terms for positions
(R. Drinan ed. 1968).
See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ; Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
141347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
139 See generally THE RIGHT To BE EDUCATED
140

142See BuRAu OF CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF CommERcE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UN~rED STATES 108 (1969).
It may be asked to what extent the correlation

exists because of the intrinsic value of what school provides, because the personal
characteristics producing high income are apt to induce staying in school as well,
or because employment yielding high income is available only to those capable of
producing evidence of their longevity in school. For present purposes, however, the
answer is unimportant.
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in the job market or for college admission. Similarly, because of the
dominant role of schools in the United States, a child's sense of
"identity" with his society may be impaired, possibly imperiling his
mental and emotional growth, if he is estranged from the schools and
the students attending them. 14
b. Physical Freedom
Apart from prison and the military, nothing in American society
compares to public schools in establishing state-imposed control over
a person's life. Despite the deprivation of liberty brought about by
that control, compulsory attendance laws have been uniformly held
constitutional because of the state's paramount interest in an educated
citizenry.' 44 Evidently this rationale excites little response even
though it celebrates the primacy of the state in a manner which seems
counter to our usual assumptions about individual freedom. 45 At the
least, it is ironic that enforced attendance is the starting point for
justifying the extensive regulation of students' school-related life. Of
course, once they are physically present, something must be done to
protect students from each other and to maintain the integrity of the
educational process. Yet, because school discipline is an infringement
of liberty built upon an infringement of liberty, special care should be
used to reduce the possibility of unfairness to students. 4 Hopefully,
43

See R. CRARY, HuMANIZING THE SCHOOL 276-83 (1969);
1
CHILDHOOD AND Socmyrv passim (2d ed. 1963).
144 State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929); Stephens v.

E.

ERsoN,

Bongart, 15
N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (1937); Commonwealth v. Bey, 166 Pa. Super. 136,
70 A.2d 693 (1950). The theory of these cases is not that compulsory education
involves no deprivation of liberty but that the deprivation is a reasonable means of
achieving a legitimate state goal. See generally A. STEIHILBER, supra note 68.
145 A student for whom education is positively harmful, especially physically
harmful, would seem to have an even stronger constitutional claim for relief. Cf.
In re Skipwith, 14 Misc. 2d 325, 180 N.Y.S2d 852 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1958) (lower
ratio of licensed teachers in schools with predominantly Negro and Puerto Rican
enrollments a denial of equal protection). But cf. State v. Vaughn, 44 N.J. 142,
207 A.2d 537 (1965).
146 Several legal theories support the adoption of an especially solicitous concern
for students because of the restrictions placed upon them. For example, the doctrine
of "fair representation" in labor law has been largely constructed on the premise
that the withdrawal by law of a basic freedom creates a compensating duty upon
those who have gained new power correlative to the loss of freedom. See Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) ; Note, supra note 31, at 1382. Also,
it has been argued that college officials have a fiduciary duty to their students
because of the dominant-dependent relationship existing between them. Goldman,
The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L. REv.
643 (1966). Plainly that argument applies much more forcefully- when the student
is younger and the school relationship is imposed on him by the law. Even the
doctrine of in loco parentis, which has historically protected the school more than
the child, may create a special duty benefiting the student. See Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1145 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Academic Freedom]. It could plausibly be argued that those who have the parent's
power over the child should be ultrasensitive to encroachments upon the child's
freedom and should have a special duty to protect the child's individuality from the
collective pressures of school.
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courts and school authorities can be convinced of the potential magnitude of the restrictions placed upon students, beginning with confinement in a particular building for substantial periods of his waking life
and elaborately supplemented by a pervasive variety of rules covering
everything from sitting in a chair and walking in the halls to the
length of his hair.
Humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of status are the inevitable
and probably intentional results of any punishment.' 47 With respect to
in-school restraints, disciplinary sanctions are especially galling because
they grow out of the compelled attendance context. Much "misconduct" would not occur but for the physically confining conditions or
the educational pressures forced upon all students without regard to
their individual capacity or temperament. Compulsory attendance also
gives exclusion from school a special sting. Sacrificing the benefits
of school voluntarily is quite different from being forced to stay away,
especially when others continue to attend. The student is told through
expulsion that he is unfit to be where society has determined all
acceptable citizens of his age should be. Furthermore, the stigma and
humiliation attaching to the expulsion may be "lifelong." s
D. The Variables
1. The Disciplinary Sanctions
The seriousness of the sanction imposed upon a student for misconduct will determine the extent of the invasion of the student's
interest in obtaining an education, being free from physical restraint,
and avoiding stigmatization. Thus, the appropriate procedural requirements will vary with the relative severity of the applicable disciplinary sanction. At some point the sanction becomes a sufficiently
innocuous part of the daily pattern that the adjudicatory character
requiring due process becomes imperceptible, and disciplining the
student becomes solely a matter of school or classroom administration.
Teachers must be allowed to make immediate good faith judgments in
imposing minor sanctions to deal with instances of minor misbehavior. 49 Discipline at this level continues to constitute a deprivation
of liberty, but the deprivation, imposed under conditions making it
tolerable, is only fleeting.
Teachers must also have emergency authority to deal temporarily
with serious disciplinary problems. 5 ° An unruly student may have
Cf. T. HoNDERICH, PUNISHMENT 77-81 (1969).
sSee Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1392-93 (E.D.

'47
4

'

Mich. 1969).
149 See text accompanying notes 181-82 infra.
15o See generally 1 F. COOPER, supra note 125, at 142-44 (1965); 1 K.
mtpra note 121, at § 7.08.

DAvis,
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to be ejected from the classroom or from school to prevent physical
harm or to avoid extensive disruption. A teacher may even have to
defend himself against physical assaults and would be entitled to use
reasonable force to do so. But an exercise of emergency power would
be justified only when an emergency was reasonably believed to exist.
An emergency would never justify failing to provide procedural regularity as soon as the crisis had passed.' 51
a. Expulsion
Expulsion is the most serious sanction imposed as a matter of
public school discipline because of its dramatic impact on the student's
interest in obtaining an education.'5 2 When the student is totally
excluded from the public school system, he may lose his only chance to
obtain an education; the consequences of this loss will have a life-long
impact. Even if he can afford to attend a private school (and if the
private school will accept him in light of the expulsion), the expelled
student has been deprived of the right to attend public school at the
public's expense.
b. Suspension
An indefinite suspension has essentially the same effect on the
student's liberty as an expulsion. Courts have frequently ruled that
expulsions cannot be extended into subsequent school years.'5 3 Whether
such a rule is generally followed in practice seems doubtful.5 4 Nevertheless, the belief that even an expulsion cannot be permanent serves to
underline the minimal difference between expulsions and prolonged
suspensions. Many recent decisions have simply assumed that equating
lengthy suspensions with expulsions requires no explanation.' 55
In determining the appropriate procedural requirements for a
hearing on whether to impose a suspension, the length of the proposed
suspension is important. Other considerations include the stigma
151 See Wright, supra note 17, at 1074-75; note 159 infra & accompanying text.
152 Because of the seriousness of this sanction, many states have statutory provisions stipulating procedures which must be followed in expelling students. For an
exhaustive summary of procedural rights contained in statutes, regulations, and
Attorney Generals' opinions, see S. Voelz, The Legal Status of Pupil Suspension
and Expulsion and Due Process, Aug. 1970 (unpublished doctoral dissertation in
College of Education Library, University of Iowa).
153 See, e.g., PuBLc SCHOOL OPmATN, supra note 14, at 410.
154 Although some statutes expressly limit an expulsion to 1 school year or less,
see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1029b (1964); LA. Rtv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416 (1963),
others leave the question to the discretion of the expelling authority, see, e.g., IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 33-205 (1963) (upon meeting school board's reasonable conditions);
ME. Rsv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 473(5) (1964) (on evidence of repentence).
355 E.g., Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Scott v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Stricklin v. Regents, 297
F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161
(W.D. Mo. 1968).
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attached to being suspended, the likelihood that the suspension will
become permanent through the inertia of the student or other factors,'5 6
the suspension's effect on the student's education, and the indirect effect
on the student's potential for educational success-a negative attitude,
a poor self-image,' and isolation from classmates. Together these
considerations reveal that any lengthy suspension can have a sufficiently deleterious effect to justify requiring procedures essentially
similar to those provided in expulsion proceedings. If the suspension
begins as an emergency measure, these procedures should be made
available while the student is temporarily excluded from school with
the understanding that a decision favorable to the student will leave no
blemish on his record, and that the school will assist the exonerated
student in making up any educational disadvantages suffered in the
interim 58 In some cases courts have even required a preliminary
hearing to determine the validity of the suspension pending a more
59
complete investigation.'
When the suspension is for a short period, c the student's interest
in escaping it is reduced, while the school's interest in avoiding complicated proceedings is increased by the possible frequency of these
short-term suspensions. In many cases the school might reasonably
assume that a brief cooling-off period is the best means of dealing with
minor disruptive behavior. If the short-suspension device is used with
relative frequency to deal with one student, however, the cumulative
effect might be equivalent to a lengthy suspension or an expulsion.
Therefore, the student should be afforded a hearing with procedural
safeguards after two or three short suspensions in rapid succession
before the school may further penalize him.'61
156 In Madera, judge Motley noted the likelihood that children above the schoolleaving age would not return to school after being excluded for a substantial period.
267 F. Supp. at 371. For statistics indicating that a significant number of students
are effectively excluded from school under the New York procedures, see Comment,
22 RUTGERS L. Ray. 342, 346 n.33 (1968).
157 Cf. COLEmAN REPORT, supra note 4, at 281.
158 See R.R. v. Board of Educ., 109 N.J. Super. 337, 350, 263 A.2d 180, 188
(1970) (high school student); cf. Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis.

1970).
'159Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis. 1970) ; Stricklin v. Regents,
297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969); R.R. v. Board of Educ., 109 N.J. Super. 337,

263 A.2d 180 (1970).
160 State statutes distinguish between different kinds of powers to exclude students
on the basis of specified periods of time. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANNt. § 12320-6(b) (1963) (board of education may delegate to principal power to suspend for
up to 5 days); FLA. STAT. AN. §232.26 (1961) (principal may suspend for up to
10 days).
161 Even when a brief suspension is used and not converted into an expulsion by
repetition, a special problem is created if the suspension is entered in the student's

file for potential future use.

In Madera, for instance, the case against the student

included eleven incidents of misbehavior reported by seven different teachers.

F.2d at 788.

386

In Gault the finding of delinquency rested upon the juvenile court

judge's conclusion that Gault was a delinquent in part because he was "habitually
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The length of the suspension frequently turns on the performance
of some act by the student. 162 Suppose a student is suspended for
violating a hair-length regulation. The key to readmission-cutting his
hair-is in the student's possession, and the length of his suspension
will be determined by his decision whether or not to have it cut. How
should the suspension be characterized or its length be measured? On
balance such a conditional suspension should entitle the student to
expulsion-type procedural protection. In part this conclusion grows
out of concern over the potential length of the exclusion from school.
In all such cases, however, the student also has an independent interest
which he is being asked to sacrifice as the price for readmission. The
nature of the particular interest will undoubtedly influence a reviewing
court's view of the procedures required; wearing an armband might
lead to greater protection than wearing long hair, whereas hair preference would merit more protection than smoking marijuana.'
Despite
this variable, in all these cases the student has a double justification
for receiving a full hearing.
c. Disciplinary Transfers
A board of education has broad authority to assign students to
particular schools, 6 ' provided that the authority is exercised within
legal limits.' 65 Unlike general school-assignment decisions, which may
be regarded as legislative actions, 166 a decision to transfer a student
from school A to school B because of his misconduct is an adjudicatory
action. Like any other disciplinary sanction, a misconduct transfer
involves determinations which the student should be permitted to influence in an appropriate hearing.
involved in immoral matters." The only immorality cited by the judge was a
"referral" for stealing a baseball glove-a referral that resulted in no action because
of "lack of material foundation." 387 U.S. at 9. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.26
(Supp. 1970), amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.26 (1961) (brief suspension for
"repeated misconduct"). To deal fairly with this problem, the school should present
the student with a copy of the proposed entry in his record, inform him and his
parents that future use of the record is possible, and permit him to add to the record
his view of the incident. The school's failure to do this should be one consideration
in determining the fairness of any future use.
162 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398

U.S. 937 (1970).
163

Cf. Weiss & Wizner, Pot, Prayer, Politics and Privacy: The Right to Cut

Your 64Own Throat in Your Own, Way, 54 IoWA L. Rlv. 709 (1969).
1 See M. NoLTE & J. LINN, supra note 67, at 215-16; PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION, supra note 14, at 333.
165 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub norn. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
166 See O'Neal v. School Dist. No. 15 School Bd., 451 P.2d 791 (Wyo. 1969).
The O'Neal court may have been misled in its characterization by concentrating on
the request for a transfer. Cf. Ravenna Pub. School Dist. No. 24 v. Big Springs
School Dist. 6F, 17 Mich. App. 106, 169 N.W.2d 183 (1969).
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The school may argue that the student's interest in procedural
safeguards is insubstantial because the student's liberty is only peripherally affected. 1' According to this argument, the student is merely
transferred from one school to another; if he suffers any loss of
liberty, it results from the compulsory attendance law, not the transfer.
But schools differ widely despite superficial similarities. Intangibles
such as the principal's reputation affect the school's image and may in
turn affect its drawing power for teachers and students (through their
parents' choice of residence). Subtle differences shape the brand and
quality of the education offered by each school. In addition, the
transferred student can nearly always point to certain objective advantages provided by school A but not by B. The student bodies will
be different, and to a certain extent the composition of the student body
influences the individual student's academic performance. 16 Finally, a
school has other attributes that matter to the student (even if not
educationally). Change in itself involves hardship-the distance or
means of traveling to school will be different and possibly more burdensome; old friends and teachers will be lost. Since the school attendance
area is often regarded as an incident of residence, a certain portion
of the parental real estate investment would be lost because of the
transfer. In total, the liberty deprivation resulting from a transfer
is substantial although not ordinarily as great as that resulting from
expulsion: the sanction is comparable in terms of the effect on the
parties involved. On the other side, the school's interest in denying
the student procedural safeguards, based mainly on minimizing costs
and administrative inconveniences, are no more impressive than with
respect to expulsion proceedings. Disciplinary transfers usually involve
some administrative deliberation which could easily be converted into
a hearing.
When the transferee school is a school for problem children
rather than one interchangeable with the transferor school, the loss of
Such a
liberty resulting from the transfer is even less debatable. 3
167 See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
16sSee CoLEmAN REPORT, .supra note 4, at 302.
169 But see Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). The Madera court's conclusion that assignment to a
"600" school does not present a serious threat to the student's liberty is unpersuasive.
The court acknowledged evidence that such schools were "presently inadequate,"
386 F.2d at 782. and that "a certain social stigma" may attach to children placed in
them, id. at 782-83. Furthermore, the three reasons offered by the court for its
outcome-that "[n]o practical alternative has been offered," id. at 782, that stigma
would attach to this child's poor performance in any case, id. at 783, and that the
transfer occurred only after the parents consented, id--do not justify denying procedural due process in the decisionmaking process. Since Family Court proceedings
would be brought to force parental consent, this was, as Judge Motley observed,
consent only in name. 267 F. Supp. at 372.
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reassignment, leading to forced attendance at a stigmatizing, inferior,
or restrictive school, may entail a greater deprivation than expulsion.
Once transfer to a detention school becomes an alternative, the distinction between juvenile court proceedings and school disciplinary
proceedings virtually vanishes. The student's interest in physical
freedom is so severely threatened when transfer to a detention school
is possible that the proceeding becomes quasi-criminal.1 7 ° Detention
schools are also generally acadamically inferior; the student's interest
in obtaining an education is thus threatened. Incarceration through
transfer to a detention school is the one disciplinary sanction threatening a more severe deprivation of liberty than expulsion. Thus, in any
disciplinary proceeding that might result in a detention school assignment, the student should be entitled to all of the procedural safeguards
discussed in this Article.
d. CorporalPunishment
The law of corporal punishment, an outgrowth of the doctrine of
in loco parentis, has not changed significantly for one hundred years.
Fortunately, the practices of schools in administering corporal punishment have not been similarly stagnant. Physical punishment of mis171
behaving students has not yet disappeared from American schools,
especially from many large urban school systems, but the dominant
thinking among educators has apparently turned away from physical
punishment." 2 In this light the unchanging nature of the legal doctrine is all the more remarkable.
The importance of determining guilt in advance of the imposition
of corporal punishment can be dramatized by looking at one of the tests
long used to determine whether the punishment is "reasonable": Was
the punishment commensurate with the offense to be corrected? '
This test assumes that some offense was committed. But the student
could most easily establish unreasonableness by proving either that he
had not engaged in the alleged conduct or that the conduct was not a
punishable offense. Similarly, courts have stated that physical punishment of a student pursuant to an invalid rule is impermissible." 4 In
either case the adjudication of the critical issue comes too late. The
170 Because of the possibility that incarceration will result from the bearing, the
analogy to It re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1968), is particularly strong. All the safeguards the Court declared available in that situation should also be afforded to a
facing transfer to a detention school.
student
17 1 See K. JAMEs, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIc ScHooLs 82-85 (1963);
J. KoZO,
supra note 7, at 9-18.
172 See K. JAMES, supra note 171, at 84. But see NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1971, at 99.
173 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
174 Berry v. Arnold School Dist., 199 Ark. 1118, 137 S.W.2d 256 (1940)
(dictum) ; see Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567 (1875) ; cf. N. EDwARDs, ttpra note 14,
at 15-17.
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result is comparable to incarcerating a man and permitting him to
disprove the allegation only after serving his sentence. A judgment
for damages is small consolation for the improper punishment.
Furthermore, no apparent justification exists .for ignoring more
civilized ways of proceeding. If the student is disrupting the classroom
or endangering others, school authorities may use reasonable force to
remove him. But deliberately inflicting physical pain is not emergency
action. This conclusion is reinforced by the existence of statutes and
school regulations prescribing requirements which must be satisfied
before imposing physical punishment. These rules cover the nature
of the striking instrument, 7 5 the method of administering the blows, 6
and the presence of another adult.1 7 1 Such rules are evidently designed to prevent excessive physical abuse and to provide the teacher
with a favorable witness; they are not designed to protect the student
from undeserved punishment. Furthermore, the existence of these
rules reveals that, whatever purpose is served by striking students, it
would not inevitably be subverted by requiring formal procedural
prerequisites.
The student's principal legal protection from unjust physical
punishment should be a prior hearing rather than a subsequent action
for damages. Corporal punishment differs from criminal punishment
only in that it has long been considered unthinkable to pillory criminals or to lock them in stocks in the public square.17 Even though the
injury to the student's education interest is not equal to that caused
by expulsion from the school system, the deprivation of liberty may,
in cases of severe corporal punishment, rise to a point at which procedural due process will entitle the student to the full range of safeguards available in expulsion proceedings.
This argument will strike many as absurd, some as outrageous. A
de minimis level exists here as elsewhere; a swat on the bottom is not
inherently harmful to either the anatomy or the psyche. Even for the
arguably de minimis swat, however, the required procedures must be
175 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 843-44 (Supp. 1970) (beating forbidden but
spanking, switching, or paddling permissible). Concerning the rules and practices
of the Boston Public Schools, see J. KozoL, supra note 7, at 9 (rattan).
176See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (1961)
(not degrading or unduly severe);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-2407 (1949) ("without undue anger") ; J. Kozor, supra
note 7, at 10 (without holding child's hand).
177 "In cases where corporal punishment is deemed necessary it shall be administered by the Chief School Officer or by the principal in the presence of another
adult." DEi.. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (Supp. 1968); accord, MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 75-2407 (1949).
178 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (use of strap held to be
cruel and unusual punishment); see Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.
1967) ; H-olt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) ; Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.

Ark. 1965).
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determined in accordance with the motives and demeanor of the punishing adult, and on the relationship before and after the punishment between him and the student. Imposing procedural requisites will
undoubtedly result in fewer instances of corporal punishment, for in
many cases the procedures will be too great a nuisance. Yet in the
end, the question must be whether this chilling effect on corporal
punishment is to be regretted-in short, whether the school has a
strong interest in administering such punishment which offsets the
student's interest in obtaining procedural protection.
e. Withdrawal of Privileges179

In Scott v. Alabama State Board of Education,'80 the student
plaintiffs alleged that, in addition to suspending them for participating
in a demonstration, state college authorities were withholding campus
jobs and the opportunity to engage in practice-teaching programs. The
court observed that "the issue of whether due process requires a hearing
before participation" in those activities could be terminated was "a
question of first impression" but found the question moot with regard
to some students and premature with regard to others.'
Eventually
the courts will have to resolve these and comparable questions concerning withdrawal of privileges as a means of punishing student misbehavior.
At the lower end of the scale of seriousness, withdrawing privileges from students to punish misconduct is comparable to imposing a
short suspension (or a good-hearted spanking). If Mary talks too
often or too loudly to Ann, the teacher may have to move Mary's
seat, and the decision to do so-isolated from any cumulative pattern
of punishment based on Mary's misconduct-must remain largely in
the teacher's control. As the duration of the deprivation or the importance of the privilege or both increase, the net effect of the punishment
will come to approximate that of expulsion. At some point procedural
protection for the student will be necessary and a hearing must be held
before further privileges are withdrawn. In some cases withdrawing a
privilege will appear to be a more serious sanction than the milder
forms of corporal punishment and will entail important future consequences comparable to those resulting from expulsion. For example,
withdrawing the privilege of playing basketball could seriously affect
a talented athlete's prospects for entering college and obtaining gainful
179 in this discussion the term "privilege" is used to mean any normal incident
of school life generally available to all students. In Kelley v. Metropolitan County
Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), the court noted that students
can be denied neither rights nor privileges without due process of law. Id. at 491-92.
180300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
181Id. at 168.
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employment." s Seriousness of the punishment is the central consideration-from either the student's or the school's perspective-in
determining which procedures must be available in a hearing preceding
imposition of the punishment. Fortunately, the concept of due process
is sufficiently flexible to be molded to the needs of the student and
the school.

f. Academic Penalties
The school must be given broad discretion with regard to all
matters of academic evaluation. The school has a legitimate claim to
expertise in this area, and the courts are ill-equipped to examine
academic judgments. These considerations do not necessarily dictate,
however, that all decisions concerning grades, promotion, and graduation are exempt from judicial inquiry.83 Courts have intervened to
prevent school boards from withholding high school diplomas' 4 or
denying promotion from one grade to another " as a sanction for disobeying a school rule. If a failing grade is given because of misconduct
rather than poor academic performance, the student should have a right
to a hearing to determine whether he is guilty of the alleged misconduct
and, if so, whether a failing grade is a reasonable sanction. At the
hearing the student might be given the heavy burden of first coming
forward with evidence that the claimed misconduct caused the grade to
be assigned. Nevertheless, the sanction of a failing grade significantly
affects the student's educational interest. Therefore, the student should
receive a procedurally sound hearing into the questions of misconduct
and the relationship between misconduct and the grade.
2. The Student's Age
Discussion of public school disciplinary practices has focused almost exclusively upon the secondary student. 6 Although no ex182 Cf. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485, 492 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968) (basketball team suspended from interscholastic competition).
183 The difficulty lies in drawing a workable line between permitting broad discretion for academic judgments and preventing schools from using the grade-giving
power to punish students. Conceptually, an arbitrary assignment of a failing grade
is a deprivation of the student's right to be free from arbitrary state action. Compare
Wright, supra note 17, at 1069-70, with Academic Freedom, supra note 146, at
1137, 1139.
1S4 See Valentine v. Independent School Dist., 191 Iowa 1100, 183 N.W. 434

(1921).
18 See Haddad v. Board of Educ., (N.J. Comm'r of Educ., Apr. 26, 1968),
upholding suspension but requiring that student be given an opportunity to take
exams and have his grades recomputed. But see Humphrey v. Adkins, 18 Ohio
App. 2d 101, 247 N.E.2d 330 (1969). See also Pittman v. Board of Educ., 56 Misc.
2d 51, 287 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rejecting challenge to demotion from
first grade to kindergarten on the ground that the child was unable to do first-grade
work.
18OSee, e.g., AMERICAN CiviL. LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEmIC FREEDOM IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1968); NATIONAL Ass'N OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINcIPALs, THE
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planations have been offered for this implicit primary-secondary school
distinction, at least two suggest themselves: serious discipline problems tend to involve older students, and a relevant difference is generally sensed between the youngest and oldest public school students.
Neither suggestion indicates that students in the primary grades do
not have substantial school-related interests capable of being seriously
affected by school discipline. In fact, the education provided during
the early school years is probably more indispensable than that provided in the later grades. Younger children have no less interest in
freedom from physical restraint than their older counterparts, and
perhaps less capacity to suffer restraints. Furthermore, younger children are arguably less hardened by experience, making the same
sanction more severe when visited upon a younger student.
In any event, the likelihood of less serious punishment should not
lead inevitably to the conclusion that different legal procedures should
result. Insofar as younger students are, in fact, disciplined only
through "minor" sanctions, the problem of dealing with younger children may be treated as a problem of dealing with minor discipline
generally. But if a second grader is to be expelled, transferred to a
detention school, or physically punished, his right to procedural protection cannot be so readily dismissed.
Even when a young student is threatened by a serious punishment,
the "feeling" persists that there is a difference, but identifying either
the proper or likely effect of this vague difference on the procedures is
difficult. Students of child development generally agree that a significant change in a child's development usually begins to be evident
at the age of ten or eleven.18 7 In gross terms, this change is revealed
in patterns of language, thought, self-control, social relations, ethical
attitudes, and physical attributes. Some or all of these characteristics
may influence judgments of what, under the circumstances, satisfies the
fundamental fairness requirement. For example, concrete rather than
abstract reasoning characterizes children in the younger age segment 8 SS
This characteristic might suggest that certain types of proceedings
would be beyond the child's comprehension and thereby of questionable
value as a "lesson in democracy." "' Consequently, in these circumstances, a simple, informal proceeding might be appropriate. The
REASONABLE ExERcIsE OF AUTHORrY (1969); Abbott, .pra
note 73; Academic
Freedom, supra note 146, passim. But see id. 1154.
187 See E. ERIKSON, supra note 143; A. GESELL & F. ILG, THE CHILD FROM FIVE
To TEN (1946); A. GESELL, F. ILG & L. AMES, YOUTH: THE YEARS FROM TEN TO
SIXTEEN (1956); J. PIAGET, SIX PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 38-60 (1967).
188 See J. PIAGET, supra note 187, at 41-48, 61-63.

189 One must be extremely careful in drawing conclusions about specifics. It
has been pointed out, for example, that Piaget's theory about capacity for abstract
reasoning has been applied to solve particular pedagogical or child-rearing problems
by others, not by Piaget himself. See D. Elkind, Editor's Introduction to J. PIAGET,
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fundamental fairness evaluation must be geared to the gradual, subtle
transitions in the individual student from kindergarten to high school
graduation, recognizing that the participation of the student's parent
will tend to neutralize the impact of the age variable.
E. The Parents' Role
A student's parents may be affected in a variety of ways by the
school's regulation and discipline of the student, all of which dictate
that the parent participate in the hearing. First, parents' interests may
be directly affected by a student's adherence to a school rule of "conduct" or by a sanction imposed against him. 9 ° For example, if a
student is required to wear a coat and tie, dressing him for school will
cost more than if a T-shirt were acceptable attire. If a student is
transferred to another school as a result of misconduct, parental expense or inconvenience is likely to result and, if the transferee school
is custodial, the impact on the parent as well as the student will be
profound. 9 ' Nonschool activities-everything from dancing class to
household chores to a part-time job-may be thwarted by either
school conduct rules or school discipline. Homework may cut heavily
into the student's time, and a student failing to satisfy homework
requirements will be subjected to informal or indirect sanctions and
may even be disciplined as for breaking other school rules.' 9 2 Furthermore, the school's regulatory and disciplinary scheme may inculcate
values inconsistent with those the parents attempt to teach the student.
For example, a parent may believe that corporal punishment is an
unacceptable method of inducing a child to obey, or that an elaborate
system of hall passes or a restrictive dress code teaches rigidity and
conformity when he is attempting to teach flexibility and individuality.
Second, a parent has an obvious claim to be involved in student
discipline proceedings based on his presumably strong interest in the
.vupra note 187, at xv-xvi. Nevertheless, it is interesting that a strong feeling of
justice is said to develop during the stage prior to the child's becoming an abstract
thinker. See id. at 56-57.
190 Some statutory rules, moreover, are directly addressed to parents. For example, the parent shall send the child to school, see, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 76,
§ 2 (Supp. 1969) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-166 (Supp. 1969), have the child vaccinated,
see, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-204 (Supp. 1970); HAWAI REv. LAws
§325-36 (1968), and appear at the school, see, e.g., MIcH. ComP. LAws ANN.
§ 340.739 (1967). In addition, a violation of school conduct regulations can lead to
an expulsion and consequently to a violation of the compulsory attendance laws by
the parent.
191 Although the primary impact is presumptively the negative effect on the
family unit, a disciplinary transfer to a detention school may have an economic impact
as well. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3214(7) (b) (McKinney 1970) (parents "able
to contribute"
may be ordered to do so by the court).
92
'1 See Balding v. State, 23 Tex. App. 172, 4 S.W. 579 (1887); cf. Magnum v.
Keith, 147 Ga. 603, 95 S.E. 1 (1918); Gentry v. Memphis Fed'n of Musicians, 177
Tenn. 506, 151 S.W.2d 1081, 1082 (1941).
But see Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss.
469, 49 So. 515 (1909) ; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 (1877).
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child's welfare. The parent may be aligned with the student simply
because of a natural emotional response, or because the school is unresponsive to community views, or because the school's rules reflect the
values of the community but the parent disagrees with those values, or
because the parent believes the school has made an improper factual
determination concerning the existence of a violation or the proper
punishment.
Third, in some situations-for instance, when parent and student
have directly and openly conflicting interests-the parent will identify
with the school rather than with the student. The parent may be
delighted to have the school enforce rules concerning dress, hair,
smoking, or homework, that he is unable or unwilling to set or enforce.
Or he may prefer to save face in the community-perhaps by acquiescing in a student's transfer to a new school-rather than resist a
charge based on possession of marijuana or pornography. Or, just as
he may be emotionally drawn to the student's side, the parent may be
so encumbered with feelings of guilt about his child's behavior that he
is unable to act in his child's best interest.
No matter how consistent the school-parent rules or approaches
to discipline, parental discipline and school discipline cannot be equated.
Somewhat similarly, it must be recognized that there is always at least
a low-level conflict between the interests of parent and student. The
parent is not the student, and it is the student who is in jeopardy of
suffering a sanction for misconduct. The possibility of and the need
to guard against parent-child conflicts of interest has been noted in
connection with juvenile court proceedings, 19 3 and the same care should
be taken in school disciplinary proceedings.
The one clear conclusion to be drawn is that the student disciplinary proceeding is at least potentially a three-party proceeding.
Because the student is more directly affected by the school's discipline,
he should always be a participant in some form. Because of the parent's
distinct interest and his potentially salutary role as mediator, the parent
also should always be a participant in his own right in some form.
And, because of the likely coincidence of parent-student interests, the
parent should participate to some extent on the student's behalf.
In narrower terms, the central question concerns the allocation
of the exercise or control of procedural rights between parent and
student. Ideally, both should have a full and independent measure of
procedural protection.'9 4 Yet cost and time will tend to dictate other193

See Paulsen, supra note 57, at 250; Skoler, supra note 104, at 572.

194See Note, Basic Rights for Juveniles in Juvenile Proceedings under the
Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules: A Response to Gault, 54 MiNr. L. REv. 335, 343

(1969); cf. In re William L., 29 App. Div. 2d 182, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968).

DUE PROCESS AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

wise; quite often dual, independent participation by parent and student
would be clumsy as well as wasteful. Besides, if the focus is one of
judging fundamental fairness as a matter of hindsight, proceedings
will rarely be found wanting for lack of unqualified double participation. Whenever a choice is appropriate to ensure an efficient and
orderly proceeding, the parent should tend to direct the exercise of
procedural rights when the accused student is in the primary grades,
and the student should tend to be in control by the time he is in high
school. In between, control should gradually shift to the student.
Whenever evidence of a conflict of interests arises, both parent and
student should be afforded independent procedural safeguards.
A proper blending of parent and student participation in a discipline proceeding is an extremely delicate matter. The suggested
roles of parent and child put forward here are not advanced as constitutional standards, but they do bear upon the application of the
constitutionally required procedural safeguards discussed in this
Article insofar as they are relevant to the process of determining
whether a particular proceeding has conformed with minimal standards
of fairness. Except for occasional instances distinguishing' the procedures available to parent and student, references in this Article to
the interest of the student--or child-should be interpreted to mean
the interest of both the student and his parent, or either.
III. DUE

PROCESS SAFEGUARDS:

A

BILL OF PARTICULARS

FOR SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CASES

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education "9' offers a convenient starting point for examining the procedural safeguards required to satisfy the demands of due process in school discipline cases.
According to Dixon, a student subject to expulsion for misconduct is
entitled to notice and a hearing at which he knows the witnesses and
evidence against him and is given an opportunity to make his own
defense-including the opportunity to produce witnesses and affidavits."9 6 In other recent school and college cases, various procedures
have been provided '9 or required. 98 When application of the due
105294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
190 See id. at 159.
197
Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala.

1969) (counsel) ; Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D.
La. 1968) (counsel, cross-examination) ; Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.
Colo. 1968) (counsel, cross-examination, transcript) ; Jones v. State Bd. of Educ.,
279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir._1969), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31 (1970) (counsel, cross-examination,
transcript).
193See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (impartial tribunal,
cross-examination); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968)
(substantial evidence); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649
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process standard is not entirely avoided, the decided cases seem to
agree that, as a minimum, due process requires notice and an opportunity for the student to be heard.
Notice implies giving the student a statement of the charge in
sufficient detail and sufficiently in advance of the hearing to enable him
to prepare a defense.' 99 What is "sufficient" for either purpose depends
The time needed depends upon such
upon the circumstances.2s°
variables as the nature of the charge, the source and kind of evidence
needed to answer it, and whether legal counsel participates on behalf
of the student. In evaluating these circumstances, the crucial determinant may be whether the court believes the student was substantially disadvantaged. In Due v. Florida Agricultural and Mechanical
University,2 ' the students were advised by telephone to appear the
morning of the hearing and notified of the charges against them only
at the beginning of the hearing. The court concluded that adequate
notice had been given because the student spoke in his own defense
at the hearing "to the point where each said he had nothing more to
say." 202 That the student is not struck dumb, however, falls short
of demonstrating that more time would not have enabled him to present
other essential evidence or to speak more effectively. The lack of
preparation time makes especially doubtful the significance of the
failure, noted by the court, of the students to request counsel or call
witnesses.
Whether the charge has been communicated to a student with
sufficient specificity will be difficult to judge. In Jones v. State Board
of Education,"3 the students argued that the evidence presented against
them at a disciplinary hearing included conduct occurring during the
summer although the notice of the proposed suspension was given in
June. Arguably, this meant that they came to the hearing prepared
only to defend against the conduct claimed to be improper as of June.
If that were the case, the notice would be of doubtful adequacy. But
the students did not claim surprise so much as a kind of technical
(W.D. Mo. 1967) (counsel); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (counsel).
1991 K. DAvis, supra note 121, at §§ 8.04-.05 (1958); W. GELLHOR & C. BYsE,
AnDMNxsTRATrvE LAW:

CASES

AND

COimENTS 837-59

(4th ed. 1960).

See

also

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
20
o See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1967) (3 days may be
insufficient); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968),
aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969) (2 days), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,

397 U.S. 31 (1970); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651
(W.D. Mo. 1967) (10 days).
201233
202

F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (indefinite suspension).

Id. at 403.

203 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
dismissed as improvideotly granted, 397 U.S. 31 (1970).
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variance. The summer conduct was related to the prior conduct and,
based on the transcript, the court said that the students "understood
fully the nature of the charges against them." 204 Yet in Hobson v.
Bailey,20' even though the charges had been read to the student and her
parents, the court found the notice defective because the record did not
reveal that the charges had been explained or understood. The minimal
test for adequacy of notice should be whether the student understood
the substance of the charge against him, rather than some more formal
criteria. The application of the test will depend upon case-by-case
judgments weighing the notice actually given against that which might
have been given, and the presentation actually made by the student
against the presentation that he claims might have been made. The
parent and student should each receive separate notice, 06 at least whenever the threatened discipline rises above a minimal threshold of
seriousness.2 07
What requiring a "hearing" means may also be elusive,"0 since
determining the content of "hearing" may scarcely differ from determining the content of "due process" itself. In its most rudimentary
form, the hearing requirement demands that the hearing body "hear"
the charged party " and implies that the party be present to "hear"
an official pronouncement concerning the charge.210 In the latter sense,
requiring a hearing suggests that knowing why one is being punished,
however correct or erroneous the grounds, is an element of fundamental
204

Id. at 199.

205 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
°206See, e.g., CowN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-234 (1957); Act of Mar. 23, 1970,
ch. 300, §2(a), [1970] Kan. Laws 884; N.Y. EDUC. LAW §3214(a) (McKinney

1970). Existing expulsion statutes more commonly require that notice be given only
to the parents (if any individuals are specified). See, e.g. ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 122,
§10-22.6(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970); Mo. REv. STAT. §0161' (1959); Wis. STAT.
ANY. §120.13(1)(c) (1970). In Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (R.D.
Ill. 1970), the court held that two-day notice to the parents was adequate. The
student's counsel argued unsuccessfully that the student had in effect received no
notice and had not been advised of her right to produce witnesses. See Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2,
Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Ill. 1970).
207 In borderline cases, determining a critical level of seriousness at which to
give notice to the parent has a built-in dilemma: giving notice to the parent may
be construed as additional punishment in itself and may result in additional punishment administered by the parent. Because of this added element, the school should
have wider latitude in deciding when to send notice home.
208 See 1 K. DAvis, vupra note 121, at § 7.01; W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, Vipra
note 199, at ch. 6.
209 See 1 K. DAvis, supra note 121, at §§ 7.01-.02.
210
A right to be present may be inferred from the Supreme Court's statement
that: "[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony--without hearing, without effective assistance
of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
554 (1966) (emphasis added). Another analogy may be found in the right of criminal
defendants to be present at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Behrens,
375 U.S. 162 (1963) ; Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892) ; Homer v. Page,
441 P.2d 473 (Crim. App. Okla. 1968).
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fairness. Thus, a student should be permitted to appear before the
disciplining body or official whenever serious sanctions may be imposed.
Dixon and the cases following it plainly assume, however, that
due process requires more than merely an opportunity to appear and
to learn the charges. A student threatened with discipline should have
a right to deny or explain the conduct upon which the charge against
him is premised."
Beyond that remain questions concerning the
form that the student's affirmative case should take, and how and by
whom it should be offered. A student is entitled to insist that a decision adverse to his interests be supported by substantial evidence.21
Fairness may require a trial-type hearing in one case,213 an "argument"
in another 214-- determined largely by what is charged and what is challenged in each case. If the student is charged with fighting, he should
be permitted to show, if such is his claim, that he did not fight or that
his involvement was provoked or merely defensive. Establishing each
of these defenses requires submitting evidence-mainly his testimony
and the testimony of others-to prove his factual contention.
When issue is joined over law or policy, the student's rights may
be more uncertain. Schools must have a broad range of freedom in
formulating the rules to regulate student conduct. Nevertheless,
students should be allowed to challenge regulations on the ground that
they violate state or federal constitutions or laws, or that they are
inconsistent with other regulations or institutional policies.2 15 For
example, a student should be allowed to challenge a rule as overly
vague.2
Law and policy determinations often depend upon the particular facts of the case. The opportunity to appeal directly to the body
given the power to exercise discretion may be important in such
211 See Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963)
(dictum);
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
2 2

1 See Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 166-70 (W.D. Mo. 1968);
Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407
F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31
(1970); Wright, supra note 17, at 1073; cf. Healy v. James, 311 F. Supp. 1275,
1281-82 (D. Conn. 1970). But see Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d
1077, 1090-92 (8th Cir. 1969) (Lay, J., dissenting).
213 See 1 K. DAvis, supra note 121, at §§ 7.01-.02, 7.04.
2 14
See FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265, 274 (1949); 1 K.
DAvis,
stpra note 121, at §§ 7.01, 7.07.
216
See Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich.
1969)2 1 6(discriminatory application of obscenity rule).
See Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.
Tex. 1969); Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala.
1969); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Wright, supra
note 17, at 1060-67; Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic
Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 290, 295 (1968). But see Jones v. State Bd. of Educ.,
279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31 (1970) ; General Order on Judicial
Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax
Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
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cases; and, at a minimum, exclusion of evidence or argument necessary
to a proper exercise of discretion denies fundamental fairness. 17
Beyond the right to notice and a hearing at which the student
may present his own case, the scope of due process protection becomes
more uncertain. I have identified for extensive treatment four
procedural safeguards--cross-examination, counsel, impartial tribunal,
and record for review.21 These safeguards play critical roles in securing a fair hearing, but they have not yet gained general acceptance as
due process requirements in college or school discipline cases. In
carrying out this analysis, the factors to be weighed in determining
whether a student has been afforded fundamental fairness are: (1) the
potential sanction; 219 (2) the procedural right claimed; (3) the procedural rights afforded other than the one claimed; (4) the benefit to
the student of having a particular right and the disadvantage of not
having it; and (5) the "burden on the proceeding" if the right is
recognized.
A. Cross-Examination
Like other safeguards claimed as a matter of procedural due
process, cross-examination is not guaranteed to all participants in all
proceedings," 0 but its fundamental importance in determining truth
has been widely recognized. Cross-examination, according to Wigmore, "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth.

.

.

. If we omit political considerations of

Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 180 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
In addition to these due process safeguards, several other procedural rights
characteristic of the criminal process have been claimed in school disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969)
(unsuccessful attempt to postpone disciplinary proceeding because testimony might be
used in criminal trial) ; Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo. 1968) (right
to remain silent) ; Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967)
(dictum) (court questions efficacy of statements included in "confession" to principal) ;
cf. People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E2d 366, 301 N.Y.S2d 479 (1969)
(challenging validity of consent to official locker search). Because school disciplinary
proceedings will probably not be labeled "criminal"--except perhaps in the rare
instance when the proceedings lead directly to the imposition of criminal sanctionsprocedural safeguards such as the privilege against self-incrimination, cf. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 43-57 (1967), trial by jury, cf. Note, supra note 135 at 112-15, and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, cf. Note, Standards of Proof and Admissibility in Juvenile
Court Proceedings, 54 Mimi. L. REv. 362, 363-78 (1969), will not be incorporated
into school discipline law. Nevertheless, these protections might be claimed in those
instances in which the sanctions flowing from disciplinary proceedings become equivalent in kind and seriousness to those administered through the criminal process.
See, e.g., N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 3214 (5) (a) (McKinney 1970) (authorizing school
authorities to commit students to detention schools).
219 Another possible variable is the alleged misconduct; Gault may be read to
suggest that juvenile proceedings differ depending on whether they arise out of
criminal or other behavior. See 387 U.S. at 13. But see Paulsen, Juvenile Courts
and the Legacy of '67, 43 Iwn. LJ. 527, 535-36 (1968). My general assumption is
that differences in the seriousness of misconduct will be reflected in differences in the
severity of the sanction, and that it is the sanction that counts.
2 20
See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); cf. Cafeteria Workers Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
217
21 8
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broader range, then cross-examination, not trial by jury, is the great
and permanent contribution of the Ango-American system of law to
improved methods of trial-procedure." "' And the Supreme Court has
"frequently emphasized that the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses is a fundamental aspect of procedural due process." ' Yet
in requiring that college expulsion hearings comply with minimal due
process standards, the Dixon court stated:
This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with
the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such a
hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless,
the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved
without encroaching upon the interests of the college.228
An evaluation of the Dixon court's reluctance to allow "full-dress"
cross-examination in expulsion proceedings requires a more careful
examination of the Dixon opinion, an accounting of other school discipline litigation, and a broader look at the constitutional dimensions
of the right to cross-examine.
1. The Dixon Rationale and Its Limits
The statement quoted from Dixon was dictum, however well considered, delivered in a decision generally regarded as achieving a
stunning breakthrough in the student discipline area. Conciliatory
assurances to prevent overreaction are foreseeable in such decisions."'
And on closer reading, Judge Rives' cautioning dictum may leave open
more than appears at first glance. Judge Rives introduced his procedural prescription with the reservation that the "nature of the hearing
should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case,"
and limited its application to the "case before us." 12 Furthermore,
throughout the quoted passage the judge used indefinite verbs such as
"might" and "may." This language prompts a number of questions:
Suppose the rudiments of an adversary proceeding cannot be preserved
:2215 J. WIGm ORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 29 (3d ed. 1940); cf. 1 K. DAVIs,
.ipra note 121, at §§7.05-.20; C. McCoRIrc, EVIDENCE §31, at 59-60 (1954);
McKay, The Right of Confrontation, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 122, 128-30.
2
= Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428 (1969); accord, Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373
U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963); Forman v. Creighton School Dist., 87 Ariz. 329, 351 P.2d
165 (1960) ; Severn v. City of Baltimore, 230 Md. 160, 186 A.2d 199 (1962) ; Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. Polito, 397 Pa. 538, 156 A.2d 99, 101 (1959).
= 294 F.2d at 159.
22 4
See Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, in JUDICIAL
REvIEw AND THE SuPEmE COURT 172 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
22294 F.2d at 158.
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without encroaching upon the college's interests? Suppose crossexamination turns out to be compatible with the college atmosphere
after all? Caution may have been urged in opening the cross-examination question simply because of the court's intuitive judgment that the
costs would outweigh the benefits. The opinion might be read to say
that a due process hearing for college discipline is not inevitably
equivalent to a full-dress judicial hearing with full-dress cross-examination. Because it admits this reading, Dixon does not present as much
of a hurdle to recognition of a cross-examination right as might at
first be assumed.
Publicity, disturbance of college activities, and detriment to educational atmosphere can be lumped together as one kind of disadvantage.
What do they amount to? First, in terms of the time and attention
of students, teachers, and administrators, cross-examination arguably
diverts too much time from the primary educational goals of the school.
As a generalization, however, that argument is unpersuasive. No
doubt adversary proceedings distract school personnel from their regular pursuits, and an uncontrolled right to cross-examine could lead to
substantially prolonged proceedings. Therefore, cross-examination
should only be permitted subject to reasonable restraints. Second,
adversary proceedings may tend to engender a spirit inconsistent with
an atmosphere of inquiry and openness, and cross-examination may
heighten this effect. But cross-examination cannot be routinely assumed to make a dramatic difference in this regard. Third, expanding
upon the previous consideration, cross-examination may create hostility
between the student and his teachers, or his fellow students.22 6 Similar
views have been reflected in some of the cases;

7 their validity can be

tested in several ways.
If it is assumed, as Dixon specified, that the student should know
the names of the witnesses 2 and the nature of the evidence against
him, animosity will probably develop out of the student's feeling that
X is "against him" or that X has betrayed a trust, has lied, or was
wrong. It is hard to believe, from the point of view of the student
226The danger of provoking hostility through cross-examination is likely to be
more significant with younger students. A court might feel that cross-examination
of school authorities or teachers by students is out of place-that the younger student
especially would be in the position to "talk back" or be disrespectful to his elders.
Pitting student against student might also be thought to generate a kind of interstudent tension that classmates in lower grades are less able to cope with than an
older student would be.
=7See Wasson v. Trowbridge 382 F 2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Zanders v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 759 (W.D. La. 1968) ; State ez rel. Sherman
v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943).
28But see Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967) (not
entitled to see confidential opinions of the faculty). In imposing this restriction, the

Wasson court may have been influenced by the military setting of the Merchant
Marine Academy.
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charged, that withholding the opportunity to confront and question the
antagonist would make him feel better; it is easy to suspect that it
would make him feel worse. Moreover, the possibility of a tensionproducing confrontation between a student and his teachers or classmates would ordinarily be reduced if the questioning were done by the
student's parent (or his lawyer) rather than by the student himself.
Particularly when expulsion might result from the proceeding, preserving the quality of relationship between the student and his teachers and
peers is an unpersuasive reason for denying cross-examination. Once
the student has been expelled, no relationship remains. Even without
cross-examination the charge against him may fail or he may ultimately
be readmitted; but these possibilities do not alter the ethical and logical
weakness of using in-school relationships as a ground for making more
difficult the student's struggle to preserve his right to attend school.
If cross-examination causes unbearable rancor, the student can usually
be transferred to another school." 9
Insofar as the danger of permitting cross-examination (or adversarial proceedings generally) lies in publicizing a possibly hostile
confrontation between a witness and the student charged, the danger
can be reduced by holding private hearings. Sometimes the student's
interest, the school's, or both will call for a public hearing, but only
rarely."' If in a particular case cross-examination seems incompatible
with a public hearing, a deliberate choice should be made between the
two, occasionally resulting in barring cross-examination. If a case is
serious enough to require a public hearing, however, it is far more
likely to call for greater rather than fewer procedural safeguards.
Perhaps the most important concern is the danger that the student or
teacher witness will be severely "attacked" with words by the crossexaminer. But the choice need not be either no cross-examination or
unrestrained cross-examination, even when the kinds of issues involved
make cross-examination vital. Interrogation may be terminated when
it becomes personally threatening to witnesses and strays from the
controlling issues. 3 Placing limits upon the scope and manner of
cross-examination would be a peculiarly appropriate way of manifesting
the flexibility of the fundamental fairness standard.
The Dixon dictum also offered impracticability as a ground for
denying cross-examination. The court might have meant simply that
time and energy expenditures would cut into other school functions;
Although transfer to a school of equal quality can be a serious sanction, it is
clearly less serious than expulsion. See text accompanying notes 164-70 sapra.
2 OSee Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D. Colo. 1968); Heyman,
Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CALiF. L. REv. 73, 79

(1966).

21 See Freidel v. Board of Regents, 296 N.Y. 347, 73 N.E.2d 545 (1947).
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but requiring cross-examination might also be regarded as impractical
because neither a college nor a public school hearing body can be relied
upon to enforce the right. The public school authorities, like their
college counterparts, have no general power to issue compulsory process.
Several courts have offered this inability as a reason for disallowing
cross-examination." 2 The subpoena power could be legislatively conferred on tribunals hearing school discipline cases, and careful consideration should be given to that possibility when establishing
tribunals to hear these cases. The absence of subpoena power does
not, however, dictate the denial of cross-examination. Witnesses will
often appear even without compulsion. 3 Although some potential
witnesses might withhold information about student misconduct rather
than "get involved" and subject themselves to cross-examination, the
risk seems worth taking in view of the seriousness of the sanctions.
A more difficult question is whether the school should be forced
to choose between excluding direct testimony and admitting it subject
to cross-examination. The federal government has, in effect, been
forced to make this choice even when both alternatives arguably endangered national security. m4 Even if great weight were allotted to
the witnesses' interest in remaining anonymous, a limitation on rather
than a bar to cross-examination should be adopted wherever possible.
The tribunal should hear the testimony (or read the affidavit) and
make a preliminary determination weighing the significance of the
testimony, the disadvantage to the student charged with misconduct
if he is not allowed to cross-examine, and the disadvantage likely to
result from permitting cross-examination. On the basis of this determination, the tribunal could exclude evidence against the student, admit
evidence but permit cross-examination (subject to appropriate limitations), or admit evidence and prohibit cross-examination.
32
See People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 210,
134 N.E.2d 635, 637 (1956) ; State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 215-16,
263 P. 433, 437, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1927).
But cf. Brown v. Macy, 222
F. Supp. 639, 641 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 340 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1965); Morrison
v. City of Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 459-60, 72 N.E. 91, 92-93 (1904). See generally
Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 382. Professor Van Alstyne has suggested that college
admission be made conditional upon the student's willingness to appear as a witness.
Yet, if testifying and subjecting oneself to cross-examination is a hardship, an implied
consent of this kind is arguably objectionable on the same ground as an implied
consent to permit the college to expel the student at will. See id. 370; Note, supra
note 31, at 1377-79. Perhaps such a limited use of the implied consent is justifiable
because of the vital importance of having cross-examination. Subject to comparable
objections, compulsory attendance laws and teacher contracts might also be used as
a technical basis for overcoming the lack of power to compel attendance of student
and teacher witnesses.
= That numerous disciplinary proceedings have been successfully conducted
makes the point rather obvious. For an interesting example of a tribunal preventing
voluntary witnesses from testifying, see Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 186 Mass.
456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904).
S4 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); id. at 510-12 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) ; McKay, =pra note 221.
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2. The Right to Cross-Examine in College and
Public School Discipline Cases
Nothing in Dixon persuasively bars cross-examination of witnesses
in student discipline hearings, and the arguments in favor of allowing
it are powerful. The only possible conclusion supported by the other
cases involving school and college expulsion is that the existence of a
right to cross-examine is still an open question. Cross-examination
has been permitted in the proceedings reported in several cases.- 5
Although these decisions do not hold that a right to cross-examination
exists,'- 6 allowing cross-examination in these instances did not result
in any notable calamity and was not criticized by the courts. In
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 37 the court order included
cross-examination among the required procedural features of a student
expulsion proceeding to be repeated on remand.- 5 In this case, the
court limited the right by making it available to the student himself
but not to his counsel, apparently intending to protect student and
teacher witnesses from a skillful lawyer. It seems doubtful that the
court made the right choice. Cross-examination will be much less
effective if conducted by a college student instead of by his lawyer;
presumably it will be an even less effective tool in the hands of a
public school student.
Although the Dixon dictum concerning cross-examination has
been repeated without question, 39 the issue has seldom been joined.
Of the few recent public school cases, only Madera v. Board of Education 40 addresses the question, and then only incidentally. In denying
the right to counsel, the court asserted that counsel would be of little
value, since cross-examination would be unavailable2 4 The court
23 5
See Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 753 (W.D.
La. 1968) ; Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D. Colo. 1968) ; Jones v. State
Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th
Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31 (1970).
236The court in Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. La. 1968), reported with seeming approval that cross-examination had been
available to its student petitioners, but it also quoted with apparent approval the
language from State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822
(1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), disapproving of cross-examination because
"honorable students do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against their

fellows .

.

.

."

281 F. Supp. at 759.

F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
238d.
at 652; accord, Healy v. James, 311 F. Supp. 1275, 1283 (D. Conn. 1970)
(cross-examination ordered for hearing to be held on petition for recognition as
campus organization).
239 See, e.g., Davis v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schools, 313 F. Supp. 1217, 1227 (E.D.
Mich. 1970) ; Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
240 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); see text
accompanying notes 83-99 supra.
237277

241386 F.2d at 788.
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simply assumed this conclusion without supporting it with reason or
precedent. Moreover, the Madera court made the questionable assumption that something less than an expulsion was involved and the
erroneous assumption that the student faced no serious loss of liberty.
In Wasson v. Trowbridge," a college expulsion case following the
misconceived Barker v. Hardway tack of treating the expulsion proceeding as investigative rather than adversarial," the court specifically stated that the student was "not entitled to see the confidential
opinions of members of the faculty."'" The court did not clarify
whether all or only some faculty opinions were to be regarded as
"confidential" and, if only some, how the confidential opinions were
to be identified.
The cross-examination issue also received attention when the
Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri issued its
general order on school disciplinary proceedings, stating:
There is no general requirement that procedural due
process in student disciplinary cases provide for legal representation, a public hearing, confrontation and cross-examation of witnesses, warnings about privileges, self-incrimination, application of principles of former or double jeopardy,
compulsory production of witnesses, or any of the remaining
features of federal criminal jurisprudence. Rare and exceptional circumstances, however, may require provision of
one or more of these features in a particular case to guarantee the fundamental concepts of fair play. 45
This order may say less than appears. "Rare and exceptional circumstances" sounds like an imposing standard, but it is impossible to
predict what interpretation it will receive. For example, the Esteban
opinion requiring cross-examination was written by one of the judges
on the bench which promulgated the general order. If strictly interpreted, the standard could not fit the flexible demands of "fundamental
concepts of fair play." Furthermore, the statement fails to differentiate
between cross-examination and other safeguards. Some of these safeguards seem much more peripheral to due process, arguably requiring
the court to draw distinctions it failed to provide. Finally, the general
order links the several procedures together as features of "federal criminal jurisprudence." Yet, as the following discussion indicates, the
right to cross-examination is not limited to criminal defendants.
242382 F2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
243

Id. at 812.

244Id. at 813.
245 General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D.

133, 147-48 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (footnote omitted).
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3. The Right to Cross-Examine in a Broader Context
Recent Supreme Court cases leave no doubt that cross-examination is regarded as a fundamental aspect of due process. At the same
time, these cases compel the conclusion that, outside the criminal area,
cross-examination is not an absolute right but depends upon a case-bycase assessment of circumstances.

In Pointer v. Texas2 4 the Supreme

Court held that a state court criminal defendant is entitled to confront
witnesses and accusers as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Although this decision, relying on the selective incorporation doctrine,
treats a situation not closely analogous to a disciplinary proceeding, it
nonetheless indicates the fundamental importance given cross-examination. The Court emphasized the unanimity of "this Court and other
courts . . . in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation

and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 247
Furthermore, the opinion linked the holding with decisions under the
due process clause (unabetted by the sixth amendment) upholding the
right of cross-examination for criminal defendants 24 and parties to
administrative procedings.24 Justices Harlan and Stewart based their
concurring opinions directly upon the due process clause without incorporating sixth amendment rights 2 50
The central importance of cross-examination in civil as well 'as
criminal proceedings was reasserted last year in Goldberg v. Kelly, 5'
and the Court responded by including it among the necessary ingredients of the constitutionally required hearing prior to termination
25
of government payments to assist families with dependent children . 2
Moreover, the Court has recognized the right to cross-examine in
administrative proceedings in which the interest at stake was no greater
than that of a student threatened with expulsion or other serious
sanction. In Willner v. Committee on Characterand Fitness, the
right was recognized in favor of a lawyer whose application for admission to the bar was denied on the basis of an unfavorable letter.
246380 U.S. 400 (1965).
247Id. at 405.

at 405 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)).
at 404-05 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)); id. at 407
(citing Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963)).
(Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 410 (Stewart, J.,
2WoSee 380 U.S. at 408
concurring).
25,397 U.S. 254 (1970).
252 "In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact,
due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."
Id. at 269.
248d.
2

491d.

=373 U.S. 96 (1963).
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The applicant was promised but never received an opportunity to confront the author and rebut his testimony before the character committee.
The Court's holding was carefully worded:
We have emphasized in recent years that procedural due
process often requires confrontation and cross-examination
of those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood.
• . . We think the need for confrontation is a necessary con-

clusion from the requirements of procedural due process in
a situation such as this. 4
A student's interest in receiving a basic education compares favorably
with a lawyer's interest in gaining admission to the state bar. Although an expulsion does not directly deprive "a person of his livelihood," it limits his opportunities by depriving him of the prerequisites
for many jobs. The lawyer, on the other hand, may still be able to
profit from his legal training in business or in other fields of employment. Although the lawyer will not be able to practice his profession
in the state of his choice, he could move to another state hoping to gain
admission to that Bar. The student, however, will be penalized
throughout the country if he fails to obtain an education. On balance,
the student suffers the more serious and lasting deprivation.
The same comparative analysis of interests also applies to Greene
v. McElroy,"' a case involving an employee discharged by his private
employer after losing his federal security clearance. To protect the
anonymity of government informers in the interest of national security,
Defense Department regulations denied the employee any opportunity
to respond to or cross-examine witnesses whose testimony supported
revoking his clearance. Without security clearance, Greene was practically disqualified from working as an aeronautical engineer. The
Court, although concluding only that the regulations were not authorized by statute, showed concern over the possibility that the statute
might be unconstitutional if given the opposite construction.
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in
our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental
action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness
of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to
prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
• . We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. . . . [This
Court] has spoken out not only in criminal cases . . . but
23Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added).
255 360

U.S. 474 (1959).

602

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.119:545

also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory
actions were under scrutiny. 5
Although Greene was a statutory rather than a constitutional decision " and although the inability to cross-examine was only one
aspect of a sweeping deprivation of due process, 2 5S the Court's decision
in that case represents a ringing endorsement of the right to crossexamine as part of "our long-accepted notions of fair procedures." 11
Not only does the student's interest in not being expelled compare
favorably with the employee's interest in not losing his security clearance, but also the school has no interest comparable to national security
to justify denying the right to cross-examine.
Comparison of the Hannah v. Larche and Jenkins v. McKeithen
decisions"0 further illustrates the importance attached by the Supreme
Court to the right to cross-examine even for a witness who is not the
focus of an adjudicatory proceeding. In Hannah the Court characterized the proceeding as investigatory, yet the potential threat to the
liberty of a witness drew a dissenting opinion from two Justices because
of the denial of cross-examination protection. In the parallel Jenkins
case, the majority believed that serious consequences to a witness followed directly enough from the proceeding to hold that the denial of
cross-examination was a denial of due process. These cases support
requiring cross-examination in expulsion proceedings, which are adjudicatory rather than investigatory, because the possible deprivation
of liberty outweighs the potential burden on the proceedings or disadvantage to the school.
4. Conclusion
A student's claim for an abstract right to a trial-type hearing with
unlimited cross-examination will probably fall on deaf ears. The claim
may be unimpressive because of the issues or evidence involved. Or
fundamental fairness may be achieved through other procedural safeguards. Affidavits may be substituted for personal testimony when the
testimony is of minor importance, peripheral to the main issues, or
repetitive of other testimony.2 8 When cross-examination is required,
256 Id. at 496 (citations omitted).
257 "We decide only that in the absence of explicit authorization from either the

President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of
his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation
and cross-examination." Id. at 508. Despite the disclaimers in the majority opinion,
Justice Harlan concurred specially because "it unnecessarily deals with the very issue
it disclaims deciding." Id. at 509.
258 Id. at 496.
25 Id. at 506-07 (footnote omitted).
260 Text accompanying notes 113-121 supra.
261 See Byse, supra note 17, at 145; Wright, supra note 17, at 1076.
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it can be tailored to protect the school's interests by holding the hearing
in private and by limiting the scope of cross-examination to prevent the
student or his lawyer from badgering witnesses. In weighing the
burden on the proceeding, the school's interest should be squarely
taken into account. Consideration should be given to the expenditure
of time and money, the possible negative effect of drying up sources of
information, and the potential for poisoning in-school relationships.
But whenever cross-examination would have been useful but was
unavailable, the proceeding should be examined with considerable
suspicion. When the student lacked the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses supplying the factual basis for the allegation, or when
certain testimony might have been vulnerable-because the witness
may have lacked direct knowledge or may have had some hostility
toward the student-the suspicion of unfairness should be strongest.
For example, when the outcome turns on the credibility of two witnesses
(possibly including the student threatened with punishment) who
supply directly conflicting testimony, cross-examination is imperative
to establishing the truth. In evaluating a claim for cross-examination,
a reviewing court or disciplinary tribunal should hesitate before placing
on the student the burden of demonstrating how denial affects his
rights. 2" This would be an unfair burden since much of the genius of
cross-examination lies in its capacity to expose latent truth unknown
by all until it surfaces. When cross-examination appears essential for
the student's protection, however, the disadvantages will ordinarily be
outweighed by the student's interest in avoiding an unnecessary deprivation of liberty. This balancing process should be undertaken in every
instance. In making the judgment for each witness and piece of
evidence, the question must always be, does fundamental fairness require that cross-examination be permitted.
B. The Right to Counsel
The right to counsel has come to receive protection at nearly all
stages of criminal proceedings."' This development extends to proceedings which, although associated with the criminal law, are administrative rather than criminal,"0 4 and to civil proceedings leading to
262
But see Brown v. Macy, 222 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 340
F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1965).
2 63
See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
264See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969) ; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See also Hyser v. Reed,
318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Reed v. Butterworth,
297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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66
The extension of the
incarceration 26 5 or other serious restrictions.
or sentencing of
conviction
right to counsel into areas not involving
a proceeding
that
criminals can be explained, in part, as a recognition
may be criminal notwithstanding a more innocuous formal charAt bottom, however, the surge toward a right to
acterization. 6
counsel in civil proceedings appears to be based upon a recognition
that fundamental rights should depend upon the existence of a serious
threat to an individual's liberty and not upon characterization of the
case as "criminal" or "civil." 26
The need in student expulsion cases for procedures that satisfy
the fundamental fairness standard is closely parallel to the need in
juvenile proceedings. Some of the sanctions imposed as a result of
college disciplinary proceedings "may involve consequences for a particular student more grave than those involved in some criminal court
proceedings." 269 And a certain compelling logic leads to Professor
Wright's conclusion that:

If "fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process" require . . . both the right to counsel
and, where it is needed, to appointed counsel in proceedings
for determination of juvenile delinquency, I do not see why
of similar rights in major
they do not require recognition
27
disciplinary proceedings.
265 See In re Harris 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968)
(civil arrest after default on payment) ; People v. Potter, 85 Ill. App. 2d 151, 228
N.F2d 238 (1967) (civil commitment as a "sexually dangerous person"); In re
James, 54 Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 29 App. Div. 2d
72, 285 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967), rev'd, 22 N.Y.2d 545, 240 N.E.2d 29, 293 N.Y.S.2d
531 (1968).
266See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970) (termination of welfare
benefits) ; United States v. Weller, 309 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (revocation
of selective service deferment), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 39 U.S.L.W.
4261 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1971) (remanded to Ninth Circuit); Cardinal v. Munyan, 30
App. Div. 2d 444, 294 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1968) (neglected child removed from parental
control) ; State v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968) (termination of parental
rights); cf. Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952) (statutory right
of dismissed public employee to a hearing). See genterally Note, The Indigent's
Right to Couinsel itCivil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
267 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
268 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) ; It re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 27-29 (1967) ; Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1028 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp.
978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
269 Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418
F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). Judge Doyle noted:
[E]xpulsion from an institution of higher learning, or suspension for a period
of time substantial enough to prevent one from obtaining academic credit for
a particular term, may well be, and often is in fact, a more severe sanction
than a monetary fine or a relatively brief confinement imposed by a court in
a criminal proceeding.
Id.
2"Wright, supra note 17, at 1075 (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967)). Professor Wright reaches this conclusion while remaining
fully conscious of the potential pitfall of drawing "analogies from criminal law or
administrative law or elsewhere." Id. 1082; see id. 1060.
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Although Professor Wright was referring to major disciplinary proceedings at the college level, the reasoning applies with equal force
to major public school disciplinary proceedings.
The appropriate question seems to be whether something about
college or school disciplinary proceedings makes a lawyer's presence
peculiarly inappropriate or unhelpful. Will denial of counsel in school
disciplinary proceedings be an example of the Supreme Court's maxim
27
that "what is unfair in one situation may be fair in another"?
Professor Wright believes that "most major universities" permit a
student to be assisted by counsel.2 7 2 The cases at both college and
public school levels are divided. After examining these cases, the
possible benefits and disadvantages of allowing counsel to participate
in school disciplinary proceedings will be assessed.
1. College and Public School Discipline Cases
As a group, school and college discipline cases since Dixon leave
the right-to-counsel question open. Representation by counsel has
been considered by several courts in determining whether particular
disciplinary hearings met the due process requirement of "fundamental
fairness," 2 7 but none of them even intimated that a right to counsel
exists2 74 Although two courts have recently held that representation
by counsel at a discipline hearing must be permitted, neither case
qualifies as solid authority for a right to counsel. In Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College, 75 two suspended college students claimed a
right to a hearing satisfying due process standards. In holding that
the students had a right to such a hearing, the court outlined the procedures to be followed by the college authorities: the student plaintiffs
were entitled
to have counsel present with them at the hearing to advise
them . . . to present their version as to the charges and to
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 487 (1960) (Frankfurter, 3., concurring).

271

Wright, supra note 17, at 1075.
Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 163, 167 (M.D. Ala.
1969) ; Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 766 (W.D. La.
1968) ; Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D. Colo. 1968) ; Jones v. State Bd.
of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (by implication), aff'd, 407 F.2d
834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31 (1970).
274
opinion
•Joes may be read as more than a mere approval of the availability of counsel in the disciplinary proceeding. The impartiality of the deciding
tribunal -was attacked by the students, and support for this attack was drawn from
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967), in which the court had
acknowledged a possible due process defect resulting from the tribunal's partiality.
In distinguishing Wasson, the Jones court pointed out that the possible absence of
impartiality was more significant in Wasso--in which the right to counsel was
denied-because the student had been denied the "full evidentiary hearing" he received
in Jones. See 279 F. Supp. at 200.
275 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),
272

273

cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
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make such showing by way of affidavits, exhibits, and witnesses as they desire . . . to hear the evidence presented

against them, and plaintiffs (not their attorney) may question at the hearing any witness who gives evidence against
them .... 276
This language leaves uncertain whether counsel's function extends to
putting in the student's version of the case. Taken literally, the court's
language permits the lawyer to be "present" to "advise" the student
who may present his own case. On the other hand, perhaps a more
reasonable inference is that the lawyer can participate in all respects
other than cross-examination, since the bar against cross-examination
by counsel was apparently a compromise between no cross-examination
and protection of student and teacher witnesses.
Goldwyn v. Allen,'77 the second case requiring that a student be
permitted to be accompanied by counsel, involved a high school senior's
request for reinstatement of her privilege to take New York's Regents
Exam (a prerequisite to obtaining a high school diploma) and elimination from her record of any references to cheating. The court granted
the petition, relying upon the Gault rationale and the seriousness of the
sanction. 278 Although the court affirmed the petitioner's right to
counsel, the narrow holding of the case was based upon withdrawal of
the examination privileges by the State Department of Education
without a hearing, contrary to state regulations. Aside from the
general discussion of Gault, the opinion does not deal with the possible
benefits or detriments of recognizing a right to counsel.1 9
The cases denying the right to counsel 0 are even more incon28' 2
8
clusive. Madera v. Board of Education,"' Wasson v. Trowbridge,

at 651-52.
Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
27.8 S
id. at 97, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 904-06.
279 In referring to the student's "confession" to the principal, the opinion noted
the relevance of fifth amendment rights in administrative proceedings, see id. at 98,
281 N.Y.S.2d at 905-06, but' disclaimed the applicability of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), and did not directly link these rights to assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, the Goldwyn decision was not appealed and thus has never been
approved by either New York's Appellate Division or Court of Appeals.
280Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1028 (1968) ; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Barker v.
Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va.), affd per curiam, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); Cosine v. Board of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d
344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966), affd miem., 27 App. Div. 2d 905, 281 N.Y.S.2d
970, motion for leave to appeal denied on ground that appeal lies as a natter of right,
19 N.Y.2d 972, 228 N.E.2d 418, 281 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1967); see General Order on
Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in
Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 147 (W.D. Mo.
1968); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
281386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
2 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
276Id.
27754
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and Barker v. Hardway283 were all influenced in various degrees by
erroneous treatment of a student discipline proceeding as an investigation."' The Madera decision was also based on two other highly
questionable conclusions: that the student's claims were premature 2 "
and that the suspended student was not directly threatened with any
significant deprivation of liberty.28 8 Both Madera and Barker relied
upon language from the Dixon opinion. Dixon, however, is of limited
value for determining whether there is a right to counsel in disciplinary
proceedings because the Dixon court did not give deliberate treatment
to the right-to-counsel question, nor was that right specifically
claimed.8
Madera and Wasson attached significance to the fact that the
educational administrators were not represented by a lawyer. The
appropriateness of this consideration seems dubious in light of Gault,
for in general no lawyer-prosecutors were present in pre-Gault juvenile
court proceedings.2 88 Of course, the presence or absence of a school
lawyer is relevant. The school will often be represented by legal
counsel, and then the student's claim to legal representation will be
stronger. Even when the school is not represented by counsel, the
student is hardly a match for the adults appearing in the proceeding.
In Madera, for instance, the student was fourteen years old. He was
accompanied by his mother, who spoke no English. He was also
permitted to have with him a representative of a social agency "to
whom the family may be known." 19 Also present at the conference
were the superintendent, her assistant, her guidance counselor, the
guidance counselor from the student's school, the principal, and the
school-court coordinator.2 9 All of these officials will not inevitably
be hostile, but only rarely will they not appear so to the student. They
are all part of the school's officialdom; they are not chosen by the
student or his parents; none of them has responsibility for representing
the student's interest against the interests of the school. Thus, the
student's defense is left to him and his parents, possibly with an assist
2S3 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 399 F2d 638 (4th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969).
2S4 See text accompanying notes 111-21 supra.
28

28

5 See text accompanying notes 83-110 supra.

See note 169 m.pra.
See 294 F.2d at 151 n.1 (setting forth plaintiffs' allegations) ; United States
v. Weller, 309 F. Supp. 50, 55 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (Dixon plaintiffs did not claim a
right to counsel), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdictiow, 39 U.S.L.W. 4261 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 1971) (remanded to Ninth Circuit).
288The absence of a "prosecuting" attorney could seriously disadvantage the
school if the student were represented by counsel. See Paulsen, supra note 57, at
259-60.
289 386 F.2d at 781.
287

290 Id.
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from a social worker, who will ordinarily not be prepared to represent
the child's interests2 9
Yet long before the right to counsel received
unqualified recognition in criminal cases, the inexperience and inability
of some defendants to defend themselves were emphasized in determining whether they had a right to counsel:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law.

.

.

. If that be

true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.2 9 The crucial question is whether, without counsel, the student is so
disadvantaged that he cannot obtain a fair hearing. 3 Although the
presence of counsel for the school makes the student's claim for legal
representation even stronger, the basic strength of that claim is not
dependent upon the presence of prosecuting counsel.
Despite denying counsel on their facts, Madera and Wasson contain some indications that the right to counsel in an expulsion proceeding would be upheld in appropriate circumstances. In Madera the
sign is faint and essentially negative--an explicit disclaimer that the
court was not facing an expulsion case." 4 In Wasson, decided by the
same panel of judges, the signs are more positive. In the first place,
the court concluded that the student was "mature and educated." 295
To the extent that this is a factor-and perhaps it explains why the
court in Madera did not rely on Wasson-it argues in favor of counsel
for public school students who are younger, less educated, and less
experienced than their college counterparts. In the second place, the
2 91

See Cook & Cook, The Lawyer and the Social Worker-Compatble Conflict,
L. REv. 410 (1963).
292 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
23 The presence of a parent will sometimes compensate for the student's disadvantage more than was apparently the case in Madera,thereby diluting the student's
claim to be represented by counsel. In fact, the parent may sometimes have a much
greater influence on the fairness of the proceeding than would a lawyer. The parent,
however, speaks for himself and does not always represent the student's interests as
12 Bu,.

a lawyer would. Thus despite parents' involvement, the student's inability to handle

his own case continues to be an important reason for permitting him the assistance
of counsel.
294 386 F.2d at 788.
The Madera decision discourages a prediction that a student's right to counsel would be recognized in an expulsion proceeding. In part the
court rested its negative conclusion on three cases denying a constitutional right to
counsel in selective service proceedings. See id. at 787. In one recent selective
service decision, however, the court recognized a right to counsel. United States v.
Weller, 309 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1969), appeal dimnissed for lack of Jurisdictio.,
39 U.S.L.W. 4261 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1971) (remanded to Ninth Circuit). Draft cases
have traditionally been compared to national security and immigration cases as examples of proceedings in which the Supreme Court has found a broad constitutional
grant of congressional power and limited protection for the adjudicating party. See
McKay, supra note 221, at 140-42. It is remarkable that these cases should have
been thought worth citing at all-evidence either of the dearth of authority for the
court's position or a limited view of the rights of students in disciplinary proceedings.
295 382 F.2d at 812.
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Wasson court explicitly adopted the balancing approach demanded by
the fundamental fairness test. Although the court did not exhaust
this approach,"9 it carefully limited the denial of counsel to those cases
in which "other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair" 297
and remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the expelled student had been afforded a sufficient
opportunity to present his case before an impartial tribunal. 9 8 Moreover, the court clearly felt that the military character of the Merchant
Marine Academy, from which the student was expelled, augmented
the government's interest and shifted the balance away from the
student 2 99
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Recognizing the
Right to Counsel
The case for counsel in school disciplinary proceedings closely
parallels the role assigned to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings by the Court in Gault:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain
whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.300
In a disciplinary proceeding, the student is likely to be charged under
the authority of a generally-worded statute or rule.30 1 To meet the
charge the student must present legal arguments concerning the reach
of that authority 2 and legal defenses to the charge. In addition,
establishing the charge against the student is likely to turn on factual
issues. Suppose the student is expelled for insubordination. Is an
expulsion on that ground authorized by statute or valid regulation?
What does insubordination mean? Is the term impermissibly vague?
2

96 See note 313 infra & accompanying text.
297382 F2d at 812.
298 Because the student failed to obtain a thorough reconsideration on remand
in Wasson, 285 F. Supp. 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), the significance of the court of
appeals decision is reduced.
299 See 382 F2d at 809-10, 812.
200 387 U.S. at 36 (footnote omitted).
301 See, e.g., HAWAII REv. LAws §298-11 (1968) ("a detriment to the morals
or discipline of any school"); IDAHEO CODE ANN. §33-205 (1963) ("an habitual
truant, or who is incorrigible, or whose conduct . . . is such as to be continuously
disruptive of school discipline, or of the instructional effectiveness of the school");
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §473(5) (1964) ("obstinately disobedient and disorderly scholar"); VA. CoDE ANN. § 22-231 (1969) ("when the welfare and efficiency
of the schools make [expulsion] necessary").
02See, e.g., Howard v. Clark, 59 Misc. 2d 327, 299 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct.
1969) (possession of hypodermic instrument off school grounds not justification for
suspension).
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Did the student do what was alleged? Lawyers are equipped to make
such arguments and test the related facts; laymen and children are
generally not. The lawyer is able to challenge the relevance of evidence offered and the basis of conclusions reached. He will be at
home in a proceeding likely to be inhibiting to the student. That
lawyers have professional standing is also valuable to the student who
faces (or feels he faces) the school establishment. The lawyer's
presence will lend moral support to the student and prevent any
abuses by the otherwise unrestrained tribunal.
The danger that a child will make admissions contrary to his
interest in the juvenile court process3 3 is also present in a disciplinary
proceeding. A lawyer can assist the student in making only wellIf the student gains a right to cross-examine,
considered statementsY
that right will be greatly diminished if it is not exercised by a lawyer.
And if cross-examination is denied, participation by a lawyer becomes
even more imperative to reveal weaknesses in hostile testimony and
to identify weaknesses in the testimony that cross-examination might
have exposed. By focusing attention on issues relevant to deciding
the case, counsel could prevent the hearing from exacerbating animosity
between the student and his teachers, administrators, or members of
the board of education."0 5 Finally, the lawyer could interpret the
proceedings for the student and his parents, and relate the student's
position to the school authorities." 6
To arrive at a balance of fairness these potential benefits must
be weighed against the burden upon the proceeding resulting from
permitting representation by counsel. Although the danger of adverse
consequences has been suggested in several opinions, the nature of the
disadvantage is almost uniformly unspecified. Acting in view of what
was characterized as "foresight of consequences," the Barker court
frankly voiced its "reluctance to grant adversary judicial status to
80 7
student disciplinary hearings" by recognizing a right to counsel.
303 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 48 (1967).

The possibility that a lawyer may advise the student to remain silent raises
an especially difficult question but does not present a valid argument for preventing
lawyers from participating. See Paulsen, supra note 57, at 262.
S05 Cf. United States v. Weller, 309 F. Supp. 50, 55 (N.D. Cal. 1969), appeal
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 39 U.S.L.W. 4261 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1971) (remanded
Circuit).
to Ninth
30 6
See Rosenheim & Skoler, The Lawyer's Role at Intake and Detention Stages
of Juvenile Court Proceedings, in CHILDREN IN THE CoURTs-TEE QURSTION 01?
The social worker might have
REPRESENTATION 380, 384 (G. Newman ed. 1967).
performed this role, but a person known to both the student and to the school
authorities to be representing the student's interests seems preferable.
307 283 F. Supp. at 237. The Barker decision is enigmatic. Although the court
purported to follow Dixon, id. at 236, and balance private and public interests, id.

at 237, it cited pre-Dixon, authority, id. at 236; refused to grant disciplinary pro-
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The Wasson court viewed counsel as unnecessary in the circumstances,"" but did not explain why presence of counsel would have
burdened the proceedings. The Madera court said that granting a
right to counsel would do little to solve the problems of such proceedings unless the other rights accorded in an adversary proceeding
were also granted, a step which would "be destructive of the original
purpose of the Guidance Conference-to provide for the future education of the child." "
Participation by a lawyer is likely to make a disciplinary hearing
more formal, more lengthy, and more expensive. The presence of a
lawyer representing the student will tend to make school authorities
feel that they should have a lawyer as well, an added expense if they
would not otherwise have retained one. By increasing the formalities
and length of the proceeding, adding counsel may increase the time
school personnel spend away from their normal activities. This increase will probably not, however, appreciably detract from their performance of their primary educational tasks. Although time and
money costs have some importance, they do not seem weighty in
comparison to the student's stake in the proceeding. In a sense an
expulsion hearing is not a diversion from but central to the school's
task of educating. If serious proceedings are relatively infrequent,
the time-and-money argument disappears. On the other hand, frequent
proceedings may signal a deeper conflict between the students and their
school, revealing a need for regular and formalized disciplinary proceedings.
Despite the strength of the cost argument, apprehension about
these burdens is not generally responsible for the courts' reluctance to
insert a right to counsel into serious disciplinary proceedings. What
troubles the courts (and probably the schools) is adversariness-at the
heart of which stands the lawyer. In short, the fear is apparently
widespread that involving a lawyer will tend to make the proceedings
contentious. When the proceeding has the sole purpose of excluding
the student from the school, however, the plea to avoid hardening
positions along adversarial lines is singularly weak, even assuming
that the exclusion is to be temporary. A student facing expulsion will
usually be sufficiently at odds with those running the school that he
will be aware of his involvement in an adversarial proceeding even
without a lawyer to convince him. Precisely because the student has
ceedings "adversary" status (contrary to Dixon, see 294 F.2d at 159); and recited
the rule denying any relief unless the student proves abuse of discretion, 283 F. Supp.
at 237-38.
309382 F.2d at 812.
309 386 F.2d at 788.
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everything to lose and because these proceedings are more adversarial
than is usually admitted, little is lost by increasing the student's ability
to help himself. The presence of counsel may even tend to defuse an
acrimonious situation.
To assume that the presence of counsel inevitably converts an
otherwise noncontentious proceeding into an ugly dispute seems unreasonableY' The Court's opinion in Gault perhaps paints too pretty
a picture of the harmonious merger of the advantages of criminal due
process and those of the informal juvenile process,"' but both kinds
of advantages can be preserved. Lawyers are not by nature indisposed
to compromise. Plea bargaining is common. Lawyers participating
in juvenile proceedings seem to have been conciliatory, perhaps to a
fault."m In school disciplinary proceedings, a lawyer is also likely to
be sensitive to the solution which will be most advantageous to his
client, because his primary concern will be to protect the student's
interests. To accomplish this purpose he cannot afford to alienate those
in whose hands the student's future rests. Even if his presence produces some unpleasant abrasiveness, that seems a small price to pay
for procedural fairness.
The potential benefits of counsel seem so indisputable that denying
the right to counsel should be presumed to disadvantage the student.
The presumption should lead to a judgment that denial of the right to
be represented by retained counsel produces an unconstitutionally
unfair hearing unless the school comes forward with an affirmative
showing that serious adverse consequences would result from counsel's
participation or that the potential advantages of legal representation
were clearly supplied through other procedural safeguards. The burden
on the school to show that the benefits of counsel have been supplied
through alternative procedures should be particularly heavy.3 13 If the
student voluntarily retains counsel, his judgment that legal aid will be
beneficial should be conclusive. When the school excludes retained
counsel, it is in a weak position to argue that the student is not prejudiced by its decision.
310 As the Supreme Court has recently stated: "Counsel can help delineate the
issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination,
and generally safeguard the interests of the recipient. We do not anticipate that this
assistance will unduly prolong or otherwise encumber the hearing." Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
31
, See 387 U.S. at 21-26.
312
See Platt & Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards it;

Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1156, 1176-81, 1183 (1968).

313 Merely observing that other procedures were available, as was done by the
Wasson court, see 382 F.2d at 812, would not adequately establish that advantages
normally deriving from representation by counsel were provided.
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3. A Right to State-Appointed Counsel?
If a student has a right to be represented by counsel, do indigent
students have a right to be represented by state-appointed counsel?
Recognition of the student's constitutional right to counsel will no
doubt be influenced by the existence of this question. A judge, seeing
no easy solution to this vexing problem, may decide to avoid ever
having to face it by denying that fundamental fairness dictates representation by counsel under the circumstances. For this reason an
analysis of the student's right to counsel must include at least tentative
consideration of this question.
An attempt to determine whether an indigent student " is entitled
to appointed counsel must initially focus on the requirements of fundamental fairness. The balance of fairness cannot be assumed to be the
same as that struck when the question is whether a student with
requisite means may be represented by his own lawyer. In terms of
the analysis developed in the preceding section, the presumption of
harm remains unchanged, but the school may be in a stronger position
to show adverse consequences to overcome that presumption.
Exclusion of retained counsel seems to elicit a stronger feeling
that the school is being unfair than does refusal to appoint counsel.
In case one, the student arrives with his lawyer and is told, "No
lawyers allowed." The student feels (as the objective observer tends
to feel) that the board of education is taking unfair advantage. In
case two, the student appears, asking for a lawyer. The board answers
that it has neither lawyers nor the funds to provide them. On the
surface, the answer is credible, manifesting no intent to gain unconscionable advantage. Requiring legal representation places financial
and administrative burdens on the school system which exceed those
resulting from permitting retained counsel to participate. Legal fees
must be paid, and an effective system for appointing and assigning
counsel must be developed. The existing organization of education,
characterized by decentralization, local autonomy, and considerable
diversity of resources, makes solving such problems difficult. Moreover, operation of an assigned counsel system would probably be more
difficult for the schools than for the criminal and juvenile courts because
schools are more removed from the legal profession. The difficulty of
recruiting lawyers would in itself pose a considerable problem, exacerbated because the pool of legal talent cannot be assumed to grow at
314

Identifying "indigent" students may present problems not immediately apparent.

For example, when a student and his parents have a conflict of interest, each has a
distinct need for legal counsel. Yet without his parent support, the student wvill
usually lack sufficient funds to hire a lawyer.
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a pace commensurate with that of the expanding right to counsel. 15
Insofar as serious disciplinary proceedings are relatively infrequent,
problems such as cost and recruitment are diminished; but the difficulty
of delivering lawyers when needed might be compounded.
Although these problems are soluble, they are sufficiently substantial to offset the presumption that the student is always disadvantaged if he lacks counsel in a serious disciplinary proceeding. Thus,
when a student claims the right to be provided counsel, a close examination of benefits and detriments will always be required to determine
whether the proceeding failed to achieve fundamental fairness.
Short of guaranteeing the right to counsel-including appointed
counsel if necessary-the Constitution may require that school authorities take reasonable steps to facilitate the student's utilization of available legal resources. This solution would still entail financial and
administrative burdens greater than those stemming from merely allowing counsel to participate. It would also present potential questions
concerning the reasonableness and good faith of the school's efforts.
On the other hand, it would save schools from becoming an appendage
of the judicial system; the primary burden of preventing injustices to
indigent students would fall on institutions better able to bear it. Legal
service programs will often be able to provide appropriate services.31
Despite difficulties in obtaining lawyers, many students would receive
legal assistance as a result of placing this affirmative duty on the school
31 7

authorities.

Following this analysis, appointed counsel would sometimes be
an essential ingredient of fundamental fairness, but an indigent student
would also sometimes receive a lower measure of procedural protection than a student financially able to retain counsel. Doubtless, a
position resulting in even occasional and minor disadvantages to poor
students is likely to be unpopular. 18 Recent constitutional decisions
315 See Paulsen, supra note 219, at 528-36; Skoler, supra note 104, at 574-76.
1See Paulsen, supra note 219, at 530; cf. Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student

Soldiers, 45 B.U.L. REv. 445 (1965).
;317 Sufficient notice is a constitutionally required prerequisite to the effective
exercise or waiver of the right to counsel for rich and poor alike. See In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967); Orcutt v. State, 173 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1969); Paulsen,
supra note 57, at 250; Skoler, supra note 104, at 571-73. See also Note, The Right
of an, Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1133 (1965). None
of the public school or college cases deals explicitly with advising the student of a
right to counsel. In Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968), however,
the court said: "We know of no legal authority that requires university officials
to advise a student involved in disciplinary proceedings of his right to remain silent
and to be provided with counsel." Id. at 287. Perhaps this statement means no
more than a disavowal of the Miranda warnings for discipline cases with an emphasis
on the self-incrimination aspects, see Wright, supra note 17, at 1077, but the context
otherwise.
indicates
31
S See Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, 374 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Paulsen, supra
note 57, at 242-43, 252-53.
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leave no doubt that even unintentional discriminations against the poor
will receive careful judicial scrutiny.31
Yet despite current trends,
the equal protection clause does not and cannot demand mathematical
equality even when fundamental interests are at stake. For example,
no one seriously suggests that indigent criminal defendants have a
right to the best lawyer money can buy. 2 ° In addition, courts have
recognized the right to retained counsel, but not to state-provided
counsel, in other contexts.3 21 It has been persuasively argued that
equal protection has taken over ground that should be occupied by
due process-without inevitably producing desirable results.'
Under
a due process standard, the rights (or resources) possessed by others
are relevant to determining what is minimally required, 23 but no rigid
rule ensues. The balancing judgment undertaken under the due process
clause should not result in gross disparities. Perhaps these points will
not halt the rolling Juggernaut of equal protection,"2 4 but they may
slow it down so that the prospective difficulty of appointed counsel
will not be used at the outset as a ground for rejecting all claims that
due process requires participation of counsel provided by the student
or his parents.
C. Impartial Tribunal
A male high school student has been suspended from school by
his principal for violating dress regulations prohibiting "extreme haircuts." A professional musician of considerable renown and success,
he wears his hair long in the fashion of certain types of performers.
As he enters a hearing before the board of education-at which he
challenges the regulation on the ground that it is unnecessary to the
operation of the school and interferes with his private life and ability
to follow his chosen profession-he spies a pair of barber's clippers
3 19

See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);

Harper v. Virginia Bd. of

Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 3, at 346-51; Equal Protection, supra note 43.
M2See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field

Findings and Legal Policy Observations, 48 MiNN. L. REv. 1, 9-14 (1964); cf.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
321 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970); Hyser v. Reed,
318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Reed v. Butterworth, 297 F2d 776 (D.C. Cir.
1961) ; Bancroft v. Board of Governors, 202 Okla. 108, 109, 210 P.2d 666, 668 (1949).
322 Michelman, supra note 3, passhn; Equal Protection, supra note 43, at 1131-32;

see Boddie v. Connecticut, 39 U.S.L.W. 4294 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1971).
323 See Gerard, The Right to Counsel on Appeal in Missouri: A Limited Inquiry

Into the Factual and Theoretical Underpinnings of Douglas v. California, 196"5
WASH. U.L.Q. 463, 481; Michelman, supra note 3, at 18.
324 Perhaps the momentum is already dissipating. See Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding maximum limits on family welfare grants not a

violation of the equal protection clause) ; Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the

Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223 (1970).
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on the table before one board member. During the hearing another
board member asks him in an insinuating manner why he did not
buy wigs of different colors. The student's challenge is rejected by
the board. Has he received a fair hearing?
In Leonard v. School Committee," the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that he had. Agreeing that the student had
a right to a hearing conducted fairly by "an impartial tribunal 'actuated
by a spirit of judicial fairness,' "26

the court stated:

We do not condone the acts of the two committee members which occurred during the plaintiff's hearing. The display of the barber's clippers reveals a regrettable lack of
appreciation for the gravity of the hearing. . . . [T]he
decorum of the hearing is not to be commended. However,
the acts complained of were perpetrated by only two members
of the committee. .

.

. [T]he plaintiff was otherwise ac-

corded ample opportunity to present his case. 32

Assuming that the student is entitled to an impartial tribunal, however,
the court's ruling seems questionable. The committee decided against
the student on a divided vote 2 8 without indicating whether the votes
of the two nonneutral members were decisive. Even if they were not,
the student is entitled to an entirely impartial tribunal. 329 Yet the evidence showed that some of the committee members were personally
antagonistic to the student or had become actively aligned with the
principal's side of the case.
Under the standard administrative law terminology adopted by
Professor Davis,"' a board member's hostility toward a student would
be termed "personal bias"-the predisposition of an adjudicating
official to decide for or against a party on the basis of considerations
irrelevant to the issues being decided. The word "personal" emphasizes that the partiality is directed for or against a party to the proceeding and probably encompasses an emotional involvement inconsistent with judicial detachment. The requirement of impartiality does
not, however, demand total abstention from holding views on matters
coming before an administrative agency. For example, in FTC v.
Cement Institute,"1 the Federal Trade Commission had made public
2349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
education is called the school committee.
326 Id. at 711, 212 N.E2d at 473.

In Massachusetts the board of

=' Id.

32 81d. at 705, 212 N.E.2d at 470.
329 Cf., e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
330 The definitions offered in this section are taken from 2 K. DAVIS .supra note
121, at §§ 12.01-.03, 13.01-.03, 13.10-.11. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 338-46;
W. GELLEORN & C. BysE, supra note 199, at 935-50 (1960).
331333 U.S. 683 (1948).
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its views concerning the legal and economic implications of a particular pricing system, and yet the Supreme Court rejected the argument that these views were disqualifying. 32 The line between the
acceptability of strong publicized positions on general issues and the
impropriety of predetermined views on particular parties or the narrow
issues of a particular controversy is a fine one. A member of a board
of education may generally advocate student neatness, but he may not
announce that a specific student has violated the dress code before the
board passes upon a charge that the student should be suspended for
lack of "good grooming."
In addition to personal bias, a basis for disqualification exists if
a member of a board of education acquires a personal stake in the
outcome of a controversy-usually termed an "interest." One form
of improper interest results from a "combination of functions" in
which the decisionmaker plays one or more roles in addition to acting
as judge. Participation as an advocate on one side gives the participant an interest in a victory by that side. The combination-offunctions doctrine embraces both the dual involvement of an individual
decisionmaker-such as a board member also actively involved in
investigating or prosecuting a violation-and the dual involvement of
an agency resulting from the activities of its members.
Convenient as the bias-interest distinction is, these categories are
to some extent artificial. The ultimate question raised by either a
bias or an interest challenge is whether the adjudicating official or
tribunal will (or did) reach a decision free of improper influences
and on the basis of the facts presented and arguments made at the
hearing. Personal bias suggests that a lack of impartiality has been
established. Improper interest suggests the presence of factors making
impartiality difficult. But disqualification under either category depends upon the strength of the evidence. Thus, a case seemingly
involving the strongest sort of hostility toward a party does not per
se demonstrate that an unfair decision will be made. The evidence
merely convinces objective observers that, in the light of experience,
the risk of an unfair decision is too great. An interest in the outcome
similarly leads to disqualification because of the likelihood of an unfair
decision. Thus, the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality is
=32 If the Commission's opinions expressed in congressionally required reports
would bar its members from acting in unfair trade proceedings, it would
appear that opinions expressed in the first basing point unfair trade proceeding would similarly disqualify them from ever passing on another .
Thus experience acquired from their work as commissioners would be a
handicap instead of an advantage. Such was not the intendment of Congress.
Id. at 702.
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of considerable importance."3 The courts often blur the distinction
between the categories to concentrate on the fundamental question of
impartiality.
Unfortunately for the student desiring a neutral tribunal to adjudicate his case, the Leonard case is probably typical in giving little encouragement for any attack based upon lack of impartiality. A strong
case must be made to establish personal bias. Combination of functions also rarely succeeds as a constitutional argument. Courts have
occasionally held that combination of functions resulted in a deprivation
of liberty or property without due process of law, but usually on the
basis of aggravated factual situations. 34 If an administrative agency
is subdivided so that different functions are performed by different
persons and the agency maintains a modicum of insulation between
these subdivisions, the agency's actions appear to be almost invulnerable to a due process attack.3" 5 That this approach predominates
today does not, however, rule out the possibility of a successful constitutional challenge."8 Not only are the Leonard court's views con37
cerning the validity of school hair regulations going out of style,
but its views concerning minimum standards of impartiality may be
similarly destined. Furthermore, because procedural due process depends primarily on the facts of each case, when the right combination
of circumstances is found, all precedent to the contrary may fall by
the way.
1. Characteristics Affecting the Impartiality of a School
Discipline Tribunal
Like most administrative agencies with any adjudicating function,
a board of education inevitably faces the problem of inconsistent funcn3 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ; Offut v. United States, 348

U.S. 11, 14 (1954); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
34 See it re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (one person acted as judgegra"djuror-accuser-witness-prosecutor); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge
received fee for convictions) ; Sandahi v. City of Des Moines, 227 Iowa 1310, 1313,
290 N.W. 697, 699 (1940) (Civil Service Commission both brought charge against
employee and heard his case).
35
See 2 K. DAvis, spra note 121, at § 13.05; W. GELLHORN & C. BysE, supra
note 199, at 1018-32.
36In a few recent instances courts have enjoined enforcement of expulsion
orders because the tribunal before which he appeared was biased or had prejudged
his case. See Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1343
(S.D. Tex. 1969) ; Perlman v. Shasta Joint Jr. College Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 873, 882-83, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563, 569-70 (Ct. App. 1970).
37See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), Breen v.
Kahil, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970) ; Griffin v.
Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Comment, Public Schools, Long Hair,
and the Constitution, 55 IowA L. REv. 707 (1970). But see Stevenson v. Board of
Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970) ; Ferell v. Dallas
Independent School Dist, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
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tions, performed either by the board members or by the school officials
and employees for whom the board is responsible. In the abstract,
combination of functions will presumably not lead to constitutional
infirmity under the due process clause, but a combination of functions
coupled with various aggravating factors may result in a proceeding
lacking in fundamental fairness. When the board performs the judging
function, the greatest threat to the fairness of the proceeding will
generally derive from the board's identification with subordinate school
personnel. If administrators or teachers perform the judging function,
the risk that the same individual will be involved in performing two
or more functions and that he will be personally interested in the
outcome increases as the locus of judgment moves from top administrators down to teachers and others closely associated with the student.
There are many possible combinations. Besides performing the
judging function, the board (or one of its members or employees)
conduct an investigation,339 premight make the formal accusation,'
sent the case against the student at the expulsion hearing, 40 or testify
against the studentY. ' In addition, the board might permit other persons, such as the superintendent or school attorney,4 who have
performed one or more of these adversary functions, to participate in
the decisionmaking. All of these possible combinations are capable
of producing an interest in the result undermining the impartiality of
judgment.
The characteristics of boards of education make them particularly
susceptible to partiality in student disciplinary proceedings. These
boards are ordinarily composed of lay citizens performing their duties
without compensation." Although they are formally considered officers of the state elected or appointed to carry out its educational
policies, 3 45 they possess broad authority to establish educational policy
for their school district.3 46 Adjudication, a common function of many
administrative agencies, is not central to their task, and board members
are likely to consider it as peripheral. In the unusual event that
338 Cf. Mackler v. Board of Educ., 16 N.J. 362, 108 A.2d 854 (1954).
339

Cf. Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 61 Cal. 2d 93, 389 P.2d 722, 37 Cal. Rptr.

194 (1964).

340 Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 309 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
341 Cf. Moran v. School Comm., 317 Mass. 591, 59 N.E.2d 279 (1945).
4

= Cf. Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 61 Cal. 2d 93, 389 P.2d 722, 37 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1964).
343 Cf. Gigger v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 23 Ill. App. 2d 433, 163
N.E.2d 541 (1959).
S44 See R. CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM & R. McPHEE, THE ORGANIZATION AND
CONTROL OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 157-87 (1965) ; H. HUNT, THE PRACTICE OF SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATION 326 (1958).
34

5 See PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION, supra note 14, at 260.

34

6 See id. 225, 228-30.
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adjudication is required, board members will probably be unprepared
by experience, training, or predisposition to exercise the disciplined
neutrality and observe the procedural regularity necessary for a fair
hearing. Furthermore, since board members receive no remuneration
for their services, they may be unenthusiastic or annoyed about the
time-consuming, "legalistic" detour from their principal concerns.
That a student's action precipitated this detour may actually decrease
the board members' interest in neutrality and an orderly, fair proceeding.
The structure and authority of the board of education may also
constitute an obstacle to impartiality in student disciplinary proceedings. Except for broad enabling legislation,3 4 the substance and
administration of student discipline is generally left to each local school
district. The specific details of the challenged rule or policy will
ordinarily be the creation of the local board or its subordinates. As
a result, the legal and factual issues involved in a student misconduct
case will often appear to entail challenges to the authority of the board
or to the teachers and administrators serving under the board.
A tendency to feel this personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding may be strengthened by the board's identification with the
persons likely to be directly involved as the student's antagonistssuperintendent, principal, or teacher. Identification with the superintendent is likely to be the most powerful,'" for the superintendent
is not only the board's appointee but also the man on whom the board
must rely to implement its policies. Unless the board is ready to
discharge the superintendent," 9 it will hesitate to undermine his position. Conversely, by upholding his position in an adjudication, they
give him a vote of confidence. Although the links are less direct, the
same instincts tend to be present when a lower-level administrator
or a teacher is involved. And regardless of the position of the charging
party, to the student and to many disinterested observers a discipline
hearing matches student against the school establishment. The sympathies of the board of education will clearly lie with the latter "party."
47
3 The legislation may be in the form of a general grant of power to establish
regulations dealing with excluding students from school, see, e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 10-233 (1967) (suspension); MONT. REv. CODE' ANN. § 75-1632(10) (1962),

or, as is most often the case, specifications for expulsion procedures or grounds for
in broad terms. See statutes cited note 301 supra.
expulsion-usually
3 45
See R. CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM & R. McPHEE, supra note 344, at 215-17,
223-24; H. HUNT, supra note 344, at 329-32; J. KOERNER, WHO CONTROLS AMERICAN
If the superintendent is a "strong" executive, he
EDUCATIOx? 127, 137-44 (1968).
will speak his mind freely and forcefully. The board or some of its members will
often have a close working relationship with him, and his position in the case gives
him an interest which may influence the board's deliberations and decision. In
addition, the superintendent communicates to the board ex parte, and thus the student
has no opportunity to respond to the superintendent's statements and arguments.
3 49
See PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION, supra note 14, at 537-38.
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Unfairness may also arise from the participation of the school's
attorney, who may both prosecute the student and advise the board
on legal issues. The board is entitled to call upon an attorney for
legal advice during or after the hearing to aid in its judging role, but
it should always attempt to consult a disinterested attorney. Any
number of these characteristics may exist to varying degrees in a
particular school discipline case. Compounding any lack of impartiality resulting from combination of functions, these characteristics
may severely jeopardize the student's chances of receiving a fair
hearing.
2. A Brief Review of the Law of Combination of Functions
The Supreme Court has decided relatively little in the area of
due process limitations upon combining functions. Yet three important
although unsurprising generalizations may be made: impartiality is a
fundamental component of due process; combining inconsistent functions may amount to an unconstitutional lack of impartiality; and
combination of functions does not automatically demonstrate failure
to afford due process.
In re Murchison,3" the central case, involved an extraordinary
procedural sequence in which the same judge conducted a secret grand
jury investigation, charged the petitioner with contempt for committing
perjury in his grand jury testimony, and subsequently tried and convicted the petitioner of contempt. The Supreme Court balked at this
extreme combination of functions.
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual
bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. ...
[N]o man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest
in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered.
. . . Having been a part of that [accusatory] process
a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused.3 51
The Court pointed out that the judge would inevitably bring forward
his impressions from the secret grand jury hearing, while the petitioner
52
could cross-examine the presiding judge only with extreme difficulty3
25o 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
351.1d. at 136-37.
352Id. at 138-39.
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Murchison involved criminal sanctions and an especially objectionable
combination of functions, but when school authorities accuse a student
of misconduct and then participate in the resulting adjudicatory hearing, the analogy is apt. Also, the language of Murchison is broad.
In more conventional contempt settings involving judge-prosecution
combinations, the Court has held that due process requires that posttrial contempt proceedings be conducted by a judge other than the one
who made the contempt charges if they arise from highly personal
aspersions.m
Balanced against Murchison is a limiting constitutional decision
in Marcello v. Bonds," involving an allegedly improper combination
of functions within the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Prior to Marcello, the Court in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath3 55
had read the newly enacted Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 356
to apply to deportation proceedings and found a violation on the
ground that the deportation hearing was conducted by an immigration
inspector performing as investigator and presiding officer. The Wong
Yang Sung Court read section 5 (c) of the APA as precluding a procedure under which hearing officers and investigators, who frequently
alternate roles, would have a strong interest in accommodating each
other. The Court's decision contained powerful constitutional overtones :
When the constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair
one, one before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness ....
It might be difficult to justify as measuring up to constitutional standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like of which has been condemned by
where less vital matters of property
Congress as unfair3 even
57
rights are at stake.
353 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 39 U.S.L.W. 4133, 4136 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971)
(No. 121). In other cases the Court has declined to set aside contempt convictions,
without discussing the constitutional argument. See Nilva v. United States, 352
U.S. 385 (1957) ; Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). In these cases the
majority opinions were based upon an interpretation of FED. P. CRIM. P. 42. The
Court held that each case was properly tried by the trial judge under the rule
although plaintiffs argued that the punishment was not designed to remedy a contempt committed in the judge's presence. In neither case did the majority discuss
the constitutional argument. In Sacher, Justices Frankfurter and Douglas dissented
on the ground that actual bias had been shown. See 343 U.S. at 14, 23, 89. When
a majority of the Court is convinced that personal bias does exist, a different result
will follow. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). In Nilva four
justices dissented, relying partially on Murchison. 352 U.S. at 396.

354349 U.S. 302 (1955).
355339 U.S. 33 (1950).
3565 U.S.C. §§551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (Supp. V, 1970).

057339 U.S. at 50-51.
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Subsequent to Wong Yang Sung, Congress exempted the Immigration
Act from the APA,"' s and the Court evidently concurred that the
"prevailing standards of impartiality" fell short of what Congress was
willing to establish for administrative agencies covered by the APA. 9
The only direct constitutional ruling following the congressional action
came in Marcello, in which the procedure rejected under the APA in
Wong Yang Sung was found acceptable. The Court said:
The contention [of a due process violation] is without substance when considered against the long-standing practice in
deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous
decisions in the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may
take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters.3 °
On its face, this statement warns that deportation is unique and that
the holding should not automatically be extended to other areas. The
Court also limited its holding by pointing out that the presiding
officer had not undertaken the functions of prosecutor and that "no
allegation" had been made "that he engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions in this or any factually related case." 61 Although
this situation differs from Murchison's judge-prosecutor, Marcello did
not leave the brave words of Wong Yang Sung untouched. Yet in
cautiously creating an exception for deportation cases, the Court did
not rescind the general principle of impartiality stated in Wong Yang
Sung and echoed in Murchison. In addition, only last term the Court
2
strongly reaffirmed this principle in Goldberg v. Kelly.3

Another aspect of this principle is illustrated by Morgan.v. United
States,36 in which the Court held it a "vital defect" for the Secretary
of Agriculture to base a decision on "findings prepared by the active
prosecutors for the Government, after an ex parte discussion with
them and without according any reasonable opportunity" 36 to the
parties to challenge these findings. In the contempt cases, the danger
was that the direct involvement of the judge would give him an
adversary's interest in the outcome, necessarily influencing his decision.
5
35
See Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, ch. 1052, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048.
359 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 580 (1955);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 500 (1952).
360 349 U.S. at 311.

361d. at 306.
362397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
363304 U.S. 1 (1937).
364Id. at 22. The Court explained the hearing requirement as embodying the
"fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due process in a
proceeding of a judicial nature."

Id. at 19.
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In the deportation cases, the danger was that a decision would be
influenced by the decisionmaker's desire to accommodate his superior
or a prosecutor with whom he alternated roles. In Morgan, the problem was that a prosecutor, clearly possessing a stake in the outcome,
would influence the decision by participating in the decisionmaking
process.
Beyond these few Supreme Court threads, the cases are voluminous and multifarious. 6 The principle of impartiality as stated in
Murchison is frequently reiterated with general agreement that combining functions creates a risk of undermining the principle 66 Yet
many cases (sometimes the same cases) hold that combining judging
with other functions does not deny a fair hearing. The decisions
justify this conclusion on a variety of grounds. The standard position,
usually claiming more support from Professor Davis' treatise than is
there,3 6 7 is that combining functions is simply not constitutionally
prohibitedY 6 s Some cases recite the standard position but also indicate
that the court has carefully examined the record to see whether the
complainant's arguments are compelling. 69 A third group of cases
contains lofty rhetoric showing concern for the petitioner's position
before a body which may lack impartiality, but nevertheless denying
relief.Y Fourth, some cases strongly suggest the existence of a broad,
controlling constitutional principle, but only remand for correction of
a narrow defect in the hearing."' Fifth, some cases prohibit combining functions because of a statutory hearing provision, but add
dictum recognizing the existence of a parallel constitutional principle.31 2
Finally, some cases hold that combining functions amounts to or contributes to a denial of due process7'
365

For exhaustive treatment of these cases, see 2 K. DAvIs, mpra note 121,

ch. 13; see 1 F. COOPER, supra note 125, at 339-43.
366

See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States ex rel. Dean, 68 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir.

1934); In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 574, 86 A.2d 430, 436 (1952) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Sharkey v. Thurston, 268 N.Y. 123, 196 N.E. 766 (1935).
367 "Even though the problem is at bottom one of procedural due process, the
courts have largely failed to provide the leadership in working out solutions."
2 K. DAvIs, supra note 121, at 248.
68 See, e.g., Pangburn v. CAB, 311 F2d 345, 356 (1st Cir. 1962); Griggs v.
Board of Trustees, 61 Cal. 2d 93, 98, 389 P2d 722, 726, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198 (1964).
369 See, e.g., Hanna v. Board of Aldermen, 54 R.I. 392, 173 A. 358 (1934).
Compare Mackler v. Board of Educ., 16 N.J. 362, 108 A.2d 854 (1954), with New
Jersey Bd. of Optometrists v. Nemitz, 21 N.J. Super. 18, 90 A.2d 740 (1952).
370 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Shockley, 52 Del. 277, 156 A.2d 214 (1959);
Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965); cf. Citta v.
Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 310-12 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (suit for reinstatement of physician's operating privileges).
371 See, e.g., State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Educ., 252 Ala. 254, 40 So. 2d 689
(1949) (refusal of witness to submit to cross-examination).
372 See, e.g., Reardon v. Dental Comm'n, 128 Conn. 116, 20 A.2d 622 (1941).
373 See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966);
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC,
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The cases condoning a combination of functions can be explained
in one of two ways: either the claim of unfairness does not impress
the court, t 4 or the court is unwilling to take the steps required to
protect the claimant from the possible unfairness because of the great
cost of doing so. The first reason is consistent with the general
approach, advocated in this Article, that fundamental fairness requires
an evaluation of a variety of factors in each particular case."
The
second suggested explanation, denying relief from combining of functions because the cost of granting it is too high, is ordinarily phrased
in terms of the rule of necessity. 7 This doctrine is conceptually
simple: A court determines that a fair hearing cannot be held without
disqualifying the judge, but disqualification appears to leave no one
else to decide; therefore, by "necessity," that judge is permitted to
decide the case. The rule of necessity is especially important because
it purports to sweep aside the disqualifying significance of every
breach in impartiality-whether based on combined functions or personal bias. Accommodating the rule of necessity to the requirements
of due process therefore deserves careful elaboration.
3. The Rule of Necessity
The first thing to notice about the rule of necessity as a response
to a due process claim is its remarkable circuitry. The circle is easily
306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 254 F2d 90
(D.C. Cir. 1958). See also Perlman v. Shasta Joint Jr. College Dist. Bd. of
Trustees, 9 Cal. App. 3d 873, 883, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563, 570 (Ct. App. 1970).
374 Challenges to the impartiality of an expulsion tribunal have been rejected in
three different college cases in part because the court was satisfied that the proceeding
was fair. In Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd,
407 F2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. disnissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31
(1970), two members of the faculty advisory committee, which recommended expulsion
to the college president, testified against the student. Although the complaint was
not rejected out of hand, the court regarded this as a "limited combination" and
was convinced that the record "demonstrated clearly" that there was no bias or
prejudice. Id. at 199, 200. The court in Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 300
F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala. 1969), concluded "with the advantage of hindsight" that
the Ad Hoe Faculty-Student Committee "appears to have dealt fairly with the
students involved." Id. at 167. The impartiality of the tribunal was challenged in
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968), because
the board's legal adviser participated as prosecutor in the hearing. Id. at 768-69.
Besides ruling that normal court standards were not controlling for the proceeding,
the court stated that no evidence "in the record" showed that counsel "exerted any
biased influence upon the Board in its consideration of the matter," and that the
student's counsel conceded the fairness of the hearing. Id. at 769.
375 Because this approach requires careful assessment of all the circumstances,
some courts have explicitly stated that the danger of unfairness resulting from a
combination of functions necessitates an especially exacting standard of review.
See Gigger v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 23 Ill.
App. 2d 433, 163 N.E.2d
541 (1959); State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Educ., 252 Ala. 254, 40 So. 2d 689
(1949); cf. In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 574, 86 A2d 430, 436 (1952); 2
K. DAvis,
supra note 121, at 181.
376
See 1 F. CooPan, supra note 125, at 348-50; 2 K. DAvis, supra note 121, at
§13.02; W. GEUHoR & C. BYsE, supra note 199, at 945-48.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

626

[Vol.119:545

drawn: The statutory framework sets up official X (and no one else)
to perform functions A (prosecution) and B (decision) ; performance
of A gives X an interest in the outcome of B; if X performs A,
therefore, his performance of B may not be impartial; but X must
perform B because no other entity is authorized to perform it. If the
rule of necessity simply means that if only a partial tribunal can decide
the question the disadvantage to a party to the proceeding is irrelevant,
then the doctrine is defective for purposes of constitutional law. When
the choice is between dismissing the charges and a deprivation of
liberty or property without due process of law, the solution is dismissal."' 7 In short, if the doctrine of necessity were read as a conclusive answer to a due process claim, it would be wrong. If, however,
the rule means only that the necessity resulting from the limitations
of the state's administrative machinery is one factor to be taken into
account, then the rule is not inherently incompatible with due process.
Under that reading of the doctrine, a balancing test including due
regard for the student's interest is required.3 8
Apart from treating the doctrine as a conclusive answer to an
individual's constitutional objection, the courts frequently apply the
rule of necessity as if it had constitutional standing itself. For example, in Board of Education v. Shockley," the court said that the rule
of necessity "compelled" the court to permit a board of education to
pass upon its own bias. "[T]he decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the highest courts in a number of states are clear
that it must sit where, as here, there is no other tribunal to decide
the matter." "8' The only Supreme Court decision cited by the Shockley court was Evans v. Gore. ' Although Evans may be a significant
rule-of-necessity case, its scope is limited and it did not deal in any
way with a denial of due process of law.
The question in Evans was whether article III of the Constitution,
providing that the compensation of the federal judiciary may not be
"diminished during their Continuance in Office," 38 prohibited application of the federal income tax to a federal judge's salary. Resolving
this question necessarily affected the members of the Supreme Court,
and this unfortunate aspect of the case was duly regretted at the outset
of Justice Van Devanter's opinion. Evidently the Court's jurisdiction
377 Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959).
378 Cf. State ex rel. Miller v. Aldridge, 212 Fla. 660, 103 So. 835 (1925).

37952 Del. 277, 156 A.2d 214 (1959).

Id. at 279, 156 A.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
381253 U.S. 245 (1920).
382U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1.
380
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went unchallenged.m Certainly the plaintiff, a federal judge, was not
challenging the Court's power to decide; he was attempting to set aside
the unfavorable judgment of the court below and wanted some court
to decide that the tax could not be collected from him. Consequently,
because the plaintiff had no occasion to invoke it and because the
federal government has no rights protected by the due process clause,
the protection of the due process clause was not involved. Moreover,
had the Court been influenced by its personal stake in the case before
it, the bias would have operated in favor of the individual litigant
and against the government. In a school discipline hearing, however,
the lack of impartiality would be likely to have an adverse effect only
upon a student whose liberty is threatened by the proceedings. Although an impartial decision is always desirable, it is most important
when individual liberty may be affected.
Finally, the Court's position as the "court of last resort" may
have influenced its decision to exercise jurisdiction in Evans despite
the existence of personal interest. In most cases in which the rule
of necessity is invoked, the conclusion is simply that the pertinent
legislative scheme left decisionmaking to the challenged tribunal and
to no other. In these cases, it is not argued that the provisions of
the state constitution-let alone the federal constitution-prevent decision by any other body. The legislature has simply not chosen to
provide an alternative. In Evans, however, only the Supreme Court
could render an authoritative decision on the constitutional question
raised. Thus, its exercise of jurisdiction was highly "necessary." 3s4
The rule of necessity is not quite a "rule" and the "necessity"
which calls it into play is relative, not absolute. Thus, reduced to
realistic stature, the rule of necessity has an important role to play
in setting the constitutional minimum of fairness required by due
process. It becomes another tool for making the complicated balancing
judgments essential to proper determinations in this area.
4. Conclusion
As part of a total balancing process, the rule of necessity suggests
two main considerations: the urgency of taking the action considered
in an expulsion proceeding, and the absence of a suitable alternative
tribunal. The urgency of making a decision to discipline would depend
383See
253 U.S. at 248.
8
4

3
The Court's opinion also suggests that it had no power to decline jurisdiction
invoked by the plaintiff under controlling law, see id. at 247-48; but this view is
offset by the Court's statement, after noting that both parties wished a decision,
that: "In this situation, the only course open to us is to consider and decide the
cause . . . ." Id. at 248.
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in turn upon a balancing of three distinct factors: the significance of
the interest affected; the degree of unfairness stemming from the
potential or actual partiality; and the importance of the purpose
achieved through the disciplinary action. The student has a strong
interest in being free from serious disciplinary sanctions. Combining
functions may constitute unfairness of relatively low order, but due to
the characteristics of a school disciplinary hearing substantial unfairness
is likely to result because combining functions will probably be accompanied by aggravating circumstances. The possibility of unfairness
will be particularly strong whenever a decision is made by subordinate
school personnel who are most likely to be personally involved in the
performance of inconsistent functions or in the controversy itself.
Presumably the purposes served by the disciplinary action are
preservation of the educational process and protection of students and
educational personnel. The urgency that action be taken, even if by
a tribunal suffering from a lack of impartiality, is proportionately
heightened as the educational goals that might be served increase in
importance. If a student threatens a teacher with a knife, expulsion
may be justified even though the tribunal lacks impartiality; at the same
time, expulsion of the student on the ground that his shoulder-length
hair causes disruption may be permissible only if the tribunal is impartial. Similarly, if the sanction employed is not reasonably calculated
to achieve important educational purposes, a decision to impose the
sanction by a biased tribunal may not conform with due process.
Finally, with respect to a breach in impartiality caused by combining
functions, the urgency of both functions must be great. However
important the purposes of adjudicating an expulsion, there is only a
weak justification for participation in the adjudication by a board
member who chooses to write a letter to the newspaper concerning the
case."
In a truly egregious instance of combining functions, the rule
of necessity ought not be accepted as a justification for acting. The
inability to discipline a particular student will not entail wholesale
frustration of the school's legitimate interests, but will simply mean
that the school's interest must yield in that instance.
The second consideration suggested by the rule of necessity justifying action by a partial decisionmaker is the absence of an impartial
one. As long as a more impartial alternative tribunal is available
under the statutory scheme, a rule-of-necessity argument should never
be permitted to justify action by the less impartial tribunal. 6 School
385 Cf. State ex re. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 209-10, 94 N.W.2d 711,

721-22
(1959).
38 6

See Smith v. Department of Registration & Educ., 412 Ill. 332, 106 N.E.2d
722 (1952), cited in I F. CooPER, supra note 125, at 350.
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discipline is administered by teachers, principals, district superintendents, superintendents, and boards of education. Given this framework, the most unqualifiedly impartial office or person should be
chosen to decide disciplinary questions. When a particular body, such
as the board of education, is expressly required to adjudicate, the
board members should avoid performing other functions in the proceeding whenever possible. Only when the statute requires board
members to perform inconsistent functions will this goal be difficult
to achieve,"' and then one or more board members might be disqualified without depriving the board of the power to act. When an
impartial tribunal would result from this disqualification, no rule-ofnecessity argument would justify action taken by the full board."' 8
The board is immune from attack for lack of neutrality if it refrains from acting in an overtly biased manner and if it insulates
decisionmaking from adversary functions such as prosecuting and investigating. Insulation could be achieved by assigning some persons
to perform the nonadjudicatory tasks and rigorously excluding these
persons from the board's decisionmaking process. If no other means
of purging a disqualifying bias were available, the board of education
could create a continuing or ad hoc committee to perform some of
the board's functions, such'as investigating or even compiling a
record."8 9 Although reserving ultimate decisionmaking power to itself,
the board could receive recommendations from this committee. As
long as creating such an independent body is possible, the board may
arguably not claim the shelter of the rule of necessity when it fails
to create a substitute. Objections will be made that this would be
an illegal delegation 9 0 or that the board has power to do only those
things expressly authorized or "necessarily implied" by statute. 91 Yet
boards of education could not function without a great variety of
employees and contractors. Expulsion statutes do not appear to require
that the board take the evidence or hear the witnesses. 39 2 Setting up
387 Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(signing brief).
388See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966);
Texaco,
Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
3 9
8 See Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 315 F. Supp. 125 (M.D. Pa. 1970);
1 F.390
CooPER, upra note 125, at 350.
See 1 F. CooPRm, supra note 125, at 92-93; PUBLIc SCHOOL OPEaATIOx, spra
note 391
14, at 231-33.
See PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION, supra note 14, at 228; N. EDWARDS, upra
note 14, at 146.
392 Connecticut's statute is representative: "The board of education of any town
may expel from school any pupil regardless of age who after a full hearing is
found guilty of conduct inimical to the best interests of the school." CoNN. GEN.
Nothing in this language requires the board to hold
STAT. AN. § 10-234 (1958).
a hearing and hear the witnesses; but official action may be taken only after the
hearing, implicitly in a manner consistent with acceptable administrative practices.
The validity of institutional decisions by bodies created through legislative dele-
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a separate agency to perform certain functions related to a disciplinary
proceeding seems to be a reasonable and orderly way of carrying out
the duty to guarantee an impartial tribunal. 93
Establishing an agency truly independent of the board will be
difficult, but even a division of responsibility clearly separating functions
within a school system would be a considerable improvement. Furthermore, creating a special agency to make the decisionmaking process
impartial would entail some disadvantages-possibly added cost and
certainly added time and formality. Consequently, the resources of the
special agency should be reserved for relatively important discipline
matters such as expulsion. 9 4 In instances involving serious sanctions,
the burden of additional time and formalization do not outweigh the
gains from greater impartiality in the decisionmaking process.
The student's strongest case challenging the impartiality of the
board of education would be presented if all of the board members
participated in both a prosecutorial and an adjudicatory capacity
although a more impartial tribunal was authorized to perform one or
both functions, and those board members revealed evidence of actual
bias at the hearing. A parallel case challenging a decision by a superintendent or a principal may be even stronger. The student's case
weakens as fewer board members participate in inconsistent capacities;
the statute expressly requires the board to perform the inconsistent
functions; the nondecisionmaking function is less adversarial; the
adversarial role is performed by a nonboard member-such as the
superintendent or board attorney-who does not participate in the
board's decisionmaking process or participates only as an advisor;
the record shows that the board conducted the hearing in a fair and
disinterested manner; and other safeguards such as cross-examination
and assistance of counsel are permitted.
gation is generally well established. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409
(1941) ; Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ; Cooper v. State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. 2d 242, 217 P.2d 630 (1950) ; 2 F. CooPER, supra
note 125, at 445-65 ; I K. DAvis, supra note 121, at ch. 2. Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), contains some ambiguous language
to the contrary, but a close reading of the opinion, id. at 651 n.1, and subsequent
action by that district court, e.g., Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D.
Mo. 1968), erases any possible suggestion that "he who hears must decide" college
discipline cases. Certainly the increasing recognition of power in boards of education
to engage in collective bargaining, see, e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A2d 482 (1951), involves more extensive limitations
upon the boards' prerogatives than the present suggestion.
393 Such a step is arguably "necessarily implied."
The school board is dutybound to determine whether to expel. Because of dual involvement as judge and
perhaps prosecutor, however, it may be unable to make an impartial determination.
If the board cannot perform its task impartially, the Constitution may prohibit it
from acting at all. Therefore, steps to insulate the board from certain types of
improper involvement may be constitutionally required to enable it to perform its
statutorily-imposed duties.
3 94

See Heyman, supra note 230, at 75-78.
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D. Review and Record
Without judicial review, the student's enjoyment of all other
rights required by due process-including the basic rights to notice,
a hearing, and to present an affirmative case-is dependent upon the
good faith, competence, and wisdom of the tribunal with primary
responsibility for the decision. Without a record, the efficacy of judicial review as a safeguard for those rights will depend upon the creative
speculation of court and counsel; and the danger of losing those rights,
through presumption of the validity of the tribunal's decision, will be
multiplied. Recognizing a parallel problem in monitoring the juvenile
process, Justice Harlan argued in his separate opinion in Gault that
"the court must maintain a written record, or its equivalent, adequate
to permit effective review on appeal or in collateral proceedings." 395r
The required record should enable the reviewing court to determine
whether the student has received adequate notice and whether the
student has had a fundamentally fair hearing, taking into account
whether certain procedural safeguards were available to him.
1. Judicial Review of School Discipline Decisions
In the past when a student wished to protest against the procedures employed at a disciplinary hearing, mandamus was frequently
assumed to be his proper remedy. 96 Mandamus, however, has often
provided rather circumscribed review of the administrative action because it has been held to apply only to ministerial (in contrast to
discretionary) acts or because the reviewed action must be upheld in
the absence of abuse of discretion.39 7 Mandamus need not, however,
be the exclusive remedy,"98 nor need it provide only narrowly restricted
095 it re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 72 (1967) (concurring opinion) ; cf. Lane v. Brown,
372 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Public Defender's discretion
to determine whether to appeal should be reviewable). The majority in Gault chose
to defer consideration of the claimed right to review and a record. 387 U.S. at 58.
Justice Harlan used the terms "record" and "review" in the broadest sense. For
the present analysis, it is unnecessary to choose between the wide variety of procedures which may be available to provide judicial review, see 3 K. DAVIS, Mpra
note 121, at 388-433; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmnNIsTRATmn AcTioz 152-196
(1965), or to identify precisely what a "record" or "its equivalent" should include,
see 1 K. DAVIS, .mpranote 121, at § 8.14. It is sufficient to state the requirement in
admittedly question-begging terms: Due process should require such review and record
as will secure a fair hearing for the student.
396 See, e.g., Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1019 (1925).
97
S See 3 K. DAVIS, swpra note 121, at §24.03; L. JAFFE, supra note 395, at

176-92.
39
SIn Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965), an
exclusion of a student from school was challenged in an action for an injunction.
The case was decided on the merits against the student, and the court expressly
disclaimed deciding whether mandamus or recovery in tort for wrongful exclusion
were the exclusive remedies. Id. at 706-08, 212 N.E.2d at 470-71. If mandamus
were regarded as being limited to informal review without a record, it would not
be an adequate remedy. See L. JAFFE, sipra note 395, at 186-87.
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Today most states have statutory provisions making

judicial review of the disciplinary decision available to the injured student."' Yet only a few of the recent challenges to the substance or
procedure of college and public school misconduct proceedings have
come through the state courts.: '

Instead, most recent suits

402

have

arisen in the federal courts under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.4 3 Even in the absence of free speech, equal protection,
or other substantive constitutional issues, the federal courts have taken
jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the procedures
utilized in imposing disciplinary sanctions.4' A claim under section
1983 is an independent action rather than review of a state or local
administrative decision," 8 but the practical effect to date has been to
provide a judicial forum for obtaining effective review of questions
arising out of public school disciplinary proceedings.40 6
If the student should choose to bring suit in state court or if
relief available under section 1983 should be curtailed by further appliS99 See Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); L. JAFFE,
supra note 395, at 176-92.
4D0See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §123-20-9(2) (1963); N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963) ; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-39-4 (1969).
401 See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E2d 468 (1965);
Cosine v. Board of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd
without opinion, 27 App. Div. 2d 905, 281 N.Y.S2d 970 (1967).
402
See, e.g. Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
403 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) ; see Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 378 n.34.
404
See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Madera v. Board
of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 386 F.2d 778 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) ; General Order on, Judicial Standards
of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported
Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 143 (W.D. Mo. 1968). Section
1983 would arguably also provide a jurisdictional basis for a state court action.
See Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1486, 1497 & n.62 (1969).
405 Compare Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.
1969), with id. at 1090 (Lay, J., concurring & dissenting). A number of questions
concerning the scope of the federal action and its relationship to state court review
remain unanswered. Is the exhaustion doctrine applicable to § 1983? See McNeese
v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d
1154, 1157 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Note, supra note 404, at 1498-1501; Comment, Exhaustion
of State Remedies uinder the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 1201 (1968).
What is the proper standard of proof or scope of review? See Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1090-92 (8th Cir. 1969) (Lay, J., concurring &
dissenting) ; Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1161-67 & n.9
(8th Cir. 1969) (Lay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969). Would a
state court decision on the constitutionality of a challenged procedure be res judicata
in a federal court action? See Vestal, Preclusion/Res .Tudicata Variables: Nature of
the Controversy, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 158, 187-88.
406See, e.g., Brown v. Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1970). But see
Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1970) (dictum) (exhaustion) ;
Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. v. Clark, 432 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1970); King-Smith
v. Aaron, 317 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (abstention) ; Rose Chalet Functions
Corp. v. Evans, 264 F. Supp. 790, 796 (D. Mass. 1967), noted in 55 GEo. L.J. 1168
(1967).
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cation of the abstention doctrine,0 7 the disciplined student might be
confronted with the frequently repeated admonition that he has no
right to judicial review of administrative decisions."' 5 Yet in the
administrative law area there are scattered suggestions that due process
may require some form of judicial determination to protect individuals
from arbitrary administrative actions. 0 9 Professor Jaffe argues that,
in some contexts, "due process may require judicial process." '0 At
common law, as he points out, reviewability of administrative action is
presumed,4 1 and as a general rule statutory review is provided either
explicitly 412 or by judicial interpretation drawing upon the common
law presumption. 413 In view of this background, the absence of clear
authority supporting a constitutional right to judicial review does not
appear to be a weighty* consideration. Most of the Supreme Court
cases denying review can be explained as invoking what the Court
apparently considered to be special considerations, 414 none of which
seem applicable to school discipline cases.'
Even those decisions
denying review as of right have ordinarily involved a question of
timing or proper procedure rather than an absolute bar to review of
the particular issues raised,41 6 and in areas in which administrative
0
oWe
note that the United States District Courts are flooded with claims
allegedly arising under the Civil Rights Act. . . . Using the federal Civil
Rights Act as a vehicle to threaten every exercise of discretion in matters
legitimately within the area of a state's competence is not the purpose of
this grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts.
King-Smith v. Aaron, 317 F. Supp. 164, 166 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
40 See 4 K. DAvis, supra note 121, at ch. 28.
409 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ; Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). But see 4 K. DAvis, a.pra 121, at 107 n24.
410 L. JAFFE, supra note 395, at 388.
411 See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REv. 401, 420 (1958) ;
cf. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 121, at 25.
412 Cf. L. JAFFE, mspra note 395, at 353.
413 See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238 (1968);
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944); Ross v. Wilson, 308 N.Y. 605, 127 N.E.2d
697 (1955); State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 199, 94 N.W.2d 711, 716
(1959) ; 4 K. DAvis, m.pra note 121, at §§ 28.01, 28.08-.16; L. JAFFE, Vtpra note 395,
at 353-63.
414
See 4 K DAvis, mpra note 121, at 32.
415 Professors Davis and Jaffe have both offered tentative explanations for this
apparently inconsistent web of decisions. See 4 K. DAvis, m.pra note 121, at 103-07
(benefit-obligation scale); L. JAFFE, mepra note 395, at 381-89 (right exists when
person is the "object of enforcement"). Perhaps focusing on the students as beneficiaries of a government program would suggest the lack of a right to review
under the Davis rationale, but in view of the importance of the educational interest,
even this conclusion is doubtful. Focusing upon the compulsory nature of the educational system and the coercive nature of all discipline would suggest that the right
does exist under the Jaffe rationale.
416 For example, although an order certifying a bargaining representative could
not be directly reviewed in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.
297 (1943), the employer could challenge the order in a refusal-to-bargain proceeding
from which he has a statutory right to review.
4
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decisions have been held unreviewable, procedural irregularity has
tended to be an exception.' 7
The importance of the juvenile court analogy for school discipline
procedures prompts recognition that the existence of a right to review
has also repeatedly been rejected in the criminal law area. The leading
case for the proposition that due process does not provide review as
4 15 General
of right from a criminal conviction is McKane v. Durston.
changes in appellate practice making the right of appeal a part of
the ever-developing concept of fundamental fairness 41 9 may, however,
have made McKane obsolete."2
Although all members of the Court
2
1
speaking in Griffin v. Illinois" repeated the McKane rule, the Court's
insistence that a transcript be provided those who could not afford
one need not be read simply as an equal protection ruling. The cases
following Griffin were influenced in part by the Court's view that
indigent defendants suffered a fundamental loss through various restrictions on their opportunity to obtain judicial review.'
Moreover,
in deferring any decision on the petitioner's claim to a transcript and
review in Gault, the Court did not cite McKane and cited Griffin only
for the cautious proposition that "this Court has not held that a State
is required by the Federal Constitution" to provide appellate review.2
Thus the statements and holdings to the contrary do not necessarily preclude recognition of a constitutional right of review under
appropriate circumstances. That due process does not require judicial
review in all cases at all stages is not inconsistent with the conclusion
that due process will often require a record and an opportunity to
appeal in school discipline cases. Because judicial review may be
constitutionally required and has generally been available, focusing on
the requirement of providing an appropriate record of the discipline
proceeding seems desirable. To place that discussion in proper perspective, however, three collateral issues must be considered.
First, what should be the impact on judicial review of previous
administrative review? If a school principal is the initial decision417

See Ellerd v. Southern P.R.R., 241 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1957); Chambers v.
Robertson, 183 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 37 (1951),
noted in 64 HARv. L. REv. 490 (1951) ; L. JAFFE, supra note 395, at 355.
418153 U.S. 684 (1894).
419 See The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 108 (1963).
42 0
See HALL, KAmISAR, LAFAVE & ISRAEL, MODERN CRIIIINAL PROCEDURE 124445 (3d ed. 1969).
421351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); id. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 27
(Burton, J., dissenting); id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
422 "Statistics show that a substantial proportion of criminal convictions are
reversed by state appellate courts. Thus to deny adequate review to the poor means
that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts would set aside." Id. at 18-19 (footnote omitted).
See The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 105-08 (1963).
2 387 U.S. at 58.
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maker, his decision might be reviewed by the superintendent or the
board of education;
or decisions of the district board of education
might be reviewed by the county board of education, 425 the state comAny review of the
missioner," 6 or the state board of education.'
original decision tends to provide additional assurance that the student
is being dealt with fairly, but the extent of the protective effect is
questionable, depending primarily upon the independence and competence of the reviewing body. The review is usually more meaningful
when performed by an agency which has no continuing contact or
institutional identification with the body being reviewed. In some
instances administrative review of local decisions by state educational
bodies has been vigorous and independent.
If the reviewing agency
is an educational body, it may be unencumbered by the courts' overly
deferential attitude toward educators' decisions. Nevertheless, intramural administrative reviews involve institutional and individual members of the educational establishment. 9 The courts, on the other
hand, have a certain detachment from the educational system. Also,
they have a particular competence for evaluating legal claims-particularly procedural claims-and a special duty to protect individual,
and especially constitutional rights. For these reasons, administrative
review is not a substitute for judicial review.
Secondly, the court's function should be to review what the educational administrative agency has done, not to grant a trial de novo.
Yet a court may purport to grant a de novo review, in which case it
will be argued that the court's hearing renders moot any departure
from due process in the disciplinary proceeding.430 For example, in
Barker v. Hardway3:' the suspended college students had refused to
appear at the disciplinary hearing without counsel. The court of
appeals said that the claimed absence of procedural due process was
rendered moot because the district court had given the students a de
424 See, e.g., HAwAn REv. LAW §298-11 (1968).
425 Cf. IowA CODE ANN. § 290.1 (1949).
42 6
See, e.g., N.Y. Euc. LAW § 310 (McKinney 1969).
427See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-27 (1969) (appeal from state commissioner to
state4 2board of education).
8 See, e.g., It; re Myers (N.Y. Commissioner of Education, July 25, 1969,
No. 8021) (short hair rule for basketball team invalid) ; In re Cossey (N.Y. Commissioner of Education, July 25, 1969, No. 8022) (short hair rule invalid); In re
Johnson (N.Y. Commissioner of Education, July 25, 1969, No. 8023) (no-slacksfor-girls
rule invalid).
42 9
See J. CONANT, SHAPING EDUcATIONAL POLICY 7, 37 (1964).
430 See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934) ; Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589, 596-98 (1931); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708-10
(1884); 1 K. DAvis, supra note 121, at § 7.10 (1958). But see Bishop v. Rowley,
165 Mass. 460, 43 N.E. 191 (1896) (when facts are in dispute, hearing must be
granted).
31 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968) (alternative holding), cert. denied 394 U.S. 905

(1969).
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novo hearing. But an examination of the district court's opinion
leaves no doubt that this view is erroneous. 3
The district court
correctly observed its duty to exercise restraint and recognize a broad
discretionary power in the college authorities. Although the district
court gave the students ample opportunity to prove that they had
been wronged, it did not in any sense relitigate the fundamental question whether the students should have been suspended. Curing administrative procedural defects through a de novo hearing seems completely
sound in principle, but a de novo hearing is unlikely to be given in
fact, 43 particularly because of the critical importance of discretion in
the school discipline area. 4
As a consequence the student, as in
Barker, receives due process from neither the disciplinary hearing nor
the judicial trial." 5
Thirdly, review based upon a record must be distinguished from
some courts' practice of issuing general guidelines for student disciplinary proceedings. In Dixon, for example, the court held that the
students could not be expelled without notice or a hearing, and then
concluded: "For the guidance of the parties in the event of further
proceedings, we state our views on the nature of the notice and hearing
required by due process .

.

.

."

"

Important as such guidelines

are, they represent a prediction of what fundamental fairness will
43 2
See 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied 394 U.S. 905 (1969).
4 See 1 K. DAvis, supra note 121, at § 7.10; cf. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 551-52 (1965). The principle of cure by de novo hearing had its origin in a
tax assessment case, Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701 (1884), and its

application has generally been limited to cases involving property interests. See,
e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) (postponement "not a
denial of due process" when "only property rights are involved"). When the issue
is the correctness of a land tax assessment, the issue is presumably determined by
the court on the basis of fresh evidence and a complete hearing.
434 See, e.g., Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Knight
v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 180 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) ; Bishop v. Rowley,
165 Mass. 460, 43 N.E. 191 (1896) ; cf. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277
F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
4-3 Suppose a student is expelled for attacking a fellow student. The student is
denied a right to be represented by counsel and to cross-examine witnesses before
the board of education but is permitted to make a statement; somewhat ambiguously,
he states that his action was taken in self-defense and was provoked. The board
of education gives no reason for its decision to expel. Assume that as a matter of
law an expulsion would not be justified if the student acted in self-defense but that
provocation is only one circumstance to be considered in determining the legality of
an expulsion. In a "de novo hearing" the court permits legal representation and
cross-examination. The student's lawyer brings out testimony that convinces the
court that the student was not attacked but was maliciously provoked, yet the
evidence is sufficiently confused by conflicting statements and questions of credibility
that a reasonable fact-finder could make the opposite determination on either point.
The court will probably not set its judgment as fact-finder against that of the board
of education. Even if it would, however, the court would not determine that the
student should not have been expelled. Furthermore, even a remand for reconsideration would be ineffective for the student unless it includes a directive that he be
permitted to have counsel and cross-examination. The student needs an opportunity
to show the most favorable facts to the body exercising discretion. This illustration
is based upon a comparable example in L. JAFFE, supra note 395, at 188.
436 294 F.2d at 158.
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require rather than a determination after the fact whether fundamental
fairness was satisfied. Such predictions may result in lower or higher
standards-lower because of a reluctance to exceed established practice
without a convincing showing of need, higher because of the absence
of the burden of a rehearing on the school.
That issuing guidelines is different from reviewing and that the
resulting standards may not be identical does not mean that guidelines
are inappropriate. On the contrary, especially during the initial stages
of giving content to the requirements of due process in disciplinary
proceedings, guidelines are highly desirable to avoid forcing school authorities to guess blindly at what is expected. Because they are issued
without the benefit of a record, however, guidelines should be announced as tentative and noncontrolling. The approach of the District
Court for the Western District of Missouri is highly commendable." 7
That district court's guidelines were issued after a rulemaking-type
hearing in which interested parties participated. 43' The resulting guidelines were not directly tied to a particular litigation and were formulated in language sufficiently broad and qualified to permit the court
to add and subtract as future circumstances might require.
2. The Requirement of a Record for Review
One pitfall in evaluating the constitutional decisions concerning
review and record is the frustrating circularity of much of the discussion. The absence of a right to review has been offered to justify
the denial of a record appropriate for review,' 9 and the absence of a
record has in turn been used to explain the refusal to review.' 4° None
of the college discipline cases has isolated the requirement of a hearing
record for explicit discussion, but several have mentioned the existence
of a transcript, apparently as a circumstance bearing favorably upon
the fairness of the hearing.4 41
A hearing record would be desirable, of course, even in the absence
of judicial review if administrative review were available. Even with
no formal review, a record of the hearing would give the student an
opportunity to identify potential errors for the school authorities, and
437 General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D.
133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
438ld. at 134.
439 See It re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 192, 407 P.2d 760, 768 (1965), rev'd, 387
U.S. 1 (1967).
440 See L. JAFFE, supra note 395, at 165-92.
441 See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968) ; Jones v. State Bd.
of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31 (1970). In Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), the court stated that "either
side" should be permitted to "make a record of the events at the hearing" at its
own expense. Id. at 652.
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they might reexamine the record for errors. Knowing that subsequent
checks may be made by the student or those acting for him, the initial
decisionmaker will make his decision more carefully in the first place.
Judicial review serves a number of related functions: ascertaining
the sufficiency of evidence; determining whether discretion was properly
exercised; seeing that the correct rule of law was applied; confining
the administrative body within its jurisdictional limits; and requiring
procedural regularity. Some form of record is necessary for the
reviewing court to know accurately what took place at the hearing.
This information could be brought before the reviewing court through
the testimony of those participating in the hearing. Although this
procedure does not necessarily require de novo review, it does entail
considerable inefficiency and a high risk of inaccuracy through lapse
in memory and self-interested distortions. It also has the disadvantage
of making witnesses of the school authorities who were the judges
at the hearing-always an awkward practice.' The ideal record would include transcripts and written opinions,
but neither is likely to be required. Rather than asking school authorities to write judicial opinions, courts will probably require no more
than a brief statement linking the factual record with the legal basis
Transcripts are expensive, and the presence of a
of decision.44
stenographer arguably adds to the formality of the hearing. Nevertheless, the right of a party to a transcript for which he is willing to
pay has been recognized in many contexts. 4" Granting this right
would place no financial burden on the school. Naturally, if a verbatim transcript is made available to those students willing to pay
for it, problems concerning the unequal treatment of indigent students
are raised. These problems are comparable to the right-to-counsel
problems,"' with some differences. On the one hand, the burden on
the school is almost exclusively financial, with no comparable problems
of organization and logistics. The cost, although significant, is likely
to be less than lawyers' fees. On the other hand, being deprived of
a transcript may be less oppressive than being without a lawyer. 4 6
In a few situations the availability of review will not automatically
require a record. For example, if it is conceded that the student re442 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
443 Cf. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir),

cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (if the hearing is not before the decisionmaker,
the "results and findings" of the hearing should be presented in a report open to
the student).
444
See 1 F. CooPER, supra note 125, at 431-32; 1 K. DAvis, supra note 121,

at §8.14.
4 45

See text accompanying notes 314-24 supra.
446 Tape recordings have been suggested as an alternative to transcripts.
Abbott, supra note 73, at 398.
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ceived no notice whatsoever of the charges on which he is being disciplined, a reviewing court might be justified in reversing on due
process grounds without looking further. Similarly, failure to permit
a student to answer charges of misconduct would conclusively establish
a lack of due process. In the majority of cases, however, a record
would be necessary for effective judicial review.
E. Recapitulation: The Interrelationship of Procedural Safeguards
in Securing a FairHearing
The thesis of this Article is that procedural safeguards are not
absolute constitutional requirements but may be required to satisfy due
process under the circumstances of particular cases. Whether a court
will decide that the denial of a specific safeguard resulted in a fundamentally unfair hearing will be influenced by the availability of other
safeguards. Thus, the case for requiring cross-examination is much
stronger when the tribunal is lacking in experience or impartiality,
since a professional, impartial tribunal may achieve some of the goals
of cross-examination. Or, a student may need cross-examination most
when he is denied legal representation, and the absence of counsel
will make it much more difficult to establish prejudice resulting from
lack of cross-examination; under these circumstances a court would
likely require and carefully peruse a hearing record to ascertain whether
the hearing was fair. Conversely, a court might determine from a
careful examination of the record that the benefits associated with
representation by counsel were supplied by other procedural safeguards.
Of course, this would require a determination that the other procedures
did compensate for the lack of counsel; mere existence of other procedures would be inadequate. Did the tribunal help the student to
present his case? Did the student develop an orderly and complete line
of questioning? If the student did not suffer by being denied counsel,
then the court would be justified in concluding that fundamental fairness
had been afforded.
If this balancing approach is adopted in the school discipline area,
the task of the reviewing court is to examine all of the relevant circumstances and then to exercise a judgment concerning the fairness
of the hearing. Performing this task necessitates a hearing record,
and hence the right to a transcript may properly be thought of as a
derivative right indispensable to the preservation of other rights. On
this theory, even the absence of all other safeguards--cross-examination, counsel, impartial tribunal-would not automatically constitute a
denial of due process. Cumulative denials of procedural safeguards
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could, however, foster skepticism on the part of the court. A skeptical
court would demand convincing evidence of fairness in the record.
As a protective device for the student's interests, the record is
both the least and the most important single safeguard. If the other
three safeguards are granted, the student has most likely received a
fair hearing; if he did not receive a fair hearing, nothing would be
more likely to reveal the deficiency to the reviewing court than an
adequate record. With an adequate record, the court might be able
to determine the effect of a hearing with no counsel or right to crossThe
examine before an improperly interested or biased tribunal."
presumption would certainly be that due process was denied under these
conditions, but the court might determine from the record that the
student did receive a fair hearing. Although none of the student
discipline cases have involved proceedings so weighted against the
student as this, courts have occasionally looked to the record and
been convinced of fairness despite substantial procedural handicaps."'
Of course, when a fair hearing has been denied, a good record cannot
supply the missing fairness.
IV. CONCLUSION

The teacher is writing on the blackboard. He hears the sound
of paper ripping and whirls to see Johnny jump back into his seat.
Upon investigation he finds that the western half of the United States
has seceded from the atlas. Confronted by the teacher's angry eyes,
Johnny flushes. "No gym for the next two weeks, Johnny." "But
...

"

"No gym for two weeks!"

A denial of due process?

Johnny had a hearing of sorts. But he did not have adequate notice,
an opportunity to present his own case, a right to cross-examine, or
representation by counsel; no record was made, and the decision was
rendered by a biased tribunal acting as investigator, prosecutor, and
judge. Due process of law makes weak demands in a case like this,
but neither because the student's liberty is unaffected nor because the
procedure afforded is particularly "fair." Due process requires relatively little in this situation because the injury is de minimis or because
requiring more would unduly burden school administrations. As this
44
7 But see Mause, Harmless Constitutiomal Error: The Implications of Chapman
v. California, 53 MiNN. L. REv. 519, 540-47 (1969); Note, Harmless Constitutional
Error:
A Reappraisal,83 HARv. L. REv. 814, 820-24 (1970).
4

8 See cases cited note 374 supra; Davis v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schools, 313 F.
Supp. 1217, 1226-27 (E.D. Mich. 1970). But see Gardner v. California, 393 U.S.
367, 369 (1969) ; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). The disadvantage of a lack of transcript for the indigent defendant's
lawyer is somewhat offset by the reviewing court's ability to look through the
transcript; this possibility would not exist, of course, if there were no transcript at all.
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vignette reminds us, the peculiar tension between what a constitutional
principle seems to demand of school authorities and what the courts
will actively enforce changes in degree and probably also in character
as the disciplinary sanction becomes less and less serious. Johnny
may have been wronged, but we do not expect him to be able to obtain
redress in court. Yet, even if the enforcing arm of the courts does not
extend to this situation, surely the shadow of constitutionally required
due process is present. Johnny's interest in a system of discipline that
meets the requirements of fundamental fairness does not depend upon
the involvement of the judiciary.
This brings me to two simple, concluding thoughts. First, the
courts will not be anxious to intervene in school discipline disputes,
especially when the threatened sanction is something other than expulsion or a long-term suspension. The possible impact of expulsion
upon a student's life is now generally regarded as sufficiently grave to
warrant judicial involvement, but the courts did not arrive at this
point without considerable apprehension and long hesitation. The
evidence to date suggests that they will be no more eager to extend
their jurisdiction beyond expulsion to lesser forms of discipline. Nevertheless, the courts will occasionally intervene when the injustice to the
student appears to be compelling and there is no tenable basis for
avoiding judicial action. It seems desirable for the courts to intervene
periodically to stimulate a regime of due process within the schoolsa state of affairs not likely to be arrived at without prompting. Second,
with a minimum of prodding from the courts, the main task of upholding fundamentally fair student discipline procedures necessarily rests
with those directly responsible for the operation of the school. This
implementation of due process by the schools must proceed with a
sensitive awareness of the student's interests and with the fullest
possible utilization of the procedures considered in this Article. Recognition of these requirements will not entail converting the schools into
a formal judicial system. Because the essence of due process is flexibility, the content and form of required procedures may be tailored to
fit the scale and informality appropriate to the circumstances of school
discipline.

